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Abstract 
  Positioned as a critique of rights-based justice, this project critically 
rethinks the American system of law by rooting its failures in its philosophical 
anthropology of atomistic individualism grounded in Locke, and recommends replacing 
that anthropology with an anthropology inspired by Franz Rosenzweig’s The Star of 
Redemption. In particular, the project explores how Rosenzweig’s “beloved soul” invites 
us to understand human individuality as open and relational, which might help pivot the 
law away from its current myopic focus on rights-based justice and the often unjust zero-
sum modality that rights-based justice produces. Rooting law in open and relational 
individuality rather than Lockean atomism and abstractions changes the goals of law, 
encouraging it to embrace complexity and devise more complicated rulings that better 
reflect the complexity of human diversity within a pluralist democracy. I argue that this 
move from zero-sum to complicated (even messy) rulings, rooted in a shift in the 
philosophical anthropology that roots our legal system, is the best and only path forward 
to increased equity for minoritized and marginalized persons and groups. 
 To illustrate the difference this shift might make, I reconsider the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling in Masterpiece Cakeshop. The rights-based approach frames and adjudicates
 iii 
the case as a question of competing rights. The outcomes within such a frame are limited. 
On the other hand, the open and relational frame of an anthropology drawn from 
Rosenzweig invites a messier, more complicated, but also more equitable and just set of 
outcomes without a winner or lose, e.g. disputants might be required to participate in a 
reconciliation conference that allows all parties to express and discuss with each other 
their different views of the conflict. In order to emphasize the importance of this kind of 
shift in our legal system, I draw on Talal Asad’s genealogical critique of the secular and 
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan’s critique of the First Amendment’ religious freedom 
guarantees. In exposing both the public square and law as only apparently secular, their 
work helps me underscore the problem posed when majority religious values and 
prejudices are exempted from application of anti-discrimination laws generally and 
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 The American legal system rests on the implicit assumption that adherence to the 
rule of law effects justice, secures religious liberty, and thereby fosters human 
flourishing. Both lawyers and non-lawyers use the legal system to resolve conflicts, 
redress harm, and even prevent loss. This is accomplished primarily through the 
individual rights advocacy model, which has in fact done much good in expanding rights 
and securing religious liberty. Despite the good accomplished through this model, 
however, both justice and human flourishing remain stubbornly elusive: too many 
individuals are unable actually to exercise their abstract rights in practice or participate as 
social or economic equals in their communities. As important as rights are to both liberty 
and equality, the exclusive focus on rights does not adequately capture the legal or social 
meaning of individuality. Only in the creative fiction of the Social Contract theory are 
individuals all free, equal, and independent, with like faculties and no natural 
subordination.1  In fact, different faculties and a variety of structures of subordination 
reduce individual freedom, perpetuate forms of dependence, and reinforce inequity. 
Indeed, the focus on individuality as rights alone in some cases actually counteracts 
liberalism’s core goals of securing both equality and liberty for all. 
 
1 Locke, Second Treatise, Chapter II and Chapter III generally. 
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This dissertation proposes that the problem is not law, or even the paradox at the heart 
of liberalism–the fact that assuring equality sometimes conflicts with liberty–but rather 
the law’s understanding of individuality. Embedded in and undergirding American legal 
theory and practice is a philosophical anthropology of individualism, based on Locke’s 
version of the social contract theory, in which independence predominates and tends 
toward abstraction. However, to be human is not simply to be an autonomous individual, 
prior to civil society as Locke proposes. Rather, to be human is to be open and relational; 
that is finite, imperfectible, particular, present, transformed and transforming, as well as 
constituted by and constituting other relationships. Even minimal flourishing, as the 
preservation of life, liberty, and property, requires law. Arguably, this is part of why 
Locke’s free, equal, and independent individual left the apparently idyllic state of nature 
to form civil society. Yet, grounded in Locke’s individual, law fails at even this most 
basic task. While law is required, law needs to be based on this broader understanding of 
individuality.  
 Positioned as a critique of rights-based justice, this project critically rethinks the 
American system of law by rooting its failures in its philosophical anthropology of 
atomistic individualism grounded in Locke, and recommends replacing that anthropology 
with an anthropology inspired by Franz Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption.2 In 
particular, the project explores how Rosenzweig’s “beloved soul” invites us to understand 
human individuality as open and relational, which might help pivot the law away from its 
current myopic focus on rights-based justice and the often unjust zero-sum modality that 
 
2 Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. Barbara E. Galli (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2005). 
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rights-based justice produces. Rooting law in open and relational individuality rather than 
Lockean atomism and abstractions changes the goals of law, encouraging it to embrace 
complexity and devise more complicated rulings that better reflect the complexity of 
human diversity within a pluralist democracy. I argue that this move from zero-sum to 
complicated (even messy) rulings, rooted in a shift in the philosophical anthropology that 
roots our legal system, is the best and only path forward to increased equity for 
minoritized and marginalized persons and groups. 
 To illustrate the difference this shift might make, I reconsider the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling in Masterpiece Cakeshop.3 The rights-based approach frames and 
adjudicates the case as a question of competing rights. The outcomes within such a frame 
are limited. On the other hand, the open and relational frame of an anthropology drawn 
from Rosenzweig invites a messier, more complicated, but also more equitable and just 
set of outcomes without a winner or loser, e.g. disputants might be required to participate 
in a reconciliation conference that allows all parties to express and discuss with each 
other their different views of the conflict. In order to emphasize the importance of this 
kind of shift in our legal system, I draw on Talal Asad’s genealogical critique of the 
secular and Winnifred Fallers Sullivan’s critique of the First Amendment’s religious 
freedom guarantees. In exposing both the public square and law as only apparently 
secular, their work helps me underscore the problem posed when majority religious 
values and prejudices are exempted from application of anti-discrimination laws 
generally and public accommodations laws specifically.  
 
3 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Human Rights Commission, 584 U.S.   (2018). 
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 While the classic secularization thesis posits the need for religion to be privatized 
in order for liberalism to take root, religion in the U.S. has always played a more 
prominent role than in European versions of liberalism. While infamously incapable of 
precise definition, protections for religious belief and practice embedded in the First 
Amendment seem to have allowed religion as well as liberalism to flourish in the U.S. 
Talal Asad and Winnifred Fallers Sullivan both argue that the reason this appears 
unremarkable is that the secular is itself a product of religion. Both agree that the secular 
and religion are intertwined. Asad focuses on the implications of this for the fiction that 
the public square is a religion-free or even religion-neutral space, while Sullivan focuses 
on the implications for apparently secular law, especially in the form of secular legal 
protections for religious belief and practice. In recent years, and particularly in the case of 
sexuality, religion has claimed a more prominent place in both political discourse and 
policy making. The consequent polarizing of both religion and politics confirms Asad’s 
claim that religion will not stay in “its place,” while also revealing the extent to which 
American Christianities are also indebted to Locke’s understanding of individuality. 
 Rosenzweig’s goal was to set out a “new thinking,” a revolutionary alternative 
philosophical system, correcting errors in Idealist German philosophy, but his work also 
lends itself to the articulation of an expanded understanding of individuality grounded in 
openness and relationality. He understood the systemic task of philosophy as the 
reconciliation of radical subjectivity and worldliness, what we might also describe as the 
“postmodern epistemic double-bind; viz., how we can make rational judgments about 
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absolutes or ‘objective’ reality with our relative and ‘subjective’ knowledge.”4  Law also 
engages this double-bind as it resolves particular disputes within the framework of 
general legal precedent. Hegel’s work purports to resolve the double-bind with the 
resolution of all flaws in the thesis and the end of history. Ultimately unpersuaded by 
Hegel’s method of reconciling this dilemma, Rosenzweig turned to theology to ground 
his radical new thinking. His turn to theology constituted a temporal as well as an 
epistemological shift from logic to experience. As re-conceived by Rosenzweig, the new 
theology, which reveals that experience is actually the condition of the possibility of 
logic, is an equal partner with the new philosophy, neither superior nor subservient to 
philosophy, each necessary in demonstrating how humans can most constructively 
engage reality, i.e., how they can flourish. This equal partnership also suggests new ways 
of thinking about how the religious constitutes the secular, structuring its relations of 
power, its inclusions and exclusions, and how religion participates in the pluralistic 
public square on equal, but not privileged terms. 
 The alternative philosophical system Rosenzweig sets out in The Star is based on 
a radical reconception of the structure of reality itself, the “All.” For Rosenzweig, the All 
is not a universal or singular abstract; instead it is a diverse, interrelational multiplicity, 
composed of three elements, or “nothings” that cannot be further reduced or conflated: 
God, World, and Man. From each of these nothings, particular somethings emerge, 
beginning the transformation that brings them into relationship with each other, while 
remaining distinct, and ultimately giving rise to reality itself. Classic accounts of reality 
 
4 F. LeRon Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2003).  
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as a universal or singular abstract, whether denominated God or World or Man, require 
explanation for how difference can arise from the singular or the particular from the 
universal.5 Rosenzweig provides a more compelling account of the originary nature of 
difference and the relationship between the subjective and the universal. Where classic 
accounts leave difference as a problem to be overcome, Rosenzweig posits difference as 
part of the very structure of reality itself. His account necessarily grounds an alternative 
understanding of humanity in which difference and relationality are also constitutive of 
the human. To be human, from this perspective, is to be a particular individual, limited 
and finite, rather than a generic or universal being. This particular human is formed 
temporally, through speech, in community, through ritual structures. 
 Grounded as it is in Locke, the law’s philosophical anthropology tends, as does 
the philosophy Rosenzweig critiques, toward problematic universals, abstractions, 
atemporality, and the pretense of a similarly pointless point of view. Looking at law 
through the lens of a philosophical anthropology based on Rosenzweig’s critique, 
therefore, supports an understanding of justice as something more than the mere 
resolution of competing rights claims. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan explicitly critiques 
law’s implicit assumptions. She argues that because Western law emerged from 
Christianity, it remains “replete with ideas and structures that find their origin in, and are 
parallel to, ideas and structures in religious traditions.”6  Western law is therefore no 
more secular, in the sense of religion-free or religion-neutral than is the secular itself, and 
 
5 Such explanations are often couched in language about the paradoxical necessity and freedom of God 
(Spinoza) or discussions of the source of evil (Shelling). 
 
6 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 153. 
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in spite of the explicit separation of Church and State in American law. Moreover, the 
law is capable of recognizing as religion only the form of religion from which law 
emerged, thus reinforcing the apparent binary of secular-religious, privileging the 
religious forms and persons the law recognizes. Thinking through the lens of the turn to 
theology in Rosenzweig, thus, also provides opportunities to confront and expose legally 
sanctioned religious privilege. This exposure may not eliminate the danger posed by 
religion, but it does provide a new basis from which to refute the demands for religious 
exemptions from anti-discrimination laws made by anti-secular religious fundamentalists 
who think they are under siege from the secular modern, when the individual rights 
advocacy model reveals itself as incapable of rejecting such claims. 
 Rosenzweig’s work provides a unique contribution in its account of the structure 
of reality itself as the foundation of a different understanding of the nature of 
individuality. Other models account for relationality, but because he locates difference in 
the very structure of reality, Rosenzweig’s work counters Locke’s view that the 
individual exists prior to and independently of civil society. Individuality is indeed 
necessary for human flourishing, however, when law is based on rights alone, social 
conflicts are reduced to mere conflicts of individual rights. This distorts the conception of 
legal harms, as well of legal solutions. From this perspective, harm is legally cognized as 
perpetrated primarily by individuals against individuals, and capable of redress through 
individual action. From this narrow perspective, law cannot even cognize, much less 
respond constructively to, systemic inequity.7  An alternative philosophical anthropology 
 
7 For example, in McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the 
death penalty was imposed in a racially discriminatory manner. However, that fact in itself did not benefit 
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that builds on Rosenzweig’s account of reality provides theoretical and practical 
alternatives to the individual rights advocacy model of law, without undoing its nominal 
gains. Justice can be understood, not simply as the resolution of claims of competing 
individual rights, and not even primarily as fairness, which requires equality, but as 
equity, as freedom to participate fully with others in civil society. 
 The hyper-individuality increasingly characteristic of U.S. culture and law is 
actually a betrayal of the coherence of the individual. Rights in the abstract are rarely 
capable of actual exercise, and the recognition of abstract rights does not guarantee their 
practical exercise, nor redress the economic injustice that so often flows from their 
denial. Rights are contextual; they are created and exercised in community. Relationships 
of relative socio-economic equity among those who are different create trust and reduce 
bias, and thus promote human flourishing. Rights as legally recognized tend to be 
abstract and rarely entail meaningful economic redress. Socrates noted that extreme 
economic disparity undermines the flourishing of the polis;8 both the Hebrew Prophets 
and modern social science verifies his insight about the connection between economic 
equity and flourishing community.9  
 Over time, by converting all legal conflicts into competing rights claims, the 
individual rights advocacy model of law ultimately undermines communal structures and 
 
the defendant, because he had not shown a specific act of individual discrimination against him. In other 
words, the Court accepted racial discrimination as normative in the system, and only actionable in 
remarkable cases.  
 
8 Plato, Republic, 420b-422. 
 
9 Authorities as diverse as Edmund Burke, Adam Smith, Roman Catholic Social Justice teachings, 
Amartya Sen & Martha Nussbaum, Wendell Berry, the World Economic Forum, local research initiatives 
and educational studies all confirm this link. 
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exacerbates economic disparity after it expands nominal equality. In his classic A Theory 
of Justice,10 John Rawls posits a natural limit to inequality, based on human self-interest, 
but cannot account for the presence of distinct ethnic or social groups. Equity has 
historically been used to reduce the harshness of the law. Traces of the separate system of 
equity, which originated “as an alternative to the harsh rules of common law and which 
were based on what was fair in a particular situation.”11  Although separate courts of 
equity no longer exist, equity is still formally included in domestic relations law, 
allowing courts to consider principles of justice as fairness that don’t fit securely within 
the legal rules. This is especially important in domestic relations law as human 
relationships do not fit the legal categories designed to deal with rights or property. A 
paradigmatic example of how equity expands the law’s capacity to foster human 
flourishing is the “best interests” standard, used by courts to resolve disputes about 
children. When divorced or never-married parents disagree on parenting time or decision-
making for their children, courts resolve the dispute by applying the standard of what is 
in the “best interests” of the children, rather than the individual rights advocacy model to 
resolve the competing rights of the parents. The best interest standard maintains 
relationships to the highest degree consistent with the children’s well-being. Equity is 
fostered where the open and relational subject thrives, and informs various possible 
alternative responses to Masterpiece. 
 
10 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Third Ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999). 
 
11 Black’s Law Dictionary, entry for Equity (emphasis added). 
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 So long as human diversity exists, conflicts will arise, even when difference is 
lived and understood as an inherent part of the All. Conflict will not be eliminated 
without eliminating difference, even if discrimination could be. Although some theorists 
and activists argue that law is a product of oppressive systems and therefore the 
elimination of law is a necessary part of the elimination of oppressive systems, my work 
takes the position that law is necessary to resolve conflict without resort to violence or 
elimination of difference; therefore, law is necessary for human flourishing. This is also 
consistent with my alternative philosophical anthropology in which openness is indicative 
of finitude and imperfectability, giving rise to an on-going need to reconsider how best to 
actualize liberalism’s goals of equality and liberty in practice. This is always at issue, but 
never more so as shifting demographics problematize normative religious assumptions 
and thus, the secular. The conflict this creates is most acute where law, religious freedom, 
and sexuality/sexual diversity intersect, as in the case of same-sex marriage and the 
question of whether religious freedom entails the right to discriminate on the basis of 
sexual orientation in ways that are otherwise illegal. 
 In 2015, the United States Supreme Court found in Obergefell v. Hodges12 that a 
legal right to civil same-sex marriage existed, enforceable in all states.  Along with their 
extremely high view of marriage, the majority in Obergefell expressed unprecedented 
solicitude for opponents of same-sex marriage. Even prior to Obergefell, as states began 
to legalize same-sex marriage, some religious purveyors of wedding goods and services 
had begun to claim that the Constitution’s guarantee of religious freedom allowed them 
 
12 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.   (2015). 
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to refuse their goods and services for same-sex weddings. Thus, it seemed almost 
inevitable that following Obergefell these claims would be presented with new urgency 
until one reached the Supreme Court, seeking a definitive answer to the question of 
whether the law permits religious exemptions. The case that ultimately did come before 
the Court, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Human Rights Commission began before 
Obergefell, and before same-sex marriage was legal in Colorado. The presenting legal 
question was one of public access, whether commercial vendors (of wedding goods and 
services) may discriminate against customers in violation of generally applicable laws, 
when their motivation to do so is religious. This precise question was ostensibly 
answered negatively in 1968 when the Court dismissed as “patently frivolous” the 
defendants’ claim of a right to discriminate on the basis of race in violation of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 because of their religious belief that the Act “contravenes the will of 
God.”13  In Masterpiece, however, the Court revisited the issue in Piggie Park, this time 
as the question of a conflict between the right to religious freedom and the right to same-
sex marriage, and the justices who dissented in Obergefell continued to angrily reject the 
contention that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is the equivalent of 
discrimination on the basis of race. This shift is not surprising, as the exclusive legal 
focus on rights necessarily re-frames disputes over communal obligations as conflicts of 
rights. It may also be unresolvable in our current context.14  
 
13 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), footnote 5. 
 
14 Since the Court issued its decision in Masterpiece, it has declined to reconsider several similar 
claims denied by state courts. In at least one case, the Court remanded the case to the lower court with 
instructions to reconsider their decision in light of the ruling in Masterpiece. Legal commentators argue 
that the only logical meaning this direction can have, given the non-opinion in Masterpiece, is that the 
lower courts should examine the record to assure that the religious claims were not viewed with hostility. 
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 Masterpiece is suited in unique and important ways to demonstrating how the 
individual rights model of advocacy fails in its broader task. In failing to make a 
substantive decision, the Court thereby exacerbated the problem of public access and 
religious freedom, while also failing to address the ultimate concerns of religious 
individuals.15 The decision thus provides the perfect, timely vehicle to imagine how an 
open and relational philosophical anthropology grounded in Rosenzweig’s construction 
of reality as an irreducibly diverse multiplicity might defuse anti-liberal religious 
fundamentalisms at the intersection of law, religion, and sexuality, especially by making 
space for compassion as the result of a shift from an epistemology of logic to one of 
experience. 
Chapter descriptions 
 I begin Chapter One: Religion and Law in the Public Square, with an orientation 
to locate the dissertation within the tradition of critiques of liberalism’s atomistic 
individualism, using 1) Asad’s critique of the secularization thesis, especially his 
description of the legal subject and its capacity for agency; and 2) Sullivan’s critique of 
law as not really secular; and 3) Locke’s version of the Social Contract theory, especially 
its premise that individuality precedes civil society. I will also explain my use of Locke to 
think through the Obergefell dissents, in order to set stage for the introduction of 
 
Doing so continues to leave open the substantive question whether discrimination in public 
accommodations is permitted when the basis of the discrimination is religious belief. 
 
15 The owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop (Phillips) has continued to refuse to sell his baked goods to 
customers on the basis of their sexual orientation in violation of the public accommodations law. Although 
Phillips’ lawyers hailed the decision as a victory for Phillips, a majority of the Court did not rule that he has 
a right to discriminate, only that he has a right to neutrality by the agency that decides his claim and that the 
Colorado HRC expressed hostility. 
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Masterpiece. Through a review of the major threads of traditional legal analysis in 
Masterpiece, I will demonstrate the shortcomings of the individual rights advocacy model 
of law. Having grounded us in traditional legal theories, Locke’s individual, and the 
location of my project within the on-going conversation about secularization and 
modernity, I will turn to an exploration of Rosenzweig and The Star of Redemption in  
Chapter Two: Rosenzweig: New Philosophy and New Theology. First, I will provide 
a broad overview of  The Star’s alternative system of philosophy, with special focus on 
how Man is transformed into Beloved Soul by God’s love and turns toward the World as 
externalization of this love. Next, I will explore his epistemological framework that 
moves backwards from communal structures to experience to logic in a single temporal 
dialectic of past-present-future. I will end Chapter Two with a close reading of the 
transformation of Man into Beloved Soul, in order to provide us with the tools to 
construct a “thick account” of the alternative philosophical anthropology of openness and 
relationality. In Chapter Three: Open and Relational Subject, I will define and explain the 
alternative philosophical anthropology I am proposing. I will do this by building bridges 
between specific elements in Rosenzweig’s All and the openness and relationality I argue 
is characteristic of individuality, in contrast to Locke’s model. For each stage of the 
transformation, I will explain the meaning of these elements in non-theological terms and 
how this forms a different legal subject. I will close out the chapter with a re-analysis of  
Masterpiece, suggesting a range of alternative legal outcomes that might flow from the 
different philosophical anthropology grounded in Rosenzweig. The alternatives I suggest 
will range from avoidance of the case altogether because of a different tone in Obergefell, 
to application of a community “best interests” standard, to a restorative justice-like option 
 14 
for religious vendors who seek to discriminate and same-sex couples and their allies to 
engage in facilitated discussions about beliefs and consequences. Finally, in Chapter 
Four: Revisiting Law in the Public Square, I will return to the question of the on-going 
relationship between religion and the secular in U.S. law. I will suggest that in addition to 
providing the ground for a philosophical anthropology which expands Locke’s model of 
individuality as open and relational, Rosenzweig’s counter to Hegel also provides new 
ways of building on Asad’s genealogical insights about the apparent religious-secular 
binary.
 15 
Chapter One: Religion and Law in the Public Square 
The questions addressed by Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Human Rights 
Commission,16 as well as the court’s failure to answer those questions, are broadly 
symbolic of longstanding internal and external critiques of liberalism, from the most 
basic question of whether the twin goals of equality and liberty are not inherently 
irreconcilable to questions about the capacity of the nominal recognition of rights17 to 
redress systemic discrimination to the question of the place, if any, of religion in the 
public square. At the heart of these critiques, but often overlooked, lies the question of 
the nature of human individuality. John Locke, the “Father of Liberalism,” grounded his 
liberalism in an individuality that he imagined preceded civil society. The legitimacy of 
government for Locke lay in the consent of such individuals, who voluntarily cede their 
right of self-enforcement in order to form civil society and to protect their remaining 
natural rights. Locke provides a limited explanation of why this choice would make more 
sense to individuals who are “free, equal, and independent” in the state of nature, “with 
like faculties and no natural subordination.”18 Because the U.S. Constitution expresses 
 
16 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Human Rights Commission, 584 U.S.  (2018). 
 
17 By “nominal recognition of rights,” I mean the recognition of rights in name, which is typical of 
anti-discrimination law. For example, Title VII is a federal law that prohibits employment discrimination 
on the basis of sex. Thus, the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of sex is “named” in the law, 
but the content and effects of this nominal protection remain at issue. Courts have already determined that 
it does not include protections against discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court will consider in its October 2019 term whether protection against discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation is included. 
 
18 Locke, Second Treatise, Chapter II and Chapter III generally. 
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Locke’s view of liberalism so directly, especially in its provisions for a separation 
between Church and State in the First Amendment’s guarantees of the “free exercise” of 
religion and against government “establishment” of religion, U.S. Supreme Court justices 
routinely turn to Locke to ground or counter decisions about what the Constitution 
requires. While Locke grounds the idea that religious tolerance is dependent on the 
Church not having the power of the state, Madison’s Remonstrance articulates the 
uniquely American version of secular liberalism, and indeed makes sense of the specific 
and sometimes contradictory form of the First Amendment’s religious protections. At the 
root of this structure is Locke’s free, equal, and independent individual whose existence 
and rights precede civil society, even the “first society” of husband and wife. 19 Both the 
legitimacy of government and the rule of law depend explicitly on the natural rights 
possessed by this individual, which can only be added to by the consent of the majority. 
By centering autonomy and independence, Locke’s philosophical anthropology tends 
toward abstraction, because actual humans are varied in faculties, interests, social 
location, and life chances. Thus, the first of a variety of legal fictions that drive liberal 
jurisprudence is the fiction of equality. In order to maintain this fiction, it is necessary to 
think of individuals in the abstract. The individual rights advocacy model of law is 
ideally suited to resolving disputes among such abstract individuals when their exercise 
of rights creates conflict. Abstraction grounds a variety of other legal fictions, as well. 
Several of these provide insight into the problem of abstraction, both how it enters the 
system and how it proliferates, limiting justice options for diverse and unequal 
 
19 This aspect of Locke’s argument is central to Justice Thomas’ rejection of the idea of a natural right 
of civil same-sex marriage and will be explored in detail later in this chapter. 
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individuals. For example, the idea of the “reasonable man,” a generic person, lacking in 
any particulars that would distinguish him, his motives or his needs from others; 
Socrates’ impartial judge20 who is theoretically restricted in relying on his own 
experience because he must not be swayed from logic in assessing and resolving claims–
even when doing so increases justice; and perhaps most perniciously, the ideal that justice 
should be “color-blind,” which invariably indicates that a court has decided that actual 
racial differences are legally irrelevant. These and various others have emerged over 
time, some ancient, and some reflective of adaptation of the common law to the social 
contract in the common law of England to which U.S. law is heir. They serve a variety of 
legal purposes that may include consistency, convenience, and sometimes to achieve 
equity in otherwise harsh cases. However, they may not always serve particular 
individuals in need of legal protection or redress; in some cases, the particular individual 
gets in the way of the abstract idea of individuality on which law rests. Conflicts that 
arise from human diversity cannot always be resolved through the individual rights 
advocacy model because at the level of the abstract individual, the conflict does not or 
cannot exist. Even at the most basic level of flourishing–the Lockean government’s 
obligation to preserve life, liberty, and property–let alone where flourishing entails the 
fostering of diversity, meaningful social participation, and relative economic equity, the 
individual rights model of advocacy cannot always achieve its task. The individual 
capable of even minimal flourishing through law requires openness and relationality. 
 
20 Referring to Socrates’ description of the good judge, who remains paradigmatic of the value for 
impartiality in the law: Four things belong to a judge: To hear courteously; to answer wisely; to consider 
soberly; and to decide impartially. 
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 Locke’s carefully structured argument from social contract theory makes clear the 
way in which the individual exists prior to civil society. Because the individual precedes 
civil society, the natural rights traditionally attached to the individual also precede, and 
are independent of, civil society. In the United States, some of these rights are protected 
in the Bill of Rights, whose adoption was controversial precisely because of the fear that 
the enumeration of some rights would work to exclude those not named. These natural 
rights cannot be taken away and are not dependent on the varying will of majorities,21 but 
this also makes adding rights dependent on the consent of majorities. All individuals in 
this original state of nature are free, equal, and independent, and remain essentially and 
theoretically so even after their entry into civil society. Because their freedom is insecure 
in the state of nature, they rationally and voluntarily relinquish a portion of their 
autonomy22 on the theory that the government is better suited to preserve life, liberty, and 
property of individuals than individuals themselves. Through this relinquishment of 
minimal autonomy, the individual consents to a common civil government and is thereby 
obligated to comply with subsequent laws adopted by the majority. The consent the 
individual offers entails an obligation to every other member of the civil society.23 The 
individual who refuses to comply with just laws is no better off than in the state of nature, 
and obviates the benefits of civil society for everyone. 
 
21 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
 
22 Locke use the term “executive” function, the right of self-enforcement of ones rights or redress for 
their violation, to express the idea I describe here as autonomy. As noted earlier, his explanation of why 
this is the logical choice is not entirely persuasive, although it implies a view of human nature as naturally 
competitive and insecure. This aspect will be explored in greater detail in the discussion of Asad’s view of 
the anthropology of those permitted entry into the public square. 
 
23 Locke, Second Treatise, §94, §97. 
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 Individuals who are innately free, equal, and independent can also function as 
equals before the law, and when their equal legal rights are infringed upon, redress is 
possible through the application of the individual rights advocacy model. Although 
modern notions of justice differ in some ways from classic models, liberal justice remains 
grounded in its ancient Aristotelian roots, dependent on two important and interrelated 
ideas: 1) that justice consists in giving good things to good people, and bad things to bad 
people, and 2) that justice requires those who are similarly situated be treated equally 
(and implicitly that treating people unequally is just when they are not similarly 
situated).24 If individuals are not actually all free, equal, and independent, then they are 
not similarly situated for purposes of resolving disputes through the application of law. 
Equality is essential for the law to be able to redress wrong in a way that achieves or 
maintains Aristotelian justice. Thus, all fundamental differences of individuals create 
legal challenges. We see the evidence of the law’s failure to resolve these challenges in a 
variety of ways, but especially in the different outcomes the individual rights advocacy 
model produces in cases of discrimination on the basis of race versus discrimination on 
the basis of gender. Allegations of discrimination on the basis of race trigger the highest 
 
24 According to Dworkin, for conservatives, “the possible acquittal of the guilty [is] not simply an 
inefficiency in the strategy of deterrence, but an affront to the basic principle that the censure of vice is 
indispensable to the honor of virtue [emphasis added]” (139). Thus, conservatives often view tolerating 
“vice” as undermining virtuous behavior. Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism,” in Public and Private Morality, 
ed. Stuart Hampshire (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978). Evolutionary psychologist 
Jonathan Haidt’s argues that six categories of moral foundations exist – care/harm, fairness/cheating, 
loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation, liberty/oppression – and conservatives resonate 
with all 6 but less so with the first two pairs, with which liberals resonate most strongly. He also explains 
that the sixth pair liberty/oppression was added to explain anomalous data gathered for the second pair 
fairness/cheating. Haidt’s research clarified that liberals resonate more with oppression, while 
conservatives resonate with liberty. This is consistent with Dworkin’s explanation of two modes of liberty. 
Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2012), Chapter Seven – Moral Foundations of Politics, pp. 150-179. 
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level of legal scrutiny, as race is considered irrelevant for virtually all legal purposes. 
Allegations of discrimination on the basis of gender trigger intermediate scrutiny, as 
gender is considered legally relevant in some cases, justifying disparate treatment. For 
example, there is no legally recognized basis for limiting jobs to whites, but there are 
legally recognized justifications for restricting women’s access to some jobs, especially 
women of child-bearing age. Where differences are incommensurable, the application of 
the individual rights advocacy model cannot fully redress legal wrongs or resolve rights 
conflicts. The application of the individual rights advocacy model in such cases may 
actually exacerbate practical inequities, even when it achieves nominal equality, as also 
demonstrated in litigation seeking racial and gender equity. 
 Although the specific forms of the U.S. separation of Church and State and of 
constitutional protections for religious belief and against the government’s establishment 
of religion owe at least as much to Madison as to Locke, the discussion of a Lockean 
anthropology for liberalism and liberal jurisprudence necessarily locates the discussion 
within broader discussions of secularization and the relations among modernity, religion, 
and the secular. Talal Asad’s contributions are recognized as paradigmatic of a particular 
strand of current secularization debates central to on-going questions of liberalism, of 
how to understand the viability of the thesis in light of current circumstances and in terms 
of its particular connection to Europe and the U.S. as well as its dependence on Western 
understandings and definitions of religion. Dressler and Mandair identify three primary 
schools of thought: “(1) the sociopolitical philosophy of liberal secularism exemplified 
by Charles Taylor (and to some extent shared by thinkers such as John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas); (2) the “postmodernist” critiques of ontotheological metaphysics by radical 
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theologians and Continental philosophers that have helped to revive the discourse of 
“political theology”; and (3) following the work of Michel Foucault and Edward Said, the 
various forms of discourse analysis focusing on genealogies of power most closely 
identified with the work of Talal Asad.” 25 
 Asad argues that most secularization debates miss the main point, which is that 
the religious and secular cannot be meaningfully distinguished, the public square is both 
created and its exclusions shaped and sustained by a particular form of religion. Further, 
he asserts both that religion is itself not a stable category or single thing, and that 
whatever religion is it cannot be “kept in its place,” even though the modern nation-state 
is dependent on “clearly demarcated spaces that it can classify and regulate [including] 
religion, education, health, leisure, work, income, justice, and war.”26 Winnifred Fallers 
Sullivan broadly agrees with Asad, but her critique focuses on the conceit of secular law 
as a realm separate and distinguishable from religion. Instead, law is only apparently 
secular, Sullivan argues, and, like the public square, is actually a product of religion, 
remaining subordinated to and submersed in religion.27 Sullivan’s most provocative 
argument, that legally privileging religious conscience in contrast to equally sincere, but 
not religious, belief undermines the very religion it is ostensibly designed to protect is not 
at issue in this dissertation. As Sullivan notes, however, “religion takes place in a space 
 
25 Markus Dressler and Arvind-Pal S. Mandair, eds. Secularism and Religion-Making (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 4. 
 
26 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 201. 
 
27 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 153. 
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structured and conditioned by law–secular law, the ‘rule of law,’ a law that enjoys an 
unprecedented hegemony,”28 and this does help us to understand why the form of 
religious belief that the proprietor of Masterpiece Cakeshop claims generates such legal 
controversy when other kinds of religious claims do not. When conservative Christian 
politicians and scholars argue that the U.S. is a “Christian” nation, they are invoking the 
very constructs Asad and Sullivan problematize. Taken together, Asad’s and Sullivan’s 
contributions to the debate over secularism and liberalism help demonstrate why the 
conflict over religious freedom at the heart of Masterpiece Cakeshop is so useful in 
highlighting the need to reconsider the law’s default or underlying philosophical 
anthropology.  
 American liberalism appears to operate from the same premise about the empty or 
neutral public square as the place in which legitimate political discussion can and must 
take place, a la Rawls or Habermas.  Those who operate from this premise may argue that 
for autonomous individuals in a pluralistic society to find and secure the common ground, 
a religion-free or at least religion-neutral, secular, public political space must exist. Only 
in such discursive space can policy be considered as a matter of a truly common versus 
sectarian good. Even in the overtly religion-friendly U.S., the neutral public square 
continues to be touted as an ideal condition of expansive pluralistic discourse. What 
appears then to be the growing political influence of politically and socially conservative 
Christians in the U.S. seems to represent the dangerous importation of untranslated 
partisan religious ideas into the public square, threating the neutrality of that space. Some 
 
28 Sullivan, Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 153. 
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post-modern advocates of religion-friendly liberalism suggest that un-translated religious 
reasoning and secular reasoning can constructively interact in the public square, while 
classicists still insist that partisan religious ideas, by their very religious nature, will 
always operate coercively and, thus, that liberalism is fundamentally incompatible with 
overt religious political discourse. As American religious discourse concentrates on 
issues of sexuality, from gender equality to sexual orientation to gender identity and 
expression, these questions about the nature of the public square are not simply academic. 
They reveal the degree to which access to the public square has always been contested, 
rather than neutral, and that all are not equally welcome. Locke’s philosophical 
anthropology of independent and autonomous individuality, and his argument for 
tolerance as requiring that religious power must be separated from state power, and 
implicit assumption that it can be, structures and organizes this model of the public 
square. Thus, the public square is not and never has been religion-free, but rather 
expresses this understanding of the religious as separable, as well as this model of 
individuality and its inherent abstractions. Those whose identity does not fit this model 
have never had significant access to the public square. So long as the society itself 
appeared relatively homogenous, this exclusion was unremarkable, as was the related 
refusal of courts to acknowledge the rights of minoritized individuals whose identity 
could not be homogenized.  
 Often compared to each other in political theory, the French practice of laïcité 
differs sufficiently from the American practice of religion-friendly liberalism that 
political conflicts over religion in the French public square can actually help to illuminate 
the claim that the square has never been either religion-free or religion-neutral, but rather 
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reflective of the structures of particular forms of Christianity. In the U.S., the form is of 
not only Protestant, but evangelical Christianity; in France, the organizing form is Roman 
Catholicism; while the current crisis of religious fundamentalism in the U.S. results from 
a surprising alignment of Roman Catholic and evangelical Protestant Christianities. In 
France, the similar crisis concerns political and educational intolerance for the wearing of 
the hijab in secular French schools. While containing characteristics unique to French 
colonial and immigration history, as well as relations within the European Union, these 
conflicts also involve philosophical anthropology, as well as the fact “that there is no 
natural distinction between the political and the religious, but a historical one resulting 
from decisions that are themselves political.”29 As Balibar notes, although the wearing of 
the hijab is a question of personal agency and/or emancipation, it is also inescapably “a 
cultural, religious, and increasingly a political symbol . . . [which cannot be] abstract[ed] 
away from.”30 In a way that is usefully parallel, sexual diversity in the U.S., especially 
the open acknowledgment of minoritized sexuality identity invokes questions of personal 
agency and/or emancipation which problematize normative assumptions about both 
identity and agency. Sexual identity in the U.S. is also increasingly a cultural and 
political symbol which cannot be “abstract[ed] away from.” In exactly these ways, such 
identities contravene the traditional exclusions of the public square. Shifting religious 
attitudes in the U.S., specifically growing religious acceptance of minoritized sexual 
identity, exacerbates the crisis and confirm the truth of Balibar’s claim that there is no 
 
29 Étienne Balibar, Equaliberty: Political Essays, translated by James Ingram (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 213. 
 
30 Balibar, Equaliberty, 211. 
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natural distinction between the political and the religious. Indeed, the fact that it is often 
the more socially progressive and socially activist Christian communities in the U.S. that 
are more accepting of sexual and gender diversity further complicates the possibility of 
distinguishing between the political and the religious, as such groups engage the tactics 
and practices of political social movement organizing and activity.31 
 The particular strand of religious freedom counter-claims opposing this entry into 
the public square threatens to dismantle a central structure of anti-discrimination law, 
public accommodations laws, which assure that businesses engaged in sales to the public, 
such as restaurants, hospitals, hotels, retail stores, places of entertainment, and public 
transportation, etc. serve all customers equally.32 Asad’s genealogy of the secular invites 
us to understand this strand of religious freedom claims as products and beneficiaries of 
the religious structures and forms that produced the secular as its discursive and 
epistemological other. As social attitudes and demographics have shifted, this mode of 
religion, and its epistemological prejudices have lost their hegemonic cultural force. 
Adherents of this increasingly marginalized mode of American Christianity, and their 
 
31 See, e.g., Rebecca M.M. Voelkel, Carnal Knowledge of God: Embodied Love and the Movement for 
Justice (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2017).  
 
32 A group of Public Accommodations Law Scholars filed an Amicus Brief is support of Respondents 
(the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Charlie Craig and David Mullins) in order to recount the legal 
history and importance of public accommodations laws and supplement the Court’s general knowledge 
with their special expertise in this area of law. Understanding that these laws are grounded in the common 
law right of equal access is particularly important in order to dispel the attempts by Petitioner Masterpiece 
to portray these laws as of recent origin and designed primarily to combat racial segregation following 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In their attempts to distinguish their religious opposition to same-
sex marriage from racism, proponents of religious exemptions from these laws have portrayed them as 
being of recent origin, created as a product of Civil Rights era de-segregation efforts. The Amicus brief 
demonstrates that the pre-Civil War common law duty “dictated that ‘[t]hose who hold themselves out as 
ready to serve the public thereby make themselves public servants and have a duty to serve.’” Brief for 
Public Accommodations Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae, p. 7-8, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado 
Human Rights Commission, 584 U.S.   (2018). 
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unlikely allies, have reacted in ways that reveal the secular myth that the public square 
operates persuasively rather than coercively. As the disputes have been reified in disputes 
over identity, especially sexual identity, the resulting political and legal disputes further 
reveal ways in which the public square has always excluded those who don’t fit the 
normative anthropology or epistemology. 
 Although most scholars agree that the secularization thesis in its original form is 
no longer viable, Asad argues that the real issue inherent in questions of secularization is 
not the continuing viability of the thesis in the face of religious significance. Instead, 
Asad argues that, because the religious and the secular interpenetrate each other, with 
neither being either a single or stable concept, we must explore how changes in the 
concepts of the secular and religion relate to changes in practice. Only through such a 
genealogical process can we understand the secular as Asad does, as a “concept that 
brings together certain behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life.”33 He 
argues against those, such as Casanova, who seek to nuance the secularization thesis by 
proposing that some religious persons can participate the public square on equal terms 
with others in a proper secular context. For Asad, this still begs the real question of the 
mutually reinforcing power structures that produce the binary construct of secular and 
religious in the first place. In explaining why the public square is neither secular nor 
empty as theorized, Asad argues that its existence, shape, and organizing assumptions are 
products of religious thought-forms and structures. Sullivan’s argument about the 
structure of law is similar. Thus, the problem is not that religion enters the public square 
 
33 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 25. 
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and the question not whether it can do so on terms sufficiently irenic to permit competing 
religious or secular ideas equal space/authority. Instead, in a similar vein to Sullivan’s 
argument that the First Amendment is capable of recognizing and protecting only some 
kinds of religion, the public square excludes and must exclude those whose anthropology 
differs irreconcilably with the abstract Lockean individual. It is not so much that religion 
must be excluded, but that all ideas, all stories, all identities, and all concerns that enter 
the public square for consideration have already been, must be, reshaped into the form 
recognized by the structure of the square itself. Even, perhaps especially, the overtly 
religious is shaped and structured in order to find its place in the public square, e.g., 
stories of devout religious belief combined with personal agency. As Balibar notes, the 
paradigmatic French example is the question of the possibility of feminist Muslim 
women who wear the hijab. In the more immediate U.S. context, illustrative examples 
include the blending of individual and social/cultural rights which are at issue, e.g. in 
conflicts over the repatriation of Native American religio-cultural objects, the status of 
land-as-sacred and the conflict with commerce (frequently in the context of oil resources 
and transport), and the perpetually contested legal status of federally recognized Native 
American tribes as dependent sovereigns. These concerns, which emerge out of a 
dramatically different, non-Locke philosophical anthropology, cannot be translated into 
terms that fit within the structure of the public square. Because this structure assumes the 
binary character and meaning of sex and gender is essential to the structure of reality, the 
challenge posed to the by those whose with minoritized, non-binary sexuality and gender 
identity goes much deeper, and so unsurprisingly engenders a fiercer rejection. 
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 For Asad, the theorized distinction between public life and private belief as the 
basis of legitimate public discourse is itself untenable, as religion infuses every aspect of 
the public sphere, refusing to stay within its “own” private space. He thus invites us to 
challenge the apparent binary of secular versus religious, and consider the ways both 
similarly organize and reify modern power structures. If Asad is correct in his insistence 
that “a modern autonomous life” requires particular kinds of law and, therefore, particular 
kinds of subjects of law,34 then the modern legal subject is also the modern religious 
individual. Thus, if the secular legal subject is an independent and autonomous individual 
rights-bearer, then the modern religious subject is also an independent and autonomous 
individual, bearing religious rights. This is contrary to Durkheim, who theorizes that it is 
the weakening of communal religious bonds that gives rise to the development of the 
secular individual. Those Christians most aggressively seeking relief from laws 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation do so by asserting their 
individual right to religious freedom, both as freedom from the claims of others to equal 
treatment/access, and as freedom to restrict the behavior of others which could undermine 
their religiously motivated exclusions. As legal subjects then, they owe their practical 
theological anthropology as much to Locke as they do to Augustine or Calvin. 
 Asad mounts his argument specifically against Jose Casanova’s definition of the 
secularization thesis in order to point out that, if modernity is synonymous with both 
social differentiation and the decline of religious belief and influence, then no form of 
religion can be acknowledged in the public square without undermining the very idea of 
 
34 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 253. 
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the secular, and thus the liberal modern. This is because Casanova’s definition of 
secularization makes the very concept of the public square dependent on the claim that 
religion is distinguishable and private, relative to the secular. It also because religious 
practitioners themselves tend to undermine the notion that it is possible for sufficiently 
rational forms of religion to enter the public square on the same terms as non-religious 
ideas. Those most likely to insist on their right to advance unadulterated and untranslated 
religious ideas in the public square are also most likely to argue that their commitments 
are entitled to privileged consideration. Thus, Asad argues that on Casanova’s reading of 
the secular, regardless of the rationality of a particular religion, the de-privatization of 
religion at all undermines the structural differentiation of social space on which the 
secular theoretically depends. Thus, the claimed ability to restrict the type of religious 
entrants to rational religions simply replicates the exclusions that created the secular 
public in the first place, because “the public square is a space necessarily (not just 
contingently) articulated by power.”35 Thus, it is not possible for religion-as-authority to 
enter the public square in any form without altering the discursive space irrevocably. On 
this model, secularists are right to be concerned that when religious ideas enter the public 
square they will seek privilege, because religious ideas are “founded on authority and 
constraint [which] has always posed a danger to the freedom of the self as well as to the 
freedom of others.”36 And thus, we should not be surprised that the apparent success of 
the secular liberal experiment would provoke a parallel backlash of apparently pre-
 
35 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 184 (emphasis in the original). 
 
36 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 186. Note that Asad is not making this claim of authority himself, 
but describing the fears of secularists who similarly buy into the binary. 
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modern religious prejudice, but expressed as the public political. Nor should we be 
surprised that a legal impasse appears to have been reached, when the individual rights 
advocacy model and its logic govern responses to the conflict. 
 In his denial that a single or stable form of the religious or the secular exists, and 
his denial that the secular and religious subscribe to competing authorities, Asad refutes 
the claim that the secular can be identified simply as a counter- or anti-religious. He also 
explicitly rejects the similar claim that nationalism can be conflated meaningfully with 
religion. Just as he explores contrasts between Islamists and Arab nationalists in order to 
illustrate how they differ importantly in their core goals, mapping a similar contrast onto 
the difference between American nationalism and American Christianities might be 
possible and even insightful.37 However, doing so is not necessary to affirm Asad’s larger 
goal of problematizing the use of the secular as an organizing category that can be 
meaningfully distinguished from the religious. When religion and the secular are viewed 
as a binary, the fact that the secular state seeks to reform all of life makes it a counter-
religious. In contrast, Asad invites exploration of how religion and the secular each create 
meaning in relation to the other. Because the religious and the political also implicate 
each other, and all social spaces are therefore political spaces, Asad argues that the 
challenge religion poses to the public square is a political challenge to the organizing 
principle of the secular–that “politics, economy, science, and so forth” are separable from 
 
37 Especially if sociologist Elizabeth Shively is correct in her claim that “Attitudes about sex have 
come to signal a person or group’s attitudes about modernity itself. Arguments about gender roles, birth 
control, abortion, sex education, and LGBTQ rights have become central to the religious and political 
identity of American Christians.” Elizabeth Shively, “Christian ‘Purity’ Guru’s Loss of Faith May Signal a 




religion. Hence, the legal impasse in a culture seeking to both expand rights connected to 
minoritized identities (like same-sex marriage) and to preserve traditional religious 
freedom is a political problem. From Asad’s perspective, this should not be surprising, as 
the “space that religion may properly occupy in society has to be continuously redefined 
by the law because the reproduction of secular life within and beyond the nation-state 
continuously affects the discursive clarity of that [public] space.”38 Redefinitions in either 
the secular or religion necessarily entail redefinitions of the other; thus, as the form of 
religion that produces the secular narrows its focus on normative heterosexist identity and 
practice as definitive of both religious freedom and national identity, the likelihood of 
clashes between the secular and the religious in the public square increases. 
 In order to sustain his broader point, Asad first provides an alternative 
anthropology of the secular. Rejecting both the claim of a simple binary opposition 
between the secular and religion, as well as the contention that the secular is a mere 
“mask” of religion, Asad reconsiders the nature and role of myth, violence, and certainty 
in the creation and maintenance of the secular as that which is distinct from the religious. 
Contrary to some accounts of both modernity and law,39 Asad argues that “a secular, 
liberal state depends crucially for its public virtues (equality, tolerance, liberty) on 
political myth.”40 Neither myth nor religion constitute the illusory in contrast to the 
 
38 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 201, emphasis added. 
 
39 Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 153, FN. 41, citing Peter Fitzpatrick, The 
Mythology of Modern Law (London: Routledge, 1992), makes this point about myth and law in modernity. 
 
40 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 56. 
 
 32 
secular “real.”41 Instead, reading religion as myth “constitutes” the secular by privileging 
secular time as “the” epistemological domain of history as history and as anthropology.42 
Despite the apparent similarity of both Christian and liberal democratic mythic structures, 
the secular is not ultimately continuous with religion. Although the secular draws on 
Christian accounts of and projects for redemption through violence,43 secular myth fuses 
“an optimistic project of universal empowerment with a pessimistic account of human 
motivation,” through the reframing of violence.44 For Asad this fusion reflects the 
contradictory goals of democratic liberalism itself, combining 1) “the Enlightenment 
myth” of emancipation from religion through reason for the elite with 2) “the 
revolutionary myth of universal suffrage.”45 In other words, Locke’s ultimately abstract 
individual is somehow to be able to engage in democratic majority decision-making, as 
well as to be able to protect minority rights, including religious rights. 
 In his alternative anthropology of the secular, Asad also argues that the 
characteristic feature of the secular is not its opposition to religion, but its insecurity.46 
 
41 Asad makes this point repeatedly, c.f. Asad, Formations of the Secular, 35, 191. 
 
42 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 43. 
 
43 Rather than simply eschewing violence. For a similar critique of the myth that modern law reduces 
violence, see James Q. Whitman, “At the Origins of Law and the State: Monopolization of Violence, 
Mutilation of Bodies, or Fixing of Prices?” (1996). Faculty Scholarship Series. 653. 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/653 
 
44 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 62. 
 
45 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 61 (emphasis added). 
 
46 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 154. Asad initially proposes this in his comparative discussion of 
Benjamin and de Man. Subsequently, he mentions in passing that “In the seventeenth century, so John 
Pocock proposed, the self was beginning to be seen as contingent. The anxiety that that provoked was the 
context in which Locke’s political appeal to natural rights acquired added plausibility (footnote omitted).” 
Paradoxically, what characterizes the strain of American Christian evangelicalism which is most deeply 
invested in opposing the secular as a counter-religious is precisely its certainty. Indeed, it is an obsession 
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This insight flows from Asad’s reading of two contrasting secular accounts of the secular, 
Paul De Man’s “The Rhetoric of Temporality” and Walter Benjamin’s The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama, which allows him to draw the conclusion that even secular 
formations of the secular differ. Just as there is no stable, universal definition of religion, 
there is also no universal, stable definition of the secular. Instead, the secular is “a 
concept that brings together certain behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern 
life,” and it lacks stability in its historical identity.47 Insecurity is thus the definitive 
characteristic of the secular, rather than the replacement of religious belief with scientific 
belief. At the end of the chapter “Reflections on Cruelty and Torture,” Asad explores the 
ways in which violence is redefined in modernity, and in this context, again notes how 
the secular produces/is characterized by insecurity and instability. He explains that 
“detachment from passionate belief” is an element of “the entire secular discourse of 
‘being human’,” because “only the skeptical individual–suspicious of his or her own 
beliefs as well as of others–can be truly free of fanatical convictions” 48 (although the 
skeptical individual cannot thereby be sincere). Therefore, the secular is inextricably 
bound to insecurity (and suspicion of others). This theme of insecurity runs throughout 
Asad’s reconfiguration of the secular and its problems.  
 
with certainty that most fully distinguishes this strain of Christianity from more progressive variations of 
Christianity. 
 
47 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 25. 
 
48 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 124 and 63. Although Asad is speaking specifically of religious 
beliefs in the context of sexual behavior, an argument can be made that extends this insight to fanatical 
political or nationalistic convictions as well. 
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 Ultimately, for Asad, the secular is most usefully understood in the form of the 
specific liberal political form of the nation-state. Judicial process is “integral” to this 
political form as legal discourses define what it is to be human: “sovereign, self-owning 
agent–essentially suspicious of others.”49 The essence of this human is that he is the 
bearer of certain inalienable rights, which law facilitates and protects “by force.”50 
Although Asad traces the concept of natural rights as characteristic of an individual’s 
“secular status” back to Latin Christendom and even “readings of Roman law,”51 like the 
Supreme Court, he invokes Locke for the proposition that inalienable rights are the 
essence of the human and that the individual possessing such rights owes “no allegiance” 
to anyone that would compromise his natural rights.52 Moreover, Asad argues that it is on 
the basis of the Lockean concept of the human being as “sovereign, self-owning agent” 
that “the secularist principle of the right to freedom of belief and expression was 
crafted.53 Thus, the specific form of religious freedom as liberal tolerance and the 
structure of the separation of church are themselves products of the secular. Without the 
secular, there is no religious freedom. 
 Sullivan also argues that the secular and the religious are connected, and that the 
religious refuses consistent definition or segregation. Like Asad, Sullivan enters the 
debate about the “existential crisis for secular liberalism” acknowledging the instability 
 
49 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 154, 135 (emphasis in original). 
 
50 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 256 (emphasis in original). 
 
51 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 130. 
 
52 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 134. 
 
53 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 135 (emphasis in original). 
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of formulations of the secular and their “inseparability from dubious projects of 
modernity.”54 Problematizing the secular is not her goal, however. Rather, she argues that 
apparently secular law is incapable of protecting religious freedom, as actually practiced 
by most religious persons, and as contemplated by the First Amendment. She makes this 
argument by problematizing law as well as religion. Sullivan agrees with those who argue 
that religion cannot be clearly defined. What she adds is a critique of law’s self-
representation, arguing that contrary to this self-representation, law is only apparently 
secular. In reality, “it is replete with ideas and structures that find their origin in, and are 
parallel to, ideas and structures in religious traditions.”55  She argues that because law is 
the product of a certain type of religion, it can recognize as religion only that which has 
the structure of law, “[a]s if the law could take cognizance only of what could be 
construed as a competing set of norms, norms finding their authority in alternative 
religio-legal structure.”56 Based both on her scholarship and on her experience as an 
expert witness in a religious freedom case, Sullivan argues that the law remains beholden 
to textual-legal forms of religion, or what she calls “religion ‘by law’,”57 despite the fact 
that the mainstream of American lived religion. These forms include one or more of the 
following: authoritative sacred texts, classic formulations of doctrine and practice, 
consistently and comprehensively practiced.58 Sullivan’s main claim, that “freedom and 
 
54 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Robert A. Yelle, and Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, eds. “Introduction,” After 
Secular Law (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 1. 
 
55 Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 153. 
 
56 Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 111. 
 
57 Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 147. 
 
58 Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 147, drawing on the work of Daniel Pals. 
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equality are better realized, and liberty better defended, if religion, qua religion, is not 
made an object of specific legal protection,”59 is not at issue here, but her related claim, 
that [e]ach time a decision is made to tailor law to account for difference, a question of 
equal treatment is presented,”60 is at issue in the question of whether courts should permit 
religious objectors to same-sex marriage to violate anti-discrimination laws. 
 Sullivan’s thesis suggests a method for conceptualizing variations in First 
Amendment jurisprudence that differs from more traditional legal analyses. Sullivan 
argues that distinctions turn on the character of the religious practice at issue. Where 
religious practitioners cannot rely on the requirements of an authoritative text to justify 
their conduct, their claims are not “legally” religious, despite the prevalence of religious 
communal practice.61 She further argues that while legal accommodations for religion can 
be means of recognizing and thus, valuing, differences, they can also be a means of 
legally privileging “anti-egalitarian” traditions.62 Finally, Sullivan is among those who 
claim an inherent conflict in the First Amendment’s structure of protecting religious 
belief and practice. The First Amendment contains two provisions, the Free Exercise 
 
59 Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 138. 
 
60 Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 149. 
 
61 Or the specifically religious significance of the practice as understood in other contexts. For 
example, Sullivan acted as an expert witness for Plaintiffs who argued that a city policy allowing 
horizontal, but not vertical memorials on grave-sites in a city-owned cemetery interfered with their exercise 
of religious freedom. Despite the fact that such burial practices are considered to be anthropological 
evidence of the religious beliefs of a community, and some of the Plaintiffs in Sullivans case identified as 
Jews, whose authoritative behavior-regulating texts do include burial practices, none of the Plaintiffs’ 
religious traditions specified methods for memorializing the dead. Thus, the state court that heard the case, 
as well as the state supreme court that reviewed the decision on appeal, both concluded that the city policy 
did not impermissibly interfere with the Plaintiffs’ religious practices. 
 
62 Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 149. 
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Clause, which restricts the government from prohibiting the “free exercise of religion;” 
and the Establishment Clause, which prohibits the government “establishment” of 
religion (generally understood as laws favoring religion over non-religion or one type of 
religion over another).63 Sullivan argues that in some cases the recognition of a Free 
Exercise claim may trigger an Establishment Clause claim, that those whose religious 
freedom is recognized are receiving such favorable treatment by the government that is 
effectively “establishing” that form of religion over other forms that do not receive 
special recognition. This type of  government favoring is arguably what the government 
is prohibited from “establishing” by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
 This problem among others, and the limitations of the individual rights advocacy 
model of law, are demonstrated in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Human Rights 
Commission. Masterpiece Cakeshop is a bakery in Englewood, Colorado which is open to 
the public and sells a variety of baked goods, including wedding cakes. The proprietor, 
Jack Phillips, identifies as a Christian who believes that God opposes same-sex marriage. 
In 2012, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins tried to purchase a wedding cake from 
Masterpiece Cakeshop. Phillips refused, arguing that his refusal was on the basis of his 
religious objection to same-sex marriage, rather than on the basis of animus against gay 
and lesbian persons. Although Colorado did not recognize same-sex marriage in 2012, 
Colorado’s public accommodations law, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) 
did prohibit commercial vendors open to the public, including bakeries, from refusing to 
sell their goods on the basis of the customer’s sexual orientation or marital status. As with 
 
63 The precise meaning of the religion clauses has always been at issue, which is not surprising, given 
Asad’s thesis. 
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public accommodations laws generally, CADA is a neutral law, which is generally 
applicable; in other words, it does not single out or target religion or religious practice 
specifically. In fact, CADA, like most public accommodations laws, contains explicit 
provisions exempting churches, synagogues, mosques, “or other place that is principally 
used for religious purposes.”64 The First Amendment is designed to prohibit express 
restrictions on religious freedom, such as a law expressly restricting ritual slaughter or 
animals for religious purposes. In contrast, laws which have only an incidental impact on 
religious practice, like a requirement that children attend school until they are 16 years 
old, that impacts the Amish only, are treated differently. In the case of a merely incidental 
burden, the State needs only to have a “rational basis” in order for generally applicable 
laws to pass constitutional muster. Public accommodations laws are generally applicable 
and do not target religion specifically (except to exempt it in specified circumstances) 
and the state has a well-documented “compelling” interest in preventing discrimination, 
especially in public commercial space. Public accommodations laws like CADA are a 
vital aspect of the legal architecture the State uses to discharge its compelling interest in 
preventing discrimination, and the U.S. Supreme Court had already rejected the claim 
that religious motivations for prohibited discrimination were entitled to exemption from 
application of such laws.65 Moreover, although the incident of discrimination occurred 
before the Court recognized the fundamental right of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. 
Hodges, the case reached the Supreme Court after Obergefell was decided, and CADA 
 
64 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(1) (2016). 
 
65 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968). 
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already included both sexual orientation and marital status as prohibited bases for 
discrimination, broader than both the federal public accommodations law and many state 
laws.66 For all these reasons, and based on the logic of the U.S. Supreme Court’s own 
majority opinion, use of the individual rights advocacy model should have produced a 
substantive result, rejecting the baker’s claim. Nevertheless, the Court declined to rule 
substantively, neither rejecting the claim, nor affirming that a right to an exemption from 
public accommodations laws exists for those who are religiously opposed to same-sex 
marriage. Instead, writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy ruled that regardless of 
whether such an exemption existed, Phillips had a right to a religiously-neutral evaluation 
of his claims, and that this right was violated when Commissioners made comments 
about religion being used as a pretext for prejudice.  
 According to Sullivan’s scheme, the type of religious claim that Phillips made is 
capable of recognition in law, grounded both in an authoritative behavior-regulating text 
(the Bible) as well as normative religious practice (mainstream traditionalist Christian, 
Jewish, and Muslim teaching that God opposes same-sex relationships). Although the 
baker had the advantage, as Sullivan’s religious freedom plaintiffs did not, of a biblical 
basis for his rejection of same-sex relationships, Craig and Mullins also had the Court’s 
 
66 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, prohibits discrimination because of race, color, religion, or 
national origin in certain places of public accommodation, such as hotels, restaurants, and places of 
entertainment. Department of Justice website. https://www.justice.gov/crt-22. The National Conference of 
State Legislatures web-site indicates that as of April 8, 2019, 45 states have public accommodations laws 
(Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas are the exceptions). All states with a public 
accommodation law prohibit discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, ancestry and religion. In 
addition, 18 jurisdictions prohibit discrimination based on marital status, 25 prohibit discrimination based 
on sexual orientation, 21 prohibit discrimination based on gender identity, and 19 prohibit age-based 
discrimination. 
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acknowledgment of their right to civil same-sex marriage.67 Because religions differ in 
their acceptance of same-sex marriage, granting an exemption from a generally 
applicable law to those who do not accept same-sex marriage may give rise to a claim 
that the exemption constitutes an impermissible “establishment” of religion, because this 
set of beliefs is being privileged. The basis of their argument would be that because some 
religious groups support same-sex marriage on the basis of explicitly religious values and 
tenets, allowing those who oppose same-sex marriage on the basis of religious values and 
tenets to discriminate in ways the law prohibits constitutes amounts to government 
endorsement of one group of religious beliefs, thereby “establishing” that group as the 
official government religion. The variety of religious belief about same-sex marriage is 
displayed in the number and variety of religious organizations who filed Amicus briefs 
arguing against a religiously based exemption for the baker. These Amici included the 
majority of mainline Protestant Christian denominations, Jewish, and American Muslim 
religious groups. 
 In order to understand the importance of this non-ruling as representative of the 
limits of the individual rights advocacy model and the philosophical anthropology that 
informs both law and liberalism itself, we must start with an earlier Supreme Court case, 
Obergefell v. Hodges.68 In Obergefell, the Court reversed previous decisions finding that 
marriage was a union between a man and a woman, in order to conclude that the 
fundamental right to marriage does includes the right to civil same-sex marriage on the 
 
67 Although the majority opinion in Masterpiece theorizes strangely that because same-sex marriage 
was not yet legal in Colorado, Phillips might have thought Craig and Mullins “were doing something 
illegal.” Masterpiece, Slip op., at 6 citing to App. 76. 
 
68 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.    (2015). 
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same terms as different-sex marriage. Despite its acknowledgment of this right, the 
majority also demonstrated an unprecedented deference to opponents of the decision. 
When combined with the Dissents’ invocation of Locke and fear of backlash prejudice, 
the decision provides crucial insights into the Court’s failure to reach a substantive 
decision in Masterpiece, especially as an inherent weakness in the individual rights 
advocacy model of justice. When understood in the context of the longer legal history 
that includes the decision in Obergefell, Masterpiece also implicates a range of conflicts 
located at the intersection of law, religion, and sexuality which constitute broader 
challenges to secular liberalism, and are similarly resistant to resolution through 
individual rights advocacy. 
 In Obergefell v. Hodges, a majority of the Supreme Court found for the first time 
(courts having rejected this claim in the past) that the fundamental right to marriage 
includes a right to civil same-sex marriage. Fundamental rights include natural rights 
found in the state of nature and rights necessarily implicated in natural rights (such as the 
right to privacy). Thus, the fact that at the time Obergefell was decided only 16 states and 
the District of Columbia recognized the legality of same-sex marriage, either as a result 
of judicial or legislative process,69 did not undermine the majority’s holding, as the right 
 
69 Some states that recognized a right to same-sex marriage did so based on state court rulings that state 
laws or constitutions required the equal treatment of same-sex and different-sex marriage. This is “judicial 
process.” In the alternative, some states passed laws expanding the definition of marriage to include same-
sex marriage. The latter is “legislative process.” The number 16 represents Justice Roberts’ calculation, 
cited in his dissent. However, according to Geoffrey R. Stone, by the time the Court heard Obergefell, 
“same-sex couples could legally marry in thirty-eight [38] states and the District of Columbia,” largely as 
the result of judicial process, interpreting the U.S. Constitution. Stone does not provide a citation for this 
number, although a review of several on-line resources suggests it reflects multiple decisions by federal 
circuit courts overturning state court bans after the Court’s invalidation of part of federal DOMA in 
Windsor in 2012. Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex and the Constitution: Sex Religion, and Law from America’s 
Origins to the Twenty-first Century (New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 2017), 511. 
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it recognized is so basic that it “depend[s] on the outcome of no elections.”70 Although 
the definition and regulation of marriage is generally the province of states, and both 
definitions and regulation of marriage do vary by state, based on local values about 
specifics such as age of consent, degrees of kinship that preclude marriage, recognition of 
common law marriage, and waiting periods, most states also recognize most marriages 
validly performed in another state. At least they did until the advent of same-sex 
marriage. In the case of same-sex marriage, most states that did not recognize same-sex 
marriage themselves also refused to recognize as valid same-sex marriages lawfully 
performed in other states, despite the Full Faith and Credit Clause.71 The decision in 
Obergefell standardized the legality of same-sex marriage everywhere, much as the Court 
standardized the legality of inter-racial marriage in the 1967 case Loving v. Virginia; the 
Court in Obergefell also ruled that every state must recognize same-sex marriages 
lawfully performed in other States. 
 Despite its acknowledgment of the right of civil same-sex marriage in Obergefell, 
the majority opinion also expressed an unprecedented level of concern for those who 
would continue to disagree with its ruling recognizing the legal equality of same-sex and 
 
70 West Virginia, op. cit. and Obergefell, at 2606, citing West Virginia, and rejecting the contention 
that the Court should “proceed with caution – to await further legislation, litigation, and debate.” 
Obergefell, at 2605. 
 
71 Article IV, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution requires that: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in 
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. U.S. CONST. art., § 1. 
Virtually all marriages validly contracted in one state were treated as valid in every other state until 1996, 
when Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) specifically to exempt same-sex marriages 
from the full faith and credit act, by defining marriage for all federal purposes as the union of one man and 
one woman. This provided cover for states to pass their own versions of DOMA and/or to invoke public 
safety and health as justification for denying recognition. Stone argues that Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court invalidated Texas’ anti-sodomy law, by invoking the horrifying 
possibility that the Court would next be asked to validate same-sex marriages, also fostered the mood that 
led to the passage of federal and state DOMA’s. 
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different-sex marriage. The majority opinion went out of its way to emphasize that the 
decision was not intended to “disparage” persons who object to same-sex marriage on the 
basis of “decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises.”72 This concern for 
dissenters is both rare and broad. Not only did the Court explicitly recognize the 
legitimacy of continuing religious dissent, itself unprecedented, the Court also 
specifically extended its consideration to those whose objection to same-sex marriage is 
based on grounds other than religious conviction.73 The majority opinion made a point of 
assuring both religious organizations and persons, as well as “those who oppose same-sex 
marriage for other reasons,” that the decision would not prevent them from continuing to 
advocate against same-sex marriage, almost inviting further litigation to limit the right it 
had just established.74 Despite the majority’s repeated and unusual acknowledgment of 
the continuing legitimacy of dissent from its ruling, Chief Justice Roberts complained 
that “the most discouraging aspect of [the] ruling is the extent to which the majority feels 
compelled to sully those on the other side of the debate,” insisting that they had been 
portrayed as “bigoted.”75 
 Both Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Clarence Thomas invoked 
Locke as the basis of their arguments against judicial recognition of a fundamental right 
 
72 Obergefell, at 2602 (emphasis added). 
 
73 Although the dissent focused on marriage as a religious as well as a social institution and the threat 
to religious liberty the decision posed. E.g., Obergefell, Robert, C.J., Dissenting “Today’s decision, for 
example, creates serious questions about religious liberty.” At 2625; and Thomas, J. Dissenting, “Aside 
from undermining the political processes that protect our liberty, the majority’s decision threatens the 
religious liberty our Nation has long sought to protect.” At 2638. 
 
74 Obergefell, at 2607. 
 
75 Obergefell, Roberts, C.J., Dissenting, at 2626. 
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to same-sex marriage. Justice Thomas argued that the liberty interests articulated by 
Locke in his justification of legitimate government are negative liberty interests, that is, 
the right to be free from government intrusion into one’s personal affairs, rather than the 
right to a claim on government to provide rights. Justice Thomas also argued that because 
the society of husband and wife precedes civil society,76 the right to marriage in its 
traditional different-sex form is a natural right inherent in the state of nature. Natural 
rights of this kind are not dependent upon government grant or the consent of the 
governed, they exist independently of civil society, and cannot be waived. Because 
Justice Thomas was not persuaded that the natural right to marriage includes the right to 
choose a partner of any gender in the same way it includes the right to choose a partner of 
any race (Loving v. Virginia),77 he used Locke (rather than an explicitly religious 
argument78 against same-sex relationships) to argue that the only legitimate liberal means 
of extending the right was legislative. For Thomas, the right to same-sex marriage is not 
part of the natural right to marriage which free, equal, and independent individuals 
brought into civil society from the state of nature. Thus, the social contract requires that 
in order to be binding upon other individuals in society such a right must come from the 
 
76 The majority cited Cicero for this proposition, while Justice Thomas cited Locke. 
 
77 The majority decision in Obergefell cited this decision, as well as several other cases in which 
restrictions on marriage were struck down, as relevant to its finding that the right to marriage includes the 
right to same-sex marriage despite the fact that there was no historical precedent for the recognition of such 
relationships. Although the question of whether these cases are indeed similar to the limitation of different 
gender partners remains a subject of social debate, it is not necessary to address this question here, beyond 
explaining the logical premises of Justice Thomas’ argument from Locke. 
 
78 Although as noted above, he did also express concern about the implications of the decision for 
religious liberty. 
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consent of the governed, i.e. through the passing of new and expanded laws or the 
judicial interpretation of existing state laws or constitutions.79 
 Many versions of the social contract theory exist, but Locke’s is comprehensive, it 
informed the work of the Founders, and both Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas 
invoke Locke specifically in the reasoning of their dissent from the majority in 
Obergefell.80 Obergefell is significantly related to Masterpiece not simply because the 
latter explores ramifications of the former for providers of wedding goods and services, 
but for two reasons unique in Constitutional jurisprudence. First, despite the extravagance 
of the majority’s view of marriage–statement such as “[c]hoices about marriage shape an 
individual’s destiny”81 and “marriage is a keystone of our social order”82– and advocacy 
of the right of same-sex couples to marry and to nation-wide recognition of their 
marriages, the decision also goes to excessive lengths to assure those who oppose same-
sex marriage, whether on religious or non-religious grounds, that they will not be 
stigmatized and their counter-advocacy will not be limited because of the decision. 
Second, this legally bizarre combination appeared to invite further legislation, just as 
 
79 Neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Thomas address the question of why state court 
interpretation of existing state legislation to include the right of same-sex marriage is any less problematic 
than the U.S. Supreme Court’s similar interpretation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
although both broadly acknowledge the democratic legitimacy of this at the state level. 
 
80 And to distinguish their dissent from a simple opposition to same-sex marriage as a policy choice. 
Each of the four dissenting justices made a point of explaining that their dissents were not a reflection of 
their personal views of same-sex marriage itself, only on whether it was part of the fundamental right to 
marriage or something that should be left to individual states to decide. Only Justice Thomas made the case 
in Lockean terms, although Justice Roberts also invoked Locke for the proposition that the liberty 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, which includes religious liberty, is a negative liberty – the right to be 
free from government intrusion in one’s private affairs or limitations on one’s religious conduct.  
 
81 Obergefell, at 2599. 
 
82 Obergefell, at 2601. 
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Justice Thomas noted in his dissent: “It appears all but inevitable that the two [marriage 
as religious institution and civil legal right] will come into conflict, particularly as 
individuals and churches are confronted with demands to participate in and endorse civil 
marriages between same-sex couples.”83 Indeed, he reiterated this concern in his 
Masterpiece decision, indicating that the situation in Masterpiece is the kind of conflict 
he had feared, and reiterating concerns that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito had 
expressed in their Obergefell dissents. Citing Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas 
revisited the concern that those who oppose same-sex marriage would be stigmatized as 
“bigots,” and citing Justice Alito, he reiterated the concern that the decision in Obergefell 
would be used to “stamp out every vestige of dissent” and “vilify Americans who are 
unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy.”84 These concerns are all the more surprising, 
given the majority’s assurance that those who oppose the majority decision Despite this 
repeated expression of concern, the majority in Masterpiece continued its excessive care 
not to denigrate the motives or character of those who oppose same-sex marriage–noting 
for instance that “Phillips’ dilemma was particularly understandable”85–and in fact 
penalized the Colorado Human Rights Commission for failing to take the same care, by 
reversing the Commission’s decision. 
 Although the incident that led to Masterpiece actually began before the Court 
recognized the right to same-sex marriage, Masterpiece nevertheless takes up the Court’s 
apparent invitation in Obergefell to revisit the open question of whether and how 
 
83 Obergefell, Thomas, J. dissenting, at 2638. 
 
84 Masterpiece, Thomas, J., concurring, slip op., at 13-14. 
 
85 Masterpiece, slip op., Opinion of the Court, at 11. 
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religious objections to same-sex marriage would be accommodated. The Masterpiece 
decision reversing the Commission’s decision by a vote of 7-2 contained five (5) separate 
opinions: 1) the majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, and joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts, and Justices Breyer, Alito, Kagan, and Gorsuch; 2) a concurring opinion 
by Justice Kagan, in which Justice Breyer joined; 3) a concurring opinion by Justice 
Gorsuch, in which Justice Alito joined; 4) an opinion by Justice Thomas, in which Justice 
Gorsuch joined, concurring in part and concurring in the judgement; and 5) a dissenting 
opinion by Justice Ginsburg in which Justice Sotomayor joined. As previously noted, the 
majority declined to rule on the question of whether Phillips’ religious beliefs entitle his 
bakery to an exemption from the public accommodations law. The majority opinion 
directed that future similar cases “must be resolved with tolerance, without undue 
disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities 
when they seek goods and services in an open market.”86 Kagan and Breyer wrote 
separately to emphasize their belief that the “Jack” cases, in which three bakers refused to 
bake cakes with religious anti-same-sex messages and were not found to be in violation 
of the public accommodations law, could be distinguished, contrary to the position 
Justice Gorsuch expressed in his separate opinion that these cases confirmed the 
Commission’s anti-religious bias. Nevertheless, Kagan and Breyer joined the majority 
opinion, finding the fact that the Colorado Court of Appeals did not explain the 
distinction “disquieting” rather than grounds for joining the dissent. Gorsuch agreed with 
the majority’s reversal of the lower court order, but wrote to assert his belief that Phillips 
 
86 Masterpiece, slip op., Opinion of the Court, at 18. 
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was entitled to an exemption on religious freedom grounds, and also that the baked good 
at issue was not a “wedding cake,” but a “cake celebrating a same-sex wedding,” thus 
rejecting Kagan and Breyer’s argument of a valid distinction between the bakers the 
Commission didn’t sanction and Phillips. Thomas wrote separately to set out his theory 
that Phillips had raised and proved both a free speech claim as well as a religious freedom 
claim. He also wrote to make the point that the rejection of Phillips’s claim by the 
Commission was representative of the general tendency to disparage religious 
conscience. Ginsburg and Sotomayor argued in their dissent that although there was 
“much in the [majority] opinion with which [they] agree,” they could not agree that 
“Craig and Mullins should lose this case.”87 Although Craig and Mullins were actually 
parties to the case, the legal issue was theoretically whether an exemption to the public 
accommodations law exists for those vendors whose objection to same-sex marriage is 
religiously motivated, and not whether Craig and Mullins won or lost. Such phrasing in a 
news article, especially given the legal complexity of the case, would not have been 
surprising, but from Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor the phrasing reflects the tendency 
of the individual rights advocacy model to reframe all conflicts as rights conflicts, and as 
competitive conflicts in which one party must lose in order for the other to win. As 
indicated by the language of the dissent, this tendency can reshape the thinking of even 
experts who know better. Although the government–in this case, the Commission, in 
criminal cases, the People–ostensibly represents a collective, communal interest in 
 
87 Masterpiece, slip op., Ginsburg, J., dissenting, at 2. 
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discrimination-free public spaces, from the perspective of individual rights advocacy, the 
government merely stands as proxy for what remain essentially individual rights.88 
 Of the five Justices who joined in the majority opinion, agreeing with the general 
premise that “[religious and philosophical] objections do not allow business owners and 
other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to 
goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law” 
and that “Gay persons may be spared from ‘indignities’ when they seek goods and 
services in an open market,” three wrote separate opinions effectively refuting these 
inclusive positions.89 The majority opinion also acknowledged that if the exemption 
requested by Phillips  
were not confined, then a long list of persons who provide goods and services for 
marriages and weddings might refuse to do so for gay persons, thus resulting in a 
community-wide stigma inconsistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights 
laws that ensure equal access to goods, services, and public accommodations.90  
 
Two others (Kagan and Breyer) wrote separately and not only affirmed that “a vendor 
cannot escape public accommodations law because his religion disapproves selling a 
product to a group of customers, whether defined by sexual orientation, race, sex, or other 
protected trait,” but they also offered an additional justification for upholding the 
Commission’s decisions, which undermined the majority’s charge of anti-religious 
 
88 Note also in this context, the prevalence of civil rights cases in which the official responsible for 
enforcing the challenged law is named as the opposing party, e.g. Roe v. Wade, Henry Wade being the 
Dallas District Attorney in charge of prosecutions that would have taken place if Roe had attempted to 
secure an abortion in Dallas in violation of the law prohibiting abortion; Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, Sylvia 
Matthews Burwell being the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services which administers 
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) which Hobby Lobby successfully challenged as applying to them.  
 
89 Gorsuch, joined by Alito and Thomas, joined by Gorsuch; theoretically leaving Kennedy and 
Roberts affirming this reasoning. 
  
90 Masterpiece, slip op., Opinion of the Court, at 10. 
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sentiment. The majority opinion, as noted in Justice Ginsburg’s and Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissent, does indeed appear to make a strong case for rejecting the contention that there 
could be an exemption from the public accommodations law on the basis of a religious 
belief that opposes same-sex marriage. It also highlights the problem of limiting any such 
exemption so that it does not obviate the very purpose of public accommodations laws. 
Justice Kagan’s and Justice Breyer’s concurrence seems only to strengthen that argument 
by rejecting Justice Gorsuch’s and Justice Alito’s argument that a wedding cake is a 
different product when it is used for a same-sex wedding than when it is used for a 
different-sex wedding. Thus, the Court’s failure to rule 6-3 to uphold the Colorado 
Human Rights Commission’s decision is inexplicable–in terms of the individual rights 
advocacy model. 
 Despite its own strong argument against an exemption from CADA, the majority 
decided that comments by two Commissioners, months after the initial decision, revealed 
animus against Phillips’ religious beliefs. The majority even acknowledged that some of 
the comments were susceptible of multiple interpretations, including benign statements 
about what the law requires. The majority expressed concern that the Jack cases were 
treated differently than Phillips’s case, despite what Justice Kagan and Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence describes as an “obvious” distinction. The bakers in the Jack cases all 
refused to sell a cake they would sell to any other customer, with evidence that they in 
fact routinely sold cakes with religious messages to other religious customers, while 
Phillips refused to sell to a gay customer a cake he would, and routinely did sell to 
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straight customers: a wedding cake.91 Although Justices Kagan and Breyer found the 
Commission’s failure to offer this explanation “disquieting,” Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor disagreed, finding that this difference did absolve the Commission of 
impermissible anti-religious bias. They also argued that the comments by some 
commissioners, which came in the middle of a multi-layered decision-making process, 
fell far short of the level of hostility to religion that the Court had previously found 
violated the First Amendment, and “far removed from the only precedent upon which the 
Court relies.”92    
 The proprietor of Colorado’s Masterpiece Cakeshop is not the only provider of 
wedding goods and services in the country who has refused to provide the same wedding 
goods/services to same-sex couples that they provide to different-sex couples. As soon as 
the first states recognized same-sex marriage as legally equivalent to different-sex 
marriage, religious vendors of wedding goods and services began to make claims that 
their religious belief, unlike the religious beliefs that motivated hostility to racial 
integration, justified exemptions from neutrally applied, generally applicable public 
accommodations laws. Masterpiece was simply the first to reach the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Since the Court issued its ruling in Masterpiece, the proprietors in several of these other 
cases have sought U.S. Supreme Court review after state courts denied their claims for 
 
91 Masterpiece, slip op., Kagan, J., concurring, at 2. 
 
92 Masterpiece, slip op., Ginsburg, J., dissenting, at 8, referring to Church of Lukumi Babalu, in which 
the city of Hialea, FL passed a municipal ordinance clearly targeting the church’s religious ritual slaughter, 
while exempting animal slaughter for non-religious purposes that was indistinguishable from the church’s 
practice. In this case, the Court found that the law itself was not neutral, but rather intended to target the 
religious practice of one group while allowing similar practices for non-religious reasons. Justices Ginsburg 
and Sotomayor rejected the contention that the same criteria could be applied to CADA. 
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exemption. In each case, the Court has declined to consider the case on the merits, either 
declining to take up the case at all93 or remanding the case to the state court to reconsider 
“in light of” the Court’s ruling in Masterpiece.94 Thus, the question of whether the First 
Amendment provides an exemption from public accommodations laws for providers of 
wedding goods and services who object to same-sex marriage on religious grounds 
remains outstanding. Justice Thomas thinks this is a good thing, that “[b]ecause the 
Court’s decision vindicates Phillips’ right to free exercise, it seems that religious liberty 
has lived to fight another day.”95 But the Court did not rule that Phillips was entitled to an 
exemption from the public accommodations law, and has declined to re-consider other 
cases in which this claim was made and denied, leaving religious vendors without clear 
guidance about whether the exemption exists and if so, under what circumstances. At the 
same time, the Court also failed to rule that such an exemption does not exist, leaving gay 
and lesbian couples likely to be “subject[ed]. . . to indignities when they seek goods and 
services in an open market,” and anti-same-sex wedding vendors to test their rights for 
 
93 Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, 415 P.3d 919 (Haw. Ct. App. 2018), petition for cert. denied 
March 18, 2019.  
 
94 Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor & Industries. The full order of the Court consisted of the 
following: “The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is 
remanded to the Court of Appeals of Oregon for further consideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 584 U.S. ____ (2018).” Legal scholars are uncertain what this 
language from the Court means, given that the Court did not make a decision on the substantive issues in 
Masterpiece. Their best guess is that the Supreme Court is directing the Oregon court to explicitly confirm 
whether the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs were treated with legally sufficient government neutrality. The 
Arizona Court of Appeals cited Masterpiece in rejecting the claim of a wedding vendor that challenged the 
Phoenix non-discrimination ordinance, also citing Piggie Park. Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 
418 P.3d 426, 432 (Ariz. Ct App. 2018), cited in NeJaime and Siegel, FN 86, at 221. However, the Arizona 
Supreme Court cited Obergefell when it overturned the Court of Appeals decision on September 16, 2019. 
 
95 Masterpiece, slip op., Thomas, J., concurring in part, at 14. 
 
 53 
clarification.96 Case law in this area is currently specific to same-sex marriage, but is 
capable of reproduction in other areas. Indeed, it is already occurring, as the same 
religious prejudices animating the claims in Masterpiece are applied to other businesses, 
and state legislatures pass a variety of anti-liberal, religiously pro-family measures, 
including health care refusal laws, further demonstrating the need for something more 
than individual rights advocacy law to resolve the conflict.97 
 The example of marriage equality usefully demonstrates the limitations of the 
individual rights advocacy model of law and its underlying philosophical anthropology of 
autonomous and independent individuality. As of 2015, the right to civil same-sex 
marriage exists throughout the United States, and every validly contracted same-sex 
marriage conducted in any state in the country is now valid in all other states.98 The 
Court’s decision in Obergefell represents a huge step forward for LGBTQIA advocates. 
Despite this important nominal gain, however, lesbian and gay couples remain subject to 
discrimination in public accommodations as they plan their weddings. Without definitive 
judicial resolution, wedding goods and service providers for different-sex couples may 
still refuse to provide the same goods and services to same-sex couples. In terms of legal 
questions of discrimination and equal protection, sexual orientation is in many ways more 
like race than gender. Although sexual orientation is not a protected classification and 
does not trigger heightened scrutiny, as do claims of racial discrimination, arguments can 
be made that disparate legal treatment on the basis of sexual orientation is as unjustified 
 
96 Masterpiece, slip op., Opinion of the Court, at 18. 
 
97 NeJaime & Siegel, esp 222-224. 
 
98 Because of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, see FN 46.  
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as disparate legal treatment on the basis of race. However, sexual orientation implicates 
religion in a way that race does not–either more so than gender or as an extension of 
gender–despite the fact that religious justifications were offered in defense of slavery, 
segregation, and anti-miscegenation laws.99 Cases produced by religious resistance to 
same-sex marriage are only the tip of the iceberg, as rights for LGBTQIA persons are 
either still-to-be recognized100 or dependent on tolerant government officials. The 
deadlock at the heart of Masterpiece demonstrates the limitations of the philosophical 
anthropology of the law, as based in Locke’s abstract and atomistic individual, and the 
consequent need for a different lens through which to view the on-going social divisions 
driving anti-liberal politics and social policy. Revisiting the philosophical anthropology 




99 Even claims of gender equity appear to trigger concern, let alone equal rights for sexual minorities. 
Case, “Trans Formations in the Vatican’s War on ‘Gender Ideology.’” See also Millbank and Pabst’s 
argument that it is the “abolition” of gender difference not patriarchy that causes subordination and 
violence, while the “complimentarity” of the different sexes “automatically produces symbolic meaning, 
legal norms, political order, social peace, charitable but non-institutionalized care and economic 
subsistence and stability (second emphasis added).” John Milbank and Adrian Pabst, The Politics of Virtue: 
Post Liberalism and the Human Future (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 271. Note also in this 
context, that despite the attempt of religious vendors who object to same-sex marriage to distinguish their 
objections from religious objections to racial integration, as recently as September 2019, an interracial 
couple was initially denied use of a wedding venue on the basis of the proprietor’s initial belief that the 
Bible prohibits both inter-racial and same-sex marriage. Although the proprietor retracted their objection, 
apparently after their pastor clarified that the Bible does not oppose inter-racial marriage, less than a year 
before, an inter-racial couple was asked to leave a Christian church whose leaders did believe that the Bible 
does oppose inter-racial marriage. 
 
100 Indeed, the Supreme Court will hear a collection of cases this term (October 2019) addressing the 
question of whether Title VII which protects federal employees from discrimination “because of sex” 
protects gay, lesbian and transgender employees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit ruled that 
Title VII does not apply to discrimination based on sexual orientation. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 2nd Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, reasoning that discrimination based on sexual orientation 
is a “subset of sex discrimination.” 
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Chapter Two: Rosenzweig’s New Philosophy & New Theology 
 Franz Rosenzweig’s goal in The Star of Redemption101 was to fully describe the 
“new thinking” he had previously hinted at, a revolution in philosophy on the order of 
Kant, not to fashion an alternative philosophical anthropology. However, his alternative 
philosophy does indeed lend itself to a robust alternative philosophical anthropology 
which counters, but remains within the tradition of liberalism. At the core of his 
revolutionary new mode of philosophy is the claim that the All cannot be cognized 
through thinking, both because there is no unity of thinking and being, and because the 
All is not an abstract, universal, timeless, singularity.  Instead, Rosenzweig argues in and 
through the structure of The Star that the All is an irreducibly diverse multiplicity, which 
is relational, oriented in time, and may only be grasped through particularity, especially 
through the particularity of Judaism.  
 His alternative begins with an insight about the fear of death–that it is not a 
universal or generic fear but a specific fear of one’s own particular death, the 
disappearance of one’s own particular something into a specific nothing. This insight 
about the particularity of death shatters the illusion of a unitary, universal cognizable All 
into three separate pieces, which must somehow come into relationship with each other in
 
101 Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. Barbara E. Galli (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2005). All references to The Star are to the Galli translation, published in 2005, unless 
they are quoted from others who use the older version. Where necessary, I will compare the two 
translations. 
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order to form reality and the possibility of human relationship to reality. Rosenzweig 
refers to these three separate pieces as the nothings of knowledge, arguing that none is 
further reducible or conflatable with the others. These three nothings of knowledge turn 
out to be the three rational sciences Kant left out of his articulation of metaphysics as 
science, precisely because they are not cognizable, thus, they are “nothings”: theology 
(God), psychology (Man or Human Being102), and cosmology (World). Rosenzweig 
moves from a description of these nothings to the new thinking’s theological turn, the 
temporal dialectic of Creation/Past, Revelation/Present, and Redemption/Future. The 
theological turn’s temporal nature re-prioritizes speaking over thinking because speech 
takes place in time. The new thinking’s alternative philosophical system culminates in the 
communal structures of Judaism, which in their vocational orientation provide the means 
for an understanding of justice as acts of love toward neighbor. The structure of the new 
thinking also uses an evolving epistemology, which moves from the traditional 
philosophical epistemological framework of logic to that of experience, and finally to an 
epistemological framework of communal structures, but which is actually understood in 
reverse order, in that the successive epistemological framework is the condition of the 
possibility of the previous epistemological framework.  
Rosenzweig’s new thinking is capable of grounding an alternative philosophical 
anthropology that is fundamentally different than the one on which liberalism is based. In 
contrast to liberalism’s portrayal of humans as primarily autonomous and independent, 
Rosenzweig’s description of the diverse relational multiplicity at the heart of reality 
 
102 Some translations use “person” or “self.” However, because this nothing transforms into “self” on 
its way to becoming “beloved soul” such gender-neutral terms create interpretive problems. 
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centers relationality as constitutive of both reality and what it means to be human. His 
description of sin as failure to love as the driving force of relationship centers openness 
as finitude and imperfectability. His account of Judaism and Christianity as vocationally 
oriented communities provides a first glimpse of an expanded conception of justice as 
equity and not merely justice as the fair resolution of rights.  
Rosenzweig’s critique of philosophy also suggests a general framework for a 
similar critique of law, especially the American legal system, which like German Idealist 
philosophy posits foundations of universality, abstraction, and a “pointless” point of 
view. Because the philosophical anthropology that grounds liberalism centers 
autonomous and independent individuality, legal analysis through the lens of relationality 
is always secondary, if it occurs at all. In contrast, the philosophical anthropology 
developed from Rosenzweig centers relationship, making this primary, thus more 
consistently producing outcomes that promote both relationality and openness in the 
resolution of conflict. Rosenzweig’s theological turn in philosophy replaces the pointless 
point of view with a contextualized, time-oriented point of view, offering a structure for a 
similarly contextualized & time-oriented method of legal analysis. Such a re-orientation 
helps to reveal the law’s historical entanglement with religion, exposing the many 
religious ideas and structures which continue to underlie apparently secular legal ideas 
and structures.103  
Rosenzweig’s thought develops a strain of explicitly Jewish philosophizing whose 
aim is to demonstrate that Judaism is fully compatible with a humanistic and universal 
 
103 Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 153. 
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philosophy. Maimonides and Rosenzweig’s own mentor, Hermann Cohen, are exemplars 
of this tradition of Jewish philosophy, which generally works to demonstrate Judaism’s 
universality, as ethical monotheism. Rosenzweig, however, argues in the opposite 
direction. Instead of arguing for Judaism’s universality, he argues that the benefit of 
Judaism is its innate and unique particularity. Contrary to Maimonides and Cohen, who 
portray Judaism as just another religious system of universal values, consistent with a 
universal philosophy, Rosenzweig argues that it is the very particularism of Judaism 
which corrects and is necessary to disabuse philosophy of its unrealistic pretensions to 
universality–the abstraction from the individual and the view from nowhere. Rosenzweig 
argues that Judaism is “uncanny” in that the Jewish community, uniquely among 
religious or ethnic/national groups, exists as a particular communal form, out of time, 
without its own land, yet possessing its own, separate language. The vocation of the 
Jewish community is to remain uncanny–not fully at home–for the sake of the 
redemption of the world. Rosenzweig makes this argument in part in opposition to 
Hegel’s explicit insistence that philosophy thrives in conditions of “at-homeness,” 
referring primarily to ancient Greek philosophy. The particular means by which the 
Jewish community does this is through the epistemological framework of its communal 
structures, the cycle of ritual liturgies and prayers, as well as by calling Christianity to 
account. This is necessary because Christianity is always only ever “on the way” and can 
never make it to redemption on its own. Rosenzweig’s description of Christianity is as 
the paradigmatic universal, determined by his systemic interests and Christianity’s 
relationship to eternity. In this sense, Rosenzweig notes that Christianity’s primary 
liturgical celebration (Eucharist) remains grounded in Revelation, unlike Judaism’s 
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primary liturgical celebration (Shabbat), which reconciles Creation and Revelation, for 
the sake of Redemption.104  
In this chapter, I will outline the structure of The Star in its several layers of 
meaning and interpretation, both as they set out the system of the new thinking and as 
they inform an alternative philosophical anthropology. This layered approach is 
necessary in part because of the complex interrelationships of the parts of The Star, and 
in part because of the way in which I will build on those interrelationships. I will also 
offer and account of how Rosenzweig’s “theological turn” functions structurally, rather 
than dogmatically. Just as Rosenzweig argues in favor of a “new” theology that can act as 
a conversation partner for philosophy, which is neither superior nor subservient to 
philosophy, I will argue that this “new” theology can ground a new philosophical 
anthropology to reorient liberal jurisprudence. My analysis begins and ends, as does The 
Star itself, with Rosenzweig’s insight about the fear of death, taking Rosenzweig to be 
both oriented toward the everyday and aware of its limits as the means of grasping or 
coming into meaningful relationship with the All. Although aspects of the alternative 
philosophical anthropology are present throughout the structure of The Star, 
Rosenzweig’s account of how Man is transformed into Beloved Soul and turns toward 
the World provides the most explicit account of this expanded conception of individuality 
and thus, of human flourishing. This description is part of the theological turn described 
in Part Two of The Star, specifically the middle of the temporal progression. Thus, after 
 
104 Rosenzweig, The Star, 330, 338. 
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exploring the overall structure of The Star and its systemic implications, I will take a 
deeper look at this transformation, which Rosenzweig calls Revelation. 
My main interpretive lenses for The Star are Leora Batnitzky’s Idolatry and 
Representation: The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig Reconsidered105 and Benjamin 
Pollock’s Franz Rosenzweig and the Systematic Task of Philosophy.106 Batnitzky’s work 
provides the explanation of how and why Rosenzweig employs different epistemological 
frameworks for each section of The Star and the “backwards” way in which these relate 
to each other. Rosenzweig’s use of grammar as the orienting structure for his theological 
turn resonates in some ways with American Christian theologian George Lindbeck’s idea 
of narrative theology, of religion as native language, rather than belief. Batnitzky offers 
Lindbeck’s theological conception to show how Rosenzweig’s theological turn remains 
relevant to both modern and post-modern discourses about meaning. Her argument here 
also makes further credible my particular extension of Rosenzweig’s thought in the realm 
of law. I rely on Pollock for his insistence on the centrality of system to The Star and his 
exploration of whether Rosenzweig acknowledges the possibility of fully grasping the All 
in life. My goal in this chapter is to demonstrate how Rosenzweig’s thought could be 
developed to ground an alternative philosophical anthropology capable of providing a 
counter and corrective to the limitations of the Lockean individual and the individual 
rights advocacy model of justice as fairness.  
 
105 Leora Batnitzky, Idolatry and Representation: The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig Reconsidered 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
 
106 Benjamin Pollock, Franz Rosenzweig and the Systematic Task of Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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Structural Overview 
In order to understand the meaning of The Star one must first understand its 
structure, both the structure of the writing, and the “structure” the writing produces. 
Rosenzweig scholars disagree about how to read the structure as an aspect of meaning 
and how to understand the meaning of the structure. Rosenzweig himself describes the 
“structure”–a Star of David–as the “countenance,” or God’s truth; and it is a vital, but 
disputed, aspect of his overall meaning. The debate over our capacity to “see” this truth 
in life and its relationship to a vocation for justice will be addressed more fully later in 
the chapter. First, though, we must take The Star’s claims of system and its “backwards” 
hermeneutical structure seriously, using Pollock’s and Batnitzky’s work as guides. 
The Star comprises three parts, each of which begins with an Introduction, and 
contains three books. The Introduction to each Part shows the reader the path leading 
from the reader’s familiar intellectual worlds to the similar but slightly different world of 
The Star.107 When put together, the structure of Rosenzweig’s philosophical argument 
creates a Star of David, which Rosenzweig describes as the countenance. The upright 
triangle is formed by the three nothings or elements: God, Man, and World, (described 
respectively in Book One, Two, and Three of Part One), and forms the forehead, cheeks, 
and ears of the countenance. The bottom-pointing triangle is formed from the temporal 
dialectic of Creation-Past, Revelation-Present, and Redemption-Future (described 
respectively in Book One, Two, and Three of Part Two), and forms the eyes and mouth 
 
107 Franz Rosenzweig, “The New Thinking,” Philosophical and Theological Writings, trans. and ed. 
Paul W. Franks and Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Publishing, 2000), 129. 
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of the countenance.108 Part Three compares and contrasts Jewish and Christian communal 
structures of time and liturgy. The book closes with a final section called, “The Gate,” a 
summation that explains the physical shape of the argument as “the countenance” [of 
God] and acts as a charge, a “commissioning,” to the reader to put the new thinking into 
practice, as an immediate grasping of the reconstituted All by heeding the words of the 
divine mouth “to do justice.”109 Rosenzweig himself appears to have actualized this 
charge through his subsequent work and to have “grasped” the All in just this way, on 
rare occasions.110  
 Rosenzweig tells his readers that The Star is a system, whose purpose is to bring 
about a Kantian order “total renewal of thinking,” which while read forward, can only be 
understood fully “backwards.” He notes in one of his subsequent explanations of The 
Star, the 1925 article, “The New Thinking,” that unlike traditional philosophical works, 
the “ultimate meaning” of The Star is revealed only at the end.111 Leora Batnitzky argues 
against a progressive or dialectical interpretation of The Star, in which logic leads to 
experience and finally to a communal understanding of truth. Instead, she argues that 
taking Rosenzweig himself seriously means understanding that for him logic is actually 
derived from experience, while experience itself is a product of communal frameworks. 
Thus, the earlier parts of The Star are “produced from” the subsequent parts, rather than 
 
108 Rosenzweig, The Star, 445. 
 
109 Rosenzweig, The Star, 446-447. 
 
110 Pollock, Systematic Task of Philosophy, 303. 
 
111 “The New Thinking,” at 114. “Therefore, if any philosophical book is to be worth reading, it surely 
requires that one does not understand the beginning, or, at the very least, [that one]understands it wrongly.” 
See also, Rosenzweig’s acknowledgment at the beginning of Book Three of Part 2 that he will explain 
“everything that the two preceding Books still had to leave in abeyance.” Rosenzweig, The Star, 221. 
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giving rise to or providing the foundation for the latter (e.g. Part One is produced from 
Part Two in that the logic of Part One is derived from the experience of Part Two).112 
Logic provides the foundation of Rosenzweig’s alternative system, but experience is 
required to ground the relationships necessary to the reconstructed All, and meaning is 
ultimately dependent on communal structures, rather than logic. Although the argument 
must start with logic and be built in the order Rosenzweig provides it, the profound 
differences the alternative system generates can only be fully understood “backwards,” 
i.e. earlier sections reveal their full meaning only after the reader has grasped the 
epistemological framework of the latter sections.    
More than simply a description of each of the features of the new thinking, the 
Parts of The Star also illustrate the way Rosenzweig uses successive epistemological 
frameworks as part of the construction of his alternative system. As Batnitzky explains, 
although each part of The Star is complete in itself, it is only through each subsequent 
epistemological framework that one comes to understand both the meaning and the 
limitations of the previous part(s). This is true for each successive epistemological 
framework and constitutes the way in which The Star must be read “backwards.” In a 
similar way, Rosenzweig argues that the future actually shapes the past, this is the way in 
which Creation and Redemption are related, not simply as the past giving rise or leading 
progressively to the future. 
In Part One, Rosenzweig describes the nature and the origin of the three nothings 
that comprise the All using the (traditional philosophical) epistemological framework of 
 
112 Batnitzky, Idolatry and Representation, 64. 
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logic. Part Two builds on this necessary prior logical framework. However, only through 
Part Two’s epistemological framework of lived experience can the reader begin to 
understand both the fullest meaning of as well as the limitations of logic, i.e. of the 
significance of the claim that the All cannot be cognized through thinking. Lived 
experience is the necessary epistemological framework for fleshing out the mere idea of 
the nothings available through the lens of logic. Logic is well-suited to and necessary for 
an explanation of the first stage of the nothings’ emergence, of how each particular 
something arises in the nothing, and the nothing begins its process of transformation 
through the mathematical differential of the something without losing its particularity. 
Only through the lens of lived experience, however, can we understand how these 
partially transformed nothings come to be grounded in time and how they turn toward 
and enter into relationship with each other. Lived experience is not only the condition for 
the possibility of understanding the temporal dialectic of Creation, Revelation, and 
Redemption, it is also the condition for the possibility of understanding the logic of the 
nothings themselves. However, it is only through Part Three’s epistemological 
framework of communal structures that the reader can begin to see both the meaning as 
well as the limitations of the epistemological framework of lived experience, that 
experience is ultimately no more adequate than logic to bring us into meaningful 
relationship with the All. Finally, Part Three also demonstrates that even the combination 
of logic, experience, and communal structures only ever generate a partial relationship to 
the All; and, thus, our “grasp” of even a reconstituted All can only ever be partial. In each 
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case, Batnitzky argues, the subsequent epistemological framework doesn’t supersede or 
replace the prior, but is instead the condition for the possibility of the prior framework.113 
As Pollock notes in his introduction to Franz Rosenzweig and the Systematic Task 
of Philosophy, despite Rosenzweig’s repeated claims that The Star is indeed a “system of 
philosophy,” the bulk of Rosenzweig scholars in his own day and since have understood 
the systematic features of The Star as incidental to its meaning.114 Given that it is 
precisely the systematic nature of German Idealism that Rosenzweig most critiques, it is 
not surprising that his interpreters have struggled to take his own systemic claims 
seriously. Like Batnitzky, however, Pollock argues that we really must take Rosenzweig 
at his word if we want to understand The Star. Pollock argues that this conundrum of 
system is resolved when we see, as Rosenzweig saw, that German Idealism’s discovery 
of system as the task of philosophy only revealed the perennial problem of philosophy. 
Unlike the system of his German Idealist contemporaries, based on Hegel’s totalizing 
system, Rosenzweig’s system is “not some kind of totalizing force of intellectual 
oppression that reduces all difference.”115 Rather, for Rosenzweig, the “task of system” is 
to provide a response to the paradox of the uniquely particular individual who also 
“shares identity in common with all others.”116 In his entry on Rosenzweig for the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Pollock identifies this as Rosenzweig’s life-long 
search for a reconciliation of the radical subjectivity of the free individual and the 
 
113 Batnitzky, Idolatry and Representation, 69. 
 
114 Pollock, Systematic Task of Philosophy, 3. 
 
115 Pollock, Systematic Task of Philosophy, 6. 
 
116 Pollock, Systematic Task of Philosophy, 5. 
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objectivity of the world. Rosenzweig initially thought that Hegel had found the solution 
to this problem, but eventually became disillusioned with Hegel’s system. Pollock 
believes that this disappointment particularly informed all Rosenzweig’s subsequent 
work. 
Going Deeper 
Having grounded ourselves in an overview of the structure of The Star and 
decided how to read the relationship of the structure of The Star to its meaning, we are 
ready to explore its parts more deeply. We start by returning to the fear of death.  
The new thinking reorients itself first and foremost through Rosenzwieg’s insight 
about the fear of death: that the fear of death is not a generic or universal fear, but the 
particular fear of one’s own particular death. “[A]ll cognition of the All begins” with this 
insight about particularity as the means through which we come into meaningful relation 
with reality.117 In contrast, the old thinking insists on the universal, “pointless” point of 
view and “excludes” death, i.e. fears and so denies death’s fundamentally particular 
nature, thus also denying its own “presuppositions.” Grounded in this combination of 
singularity and denial, the old thinking can only consciously presuppose a singular All. 
Through the epistemological lens of logic, it appears that this singular All can be fully 
cognized because of the supposed unity of thinking and being.  A philosophy based on 
the goal of cognizing such an All eventually culminates in an “end” of history, as 
thinking thinks the All, creating a system with no remainder, nothing outside of itself.118 
 
117 Rosenzweig, The Star, 9. 
 
118 Rosenzweig, The Star, 26. 
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However, as Rosenzweig argues, such a philosophy cannot reconcile the fundamental 
paradox of particularity and universality (subjectivity and objectivity), much less the 
conundrum of how the world can be both contingent and necessary. 
In other words, “the basic thought of philosophy, the thought of the one and 
universal cognition of the All” is a lie.119 For Rosenzweig, the counter to this lie is that 
the only All worthy of cognition is an All that is not fully cognizable. Instead, it is an All 
grounded in the multiplicity of knowledge (both Kant’s omitted rational sciences/the 
nothings of knowledge and the successive epistemologies), refracted from the view of the 
particularity of one’s own death. Rosenzweig’s description of how the elements of the 
diverse All are transformed through the interaction of their Yes and their No, and then 
turn toward relationship with each other through the temporal dialectic of Creation-
Revelation-Redemption, demonstrates the capacity, even the necessity, for establishing 
relationship generally through the particularity of difference, without the need to 
eliminate, conflate or reduce difference.  
This multiplicity of knowledge–the elements of the true All–is comprised of the 
detritus Kant left out of his account of the possibility of metaphysics as a science, 
precisely because they cannot be “cognized,” i.e., they cannot be proved or disproved 
cognitively: rational theology, cosmology, and psychology.120 In his Critique Of Pure 
Reason, Kant reduced the objects of these three rational sciences to what Rosenzweig 
calls the three “nothings” or elements from whose relationship the All is actually formed: 
 
119 Rosenzweig, The Star, 11. 
 
120 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Geyer and Allen W. Wood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 115/Bxxvi. 
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God, World, and Man.  Although Kant wasn’t able to get farther than deconstruction, 
Rosenzweig credits him with at least not falling back into a “one and universal despair 
about cognition.”121 Thus, for Rosenzweig, it is Kant who provides the foundation for the 
three-fold nothing of knowledge that leads to the true All, even though Kant did not 
understand the consequences of his own insight. Rosenzweig understands his project as 
going beyond Kant in providing, not merely a Copernican revolution of thought, but “a 
total renewal of thinking.”122 
Kant found it necessary to exclude the three nothings precisely because they were 
uncognizable and despite the fact that (per Rosenzweig) they appear consistently through 
history as aspects of a unified philosophy and of general metaphysics. Previous 
generations of philosophers did not have Kant’s concerns about the inability to cognize 
these features of the All, although they did effectively eliminate two of the three by 
consistently theorizing a similarly singular All. Previous generations of philosophers 
missed the diverse nature of the All because they posited the All as universal, singular, 
and therefore as primarily one of these elements, with the others understood as mere 
expressions or emanations of the one primary something which was itself the unitary All. 
Thus, in “cosmological antiquity” (Greek philosophy), the Cosmos (World) was the All, 
while the divine (God) and human (Man) were conceived as merely aspects of the 
Cosmos–imperfect copies, as in Plato. In the “theological Middle Ages” (Medieval 
Christian philosophy), the Divine (God) was the All, who created the World and Man in 
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His [sic] own image, and from which Man subsequently fell, disordering himself and the 
World as well. In “anthropomorphic modernity” (as articulated in Kant and typified in 
German Idealism), the Human (Man) was the All, while both God and World were 
derived from the human, mere projections of the human mind, uncognizable, in Kant’s 
definitive terms. In each case, the All was conceived as unitary and thus all movement 
was toward homogenization or perfection of what had fallen or was otherwise incomplete 
or imperfect, rather than toward the valuing or proliferation of difference and 
incompleteness-as-openness. Such an All is not only singular but progressive or 
perfectible, in the sense in which Hegel’s dialectic is progressive. 
Philosophers such as Fichte and Schelling, drawing on Kant’s work, identified 
difference as a key feature of the All, noting that without difference, there is nothing.123 
Fichte even had the insight, contra Kant, that the Absolute was in the relationship 
between being and consciousness, rather than in either alone. However, each remained 
ultimately committed to the proposition that the All was absolutely one and invariable, so 
much so that Rosenzweig identified Fichte and Schelling as among the “three great 
charlatans” (along with Hegel).124 Even the Christian Trinity–the God who is three in 
one–is ultimately One, and thus unitary. Rosenzweig’s framework preserves God as one, 
while providing a basis for Man and World as distinct additional and irreducible elements 
of the All. 
 
123 Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Jeff Love and 
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Understanding how the elements of the All have been misconceived and conflated 
is necessary to the deconstruction of Idealism’s false All, and as precursor to its authentic 
reconstruction through relationship and its capacity to be grasped through communal 
structures. This deconstruction starts with the success of the Hegelian project, the “end” 
to which Hegel brings philosophy. This is the point “where knowledge of the All comes 
to a conclusion in itself,”125 as historicism eliminates all points of view through 
relativizing. This realization that “thought presupposed that thinking has to think the 
All”126 shatters the illusion of the one and universal All into the three distinct, mutually 
opposed nothings, precisely those that Kant excluded from metaphysics as a science. 
When combined with Rosenzweig’s insight about the particularity of the fear of death, it 
becomes clear that none of the three nothings is reducible to the others; each is a distinct, 
particular nothing. Each of these three nothings represents an aspect of reality that cannot 
be further reduced or conflated. There is no generic nothing that counters a generic All. 
God, Man, and World are the three separate, “indissoluble and permanent” pieces of the 
All. Although the shattering of the false All reveals a still “only” possible and not actual 
opportunity to construct the true All, the eventual realization of this All will be “beyond 
cognition and experience,”127 i.e., beyond the epistemological framework of logic in Part 
One, and beyond the epistemological framework of lived experience in Part Two. 
Ultimately, Rosenzweig demonstrates that it is even beyond the epistemological 
framework of communal structures, as outlines in Part Three. 
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Part One uses the logic of math to explain both the factual nature of each nothing 
and how something can emerge out of nothing. Despite the prevalence of examples of 
diverse-but-unified systems, both Western philosophy and theology tend toward a 
conception of reality as having oneness or singularity of some kind at its heart. This is 
true of Greek and medieval theology and philosophy, as Rosenzweig describes the 
history of philosophy leading up to German Idealism. These essentially unified systems 
necessarily struggle to account positively for difference or diversity. In spite of notable 
efforts by German Idealists such as Fichte and Schelling to account for diversity within 
the Absolute, neither was able to provide an ultimately compelling resolution to this 
conundrum while they retained a commitment to an absolute that was absolutely one and 
invariable. Fichte explained multiplicity as somehow embedded in the Absolute, while 
Schelling posited a distinction between what he termed the “ground of existence” and the 
Absolute itself. This allowed him to argue that paradoxically darkness is mixed with light 
in the ground of existence, evoking the Christian narrative of the Fall in Genesis to 
explain the presence of evil without locating evil in the Absolute itself. While this 
provided for a unique theodicy, it failed to explain the conundrum of how something 
comes out of nothing.128  
Rosenzweig uses his mentor Hermann Cohen’s work with the mathematical 
differential to explain how something can be part of the nothing without resorting to the 
use of a Hegelian dialectic. For Rosenzweig, Cohen’s application of this math principle 
 
128 Schelling, Philosophical Investigations, 40-65. Theodicy–the explanation of how evil can be 
present in a world in which God is both omnipotent and benevolent. 
 72 
to philosophy was the “organon of thinking,”129 that resolved this critical foundational 
paradox, despite the fact that he locates Cohen’s project as remaining within the German 
Idealist philosophy the new thinking rejects. In essentially the same way that the 
differential in math contains within it infinitesimal relative value, each of the three 
nothings at the heart of reality contains specific somethings as part of its original state. 
These are not contradictions, as in the dialectic, emerging cyclically only to be eventually 
resolved in the creative synthesis. Instead, for Rosenzweig, these somethings are 
“originary” to the nothing. He calls them the Yes and the No, the original words. They 
provide for two distinct paths out of each nothing: 1) the affirmation of the nothing is the 
path of the Yes; and 2) the negation of the nothing is the path of the No. Although they 
appear to emerge in the manner of the dialectic, with the Yes emerging before the No, 
and being ultimately joined together by the And, Rosenzweig insists this is not a dialectic 
in the Hegelian sense. This is because the differences are not resolved, not eliminated or 
synthesized, but rather transformed in the process of establishing relationship, while 
remaining distinct aspects of the distinct nothings-now-elements.  
As each nothing represents a particular aspect of the All (God, World, Man), 
which cannot be further reduced or resolved, each also has its own differential, its own 
Yes and No. The Yes, as the way of affirmation, is the essence/origin of the Nothing and 
posits the infinite. The No, as the way of negation, is the action/beginning of the Nothing 
and posits the finite. The Yes of each nothing is its mode of being, while the No is its 
mode of Action. As they emerge, the Yes and the No reverse, producing change in their 
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nothing, which is unique to the character of the nothing. The specific being and action of 
each nothing can be plotted on the upright triangle, e.g., as 1) God–being in the 
unconditional/(action)divine freedom; 2) Man–being in the particular/(action) free will; 
and 3) World–being in the universal/(action) inexhaustible fountain of the phenomenon. 
Although the And is not an “original” word, the process is capped by the And. 
The And is not a synthesis–it is not original to the nothing, nor is it creative. It does not 
resolve the differences in the Yes and the No through the creation of something new. For 
Rosenzweig, the And represents the crucial final difference from a dialectic in its lack of 
creativity. In the traditional dialectic, only the thesis is original. After the thesis emerges, 
various contradictions develop from within the thesis, which become the antithesis. 
Eventually, these contradictions are resolved through the creative action of the synthesis. 
As “originary” terms, Rosenzweig’s Yes and No both have their origin in–are 
“immediate” before–the nothing.130 Although the No emerges after the Yes, this is a 
simple temporal rather than a causal relationship, as in the Hegelian dialectic. The No is 
not dependent on and does not emerge out of the Yes, either because of contradictions or 
otherwise. To explain the difference between the Yes-No-And and the dialectic, 
Rosenzweig offers the example of packing and unpacking a suitcase, that what is packed 
first is unpacked last. This also explains why the No emerges after the Yes from the 
nothing.131 Thus, for Rosenzweig, there is no progression toward a final resolution of all 
contradictions; there is instead a single progression of the somethings inherent in the 
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original nothings. Whereas the dialectic is “progressive” in that it repeats the cycle of 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis over and over until all contradictions have been resolved, 
Rosenzweig’s differential is not progressive. The somethings within the nothings are not 
contradictions needing resolution to resolve difference as a problem. Instead, for 
Rosenzweig the differences are a permanent part of the structure of the All, emerging to 
establish the relationships that secure the All. 
Because the Yes and the No, as two originary terms, are equal, their differences 
do not need to be resolved. In fact, their differences cannot be resolved, they are 
necessary if each nothing is to become relational with the others. Unlike the thesis and 
antithesis, which must be resolved in the synthesis in order to maintain the progression 
toward a final resolution of all contradictions, the Yes and the No remain distinct, even as 
each reverses and transforms its nothing such that it becomes capable of relationship with 
the other nothings. This difference not only distinguishes Rosenzweig’s differential from 
Hegel’s dialectic, it also provides a uniquely solid foundation on which to construct an 
alternative system of philosophy in which difference itself is original, necessarily 
constitutive of existence, and therefore positive.  Even as each nothing is transformed 
through the emergence of its own Yes and No, their interaction, and the bridge of the 
And, each nothing remains distinct. This transformation does not resolve or eliminate 
differences, it is the first step on the road to relationship among the still-distinct nothings, 
it grounds existence in difference. Ultimately, we will see that existence is also grounded 
in relationality and, thus, that relationship requires difference as does existence. 
Rosenzweig also demonstrates, through the lens of logic, how little we know of 
each element. Each Book of Part One begins with the acknowledgment that we start with 
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the understanding that we know nothing: “About God we know nothing,”132 and “Of the 
world we know nothing,”133 and finally, “Man cannot be proved any more than can the 
world or God.”134 We learn much about the nothings in Part One, always in the context of 
the limits of knowledge, but it is in Part Two, where the epistemological framework shifts 
to lived experience, that we begin to understand the meanings of what we know. It is also 
in Part Two that Rosenzweig tells us that something new happens: God creates.135 With 
this, God, Man, and World begin to come into relationship with each other. God creating 
(creation/past) is what begins Rosenzweig’s dialectic, which is for him a one-time 
progression from creation to revelation to redemption, from past to present to future. This 
progression is also what constitutes Rosenzweig’s philosophical turn to theology.  
Rosenzweig was always ambivalent about The Star’s description as a “Jewish” 
book or work of philosophy, perhaps because he understood that this set it apart in 
precisely the way he did not want. However, in “The New Thinking,” he acknowledged 
that if the book is Jewish, it is Jewish in its method, and that its method is the method of 
“healthy human understanding,” which is “healthy” in that 1) it “knows . . . that it cannot 
cognize independently of time,”136 and 2) in its use of “Jewish words.”137 Thus, Part Two 
is the most “Jewish” part of the book, in its exploration of the temporal method of healthy 
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human understanding, the epistemological shift from logic to experience, and the 
prioritization of speaking over thinking, which Rosenzweig calls “speech-thinking.” For 
Rosenzweig, thinking epitomizes the atemporal, while speaking is always  “time-bound, 
time-nourished” and “lives from the life of the other.”138 In living “from the life from the 
other,” speech is also, thus, fundamentally relational. 
Despite the prioritization of speech over thought, the temporal dialectic does not 
begin with God speaking, but with God creating. For Rosenzweig, this is the initial 
miracle.139 Creation initiates the temporal cycle, and the first thing to emerge from this is 
the end of the hidden God and the beginning of the God capable of relationship. The 
temporal progression is also ultimately understood in the same way as the progression of 
epistemological frameworks: backwards. So, for example, it is not primarily the case that 
understanding Creation is necessary in order to  understand Revelation, but that Creation 
is understood more completely through the lens of Revelation; the past is understood 
from the perspective of the present, while the present is most fully understood from the 
perspective of the future (Redemption). The temporal dialectic is the “only one fully 
unique and particular progression, absolutely not admitting of a universal concept.”140 In 
its temporal ordering, its prioritization of speech, and in its shift of epistemological 
framework, we see more fully how Rosenzweig distinguishes his alternative system from 
a Hegelian dialectical framework, despite its apparent structural similarity.  
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Through this process of temporal progression, while the nothings remain distinct, 
neither emanating from each other nor blurring into or becoming each other, they also 
emerge beyond mere “factuality” and through the reversals they encounter enter into 
relationship with each other. Their distinctiveness remains in the context of their 
relationships with each other, even as each is transformed itself through the process of 
relationship. Entering into relationship in each case also involves speech. Where math 
operated in the epistemology of logic in Part One, grammar takes its place in the 
epistemology of experience. Having become capable of relationship, the transformed-yet-
still-distinct nothings, or elements have also become capable of constituting a 
reconfigured All, which can’t be “known honestly” (through logic alone) or “experienced 
clearly,” (through experience) but only “grasped immediately” (through the 
epistemological framework of communal structures, i.e. the liturgy). The epistemological 
framework of each section is not simply transcended by the subsequent one, but is the 
condition for the possibility of the prior. Through this epistemological progression, 
Rosenzweig is also expanding our philosophical understanding of knowledge itself, from 
the purely cognitive, through experience, by means of communal structures. 
Readers grounded in an understanding of Judaism or Christianity will recognize 
both the familiar, biblical aspects of this structure (creation-revelation-redemption), as 
well as distinctly non-biblical aspects in Rosenzweig’s work. His purpose, however, was 
not apologetic in a theological sense; instead he is correcting or expanding the limits of 
the old thinking. In the new thinking, the new philosophy works together with a new 
theology to render “visible” through grammar “the greater part of human [problems] . . . 
for scientific comprehension,” although the old thinking remains “accessible and 
 78 
intelligible.” 141 Through the lens of the new thinking, this is understood as merely a 
“first orientation,” which is completed in the new thinking through the more equal 
relationship between theology and philosophy.  
In contrast to the “old” theology, Creation-past is the process by which God 
comes into relationship with the World, beginning with the miracle of God speaking142 
and characterized by divine activity.143 Revelation-present is the process by which God 
comes into relationship with Man. This also takes place through speech–the call by the 
proper name, the command to Love, and Man’s confession of sin–and is also 
characterized by divine activity. Redemption-future is the process by which Man comes 
into relationship with the World, when “[l]ove for God is externalized as love for 
neighbor” and can therefore also be commanded, without becoming law.144 While each 
stage of this temporal progression involves speech, the speech is essentially one-way in 
Creation and Revelation (from the divine), while in Redemption, the speaking becomes a 
duet, in which God is not involved. Instead, the duet is between Man-as-Beloved-Soul 
and the World.145 All aspects of the theological turn are infused with time as well as with 
speech,146 because it is precisely the theological which restores time to philosophy, and 
because speech is time-bound and time-nourished, as thought is not.  
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 The beginning of Rosenzweig’s temporal dialectic and the turn to theology clearly 
references the opening lines of Genesis, “in the beginning, when God began to create.” 
However, creation in this sense is not a matter of theistic belief, but rather the process by 
which existence comes into being, God and the World coming into relationship with each 
other.147 Thus, despite the clear reference to the structure of Genesis, Rosenzweig is not 
making a case for the existence of God as deity or for belief, but rather a case for 
structure, the structure of reality (the All) and the structure of relationship as fundamental 
to reality. Although his explanation of how God and Creation come into relationship with 
each other in Book One of Part Two of The Star bears a striking similarity to the 
theological explanation one finds, e.g., in the Jewish Publication Society’s classic Torah 
Commentary series on Genesis, Rosenzweig is not making a traditionally theological 
argument. Rather, he is providing the first example of the way the new thinking 
restructures reality through an alternative system that takes difference seriously. He is the 
“new philosopher,” who is “situated between theology and philosophy;”148 the new 
philosopher of the “point of view,”149 who needs the new theologian, who in turn needs 
philosophy for the sake of integrity. Rosenzweig’s purpose in reordering the relationship 
of theology to philosophy from that of “charwoman” to sibling is to reconnect Creation to 
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knowledge as an orientation to and engagement with the past. Because God created the 
world and not religion, theological problems “want” to be translated into human 
problems, according to Rosenzweig. His goal is not to justify or even explain religion, 
but rather to explain the structure of reality as temporal, reconstructed from the point of 
view, in contrast to the old thinking, and thus, to complete philosophy.150 As Rosenzweig 
explains further in “The New Thinking,” Judaism and Christianity are uniquely capable 
of providing the necessary completion for philosophy because of their “impulses to free 
themselves from their religiosity.”151 
 As mathematical logic explained the initial, pre-relationship stage of the 
transformation of the three primordial nothings, grammar is what allows the new 
theology to complete the new philosophy. Language, thus, plays a significant role in 
relation to reality. Through speech, each nothing-now-element is further transformed as it 
enters into relationship with the others. The process for each is unique, although the 
pattern is similar. This grammar particularly informs the transformation of primordial 
Man into the Beloved Soul and the resulting alternative philosophical anthropology that 
flows from Rosenzweig’s system. 
Beloved Soul-Man’s Transformation 
 Rosenzweig’s alternative account of reality as inherently relational necessarily 
suggests an alternative philosophical anthropology, a different reality generates a 
different anthropology. This becomes most evident in his account of the relationship 
between God and Man, as this takes place in/as Revelation. In many ways, Rosenzweig’s 
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whole system can be summed up in Revelation,152 because the Revelation of divine love 
is the heart of the All.153 In God’s vitality, God creates, initiating the process of Creation, 
and then God speaks, initiating the process of Revelation. Just as each successive 
epistemological framework of the parts of The Star provides the lens through which the 
prior can be fully understood, Revelation provides a degree of retrospective meaning to 
Creation. As Rosenzweig describes it, Creation is a kind of first revelation of God, which 
actually risks being lost in the very “infinity of the Creation,” unless it is anchored in “a 
“second” Revelation, of a Revelation that is nothing but Revelation.” 154 
 Although mathematics was able to explain “the becoming of the elements,” this 
new mode of becoming requires grammar because the “order of cognition does not 
correspond to [the] order of the concrete.”155 Hence, where the initial transformation of 
the nothings was explained through the use of the “original words” as mathematical 
symbols, the continuing transformation of the elements is explained through grammar, 
including the root words of Creation and Revelation (or in the case of Redemption, the 
“root sentence”), which are true regardless of who speaks them. The “root word” of 
Revelation is I, while the root word of Creation is good. The root sentence of Redemption 
is “God is good.” The root word “leads from the primordial, inaudible Yes . . .  to the 
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audible reality of language.”156 (138). As we see more concretely, language is the key to 
the reversals that bring the nothings into relationship. 
Revelation (Book Two of Part Two) begins with the Song of Songs’ claim that 
“Love is as strong as death” (Song of Songs 8:6). From this Rosenzweig explains the 
origin of the soul as faithfulness in responding to God’s love, which also gives 
permanence to God.157 After God calls to the self, “Where are you?” (Genesis 3:9), using 
the proper name (Adam), the soul responds, “I am here.” God’s speaking calls forth the 
soul, which in its response, “Here I am,” becomes an authentic I responding to an 
authentic you.158 This self or soul is coming into a different mode of existence than Man 
in Man’s primordial state; it is doing so relationally through language and in particularity. 
That God calls with “the proper name” is vital here because it is the indication of the 
particularity of the incipient relationship. This self, Adam, is not a generic or abstract 
entity, but a particular self, coming into relationship through particular language – Jewish 
words, which for Rosenzweig are capable of renewing the world.159 This particular self, 
this authentic I, this Adam, doesn’t fully exist autonomously, but as a product of 
relationship through language. The rise of the authentic I also constitutes the prelude to 
the Commandment, “You shall love the Eternal your God with all your heart, with all 
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your soul and with all your might.” This command from God to love God is the only one 
not capable of being “decanted” into law,160 because it is so fully present, lacking the 
future and duration necessary for law. Indeed, it is so fully present that it transforms all 
other commandments from law back to commandment. For Rosenzweig, the 
commandment to Love God, like all love, is immediate, pure present. In contrast to the 
perpetual immediacy of love and thus, of the commandment to love, law requires time, 
future, duration.161 
The soul eventually responds to the command to love with the confession of sin, 
“I have sinned/I am a sinner.” Rosenzweig is again building on and correcting Cohen, 
this time for the understanding of sin as the failure to love. Time remains significant here. 
The confession takes time, because in order to confess its sin, the soul must confess to a 
lack of love in the past, and this admission of finitude is painful to the soul in the face of 
the constancy of God’s love, as an expression of God’s finitude. But from the confession 
of sin also springs the confession of faith that “the God of my love is really God.”162 This 
confession of faith effects two goals, it expresses the soul’s certainty of God’s love and it 
confirms the being and duration of God. The confession of sin/faith also gives rise to the 
love of neighbor. Note again that as Rosenzweig uses the concept of faith here, it is not 
an expression of theistic belief, but a component of the structure that secures the nothing 
of God against slipping out of relationship and back into nothingness.  
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The individual human I is the necessary precursor to the externalization of the 
Self as love of neighbor. In effect, Rosenzweig demonstrates that the individual human I 
is not an end in itself, but rather the condition of relationship, the prerequisite for the 
connection between Man and World. As Rosenzweig notes in his description of Man’s 
metaethical nature, “even though he prides himself on his individuality, he recognizes 
that he is himself a part.”163 It is in the relationships among the nothings that reality is 
grounded and it is in relationship (communal structures) that we experience the 
reconstituted All,164 to the extent that this is possible. More than this, though, it is in 
relationship that Man emerges fully from the primordial world. One may 
logically/experientially draw from this account of the human as fundamentally relational 
in its origin the conclusion that relationship is not an addition or a choice. Instead, 
relationship is both constitutive of the human, and the purpose of what it means to be 
fully human, and it begins with the relationship between God and Man. It is, therefore, 
properly a theological anthropology, without being dependent on religious belief. It is 
therefore also a philosophical anthropology, capable of application elsewhere without 
importing the sectarian religious. Finitude is also a constitutive factor in the meaning of 
humanity–in the notion of sin, as failure to love–and in the way sin fosters the 
transformation of Man into Beloved Soul, still distinct from, but now defined by God’s 
love and its own response of externalizing love. Finitude is also demonstrated in the 
Beloved Soul’s need to externalize its response to God’s love as love of neighbor.165 
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Book Two of Part Two (Revelation) ends with the words, “As he loves you, so 
shall you love.” This phrase directs attention to the initial work of Redemption, to bring 
Man and World into relationship, which is the final stage of the temporal dialectic. The 
Beloved Soul comes into relationship with the World because it must externalize its love 
of God as love of neighbor. Speech is once again involved in this turning. In this case, the 
turning involves a different kind of speech than the speech of Creation or Revelation. 
Rather than the one-way speech of Creation or Revelation, the speech of Redemption is 
mutual speech, a “duet.” Just as God’s love is constantly in the present, the soul’s love of 
neighbor is also prospective, a constantly renewed response to God’s own love of the 
Beloved Soul. The constant renewal of the response to God’s commandment to love is in 
contrast to the law of obedience, which is static and always in the past.166 Only through 
love of neighbor is the soul “finally definitively con-firmed in its place,”167 as the result 
of the soul’s concern for the World and a fundamental aspect of reality. Out of the same 
gratitude that allowed the confession of sin, the Beloved Soul externalizes its love of God 
as love of neighbor, turning toward and entering into relationship with the World. 
The core question Rosenzweig explores in Redemption is how “Love your 
neighbor” follows from God’s “Love me.” Although the soul has responded to and 
grounded God in actuality, the soul itself is not fully grounded; it still has the possibility 
of slipping back into silence and isolation. The process of becoming grounded, through 
entering into relationship with the World takes the soul through ancient and modern 
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tragedy, the mystic, the saint, and finally through God’s servant to the “oriented will,” a 
further inner reversal (which God and World also experience) in which “the surrender 
required in the commandment of love for God” is completed. This completed or pure 
surrender makes it necessary for the soul to “externalize [itself] in the act of love, once 
the soul has been awakened by God.”168 For Rosenzweig, “Love cannot do other than be 
effective. There is no act of love toward one’s neighbor that falls into the void.”169 Hence, 
the soul is not merely oriented toward or even merely concerned for the neighbor; the 
soul must engage in acts of love toward neighbor in order to be secured in its existence. 
Thus, in a foundational sense, the very existence of the individual may be dependent on 
the soul’s acts of love toward others. Indeed, it might even be the case that the existence 
of reality itself is at risk when the soul fails to engage in acts of love toward the neighbor.  
 This brings us back to Rosenzweig’s unique philosophical insight: that we 
understand reality not through some abstract universal, but through our own particularity. 
For Rosenzweig, this particularity is Judaism, at least in part, to invoke Lindbeck, 
because this is his “native language.” However, although the communal framework 
grounded in the Jewish community is the paradigmatic expression of the epistemological 
framework of communal structures necessary to grasp the all, even the communal 
framework of the Jewish community is insufficient for a complete realization of the All. 
Finitude is ultimately the condition for the possibility of relating creatively to reality. As 
Batnitzky says, “To remain in life is to remain human, and to remain human, The Star of 
 
168 Rosenzweig, The Star, 230. 
 
169 Rosenzweig, The Star, 286. 
 87 
Redemption continually reminds us, is to be able to perceive only partially and always 
incompletely.”170 The very structure of The Star “suggests that incompleteness emerges 
through relation.”171 One of the ways we see this is in the fact that the Soul recognizes its 
sin of failure to love in the past only because God speaks and, thus, initiates relationship. 
In other words, the Beloved Soul’s recognition of its finitude is the condition of its 
relationship with God, and all others. 
Communal Structures 
 The final progression of epistemological frameworks takes place in Part Three, in 
which Rosenzweig explores Jewish and Christian liturgy and liturgical cycles, as well as 
the core liturgies and vocation of each worshipping community. Having explored the 
nature of reality and the place of Man through the epistemological framework of 
experience, Rosenzweig turns in the final part of The Star to the epistemological 
framework of communal structures “in general and the Jewish community in 
particular.”172 Communal structures include time, prayer, and liturgy, and through these 
lenses, one comes to a fuller understanding of the possibilities and limits of the 
experience of Redemption. In this context, Rosenzweig is talking about more than the 
reorientation of past, present, and future, or the way in which the past constitutes identity 
in the present. Here in Part Three, the communal structure of time is the cycle of the 
Jewish and Christian liturgical calendars, the structure of the religious ritual year, which 
 
170 Batnitzky, Idolatry and Representation, 68. 
 
171 Batnitzky, Idolatry and Representation, 78. 
 
172 Batnitzky, Idolatry and Representation, 62. 
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consists of regular recurring rituals. Both the cycle of liturgies and the liturgies173 
themselves are structures of this last epistemological framework.  
 Rosenzweig contrasts the Jewish and Christian forms of the cycle of liturgies and 
the liturgies themselves, demonstrating the superiority of Jewish communal frameworks 
as well as the necessary relationship between Judaism and Christianity. Although 
Judaism requires Christianity to fulfill its vocation, the Jewish communal structure is 
always superior. For Rosenzweig, this is expressed most fully in the fact that the core 
Christian liturgy is celebrated on Sunday, the first day of the week. In choosing this day 
for the celebration of the Eucharist, Christianity chose to perpetually align itself with the 
present (revelation). Christianity is, thus, only ever “on the way.” In contrast, the core 
Jewish liturgy, Sabbath, is celebrated on the seventh day, the day of completion and of 
rest. It is, thus, “both sign of Creation and first Revelation, as well as and even above all 
anticipation of Redemption.”174 While Christian liturgies, prayer, and the Christian 
liturgical calendar do provide community as the condition for experience, Rosenzweig 
argues that Christian communal structures fail to express mutuality and thus, remain 
fundamentally individualistic. For example, although Christians come to a common table 
in the core liturgy of the Eucharist, they both approach and leave the common table as 
individuals. In contrast, the Sabbath meal is truly communal, set in the mutual life of the 
home, in which “each is equal to the other.”175 In his extended comparison (which 
 
173 Specific, “core” liturgies from each tradition. From Judaism, the Days of Awe (Yom Kippur and 
Rosh Hashanah), Shabbat, and the Festivals of Revelation (Passover, Shavuot, and Succot). For 
Christianity, weekly Sunday worship and the Festivals of Revelation (Christmas, Easter, Pentecost). 
 
174 Rosenzweig, The Star, 230. 
 
175 Rosenzweig, The Star, 334 
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includes Islam as foil), we see how Rosenzweig prioritizes communal frameworks “in 
general and the Jewish community in particular,”176 even where the structures of the 
communal frameworks are similar, such as in the reading and explication of the biblical 
text. Nevertheless, for Rosenzweig, “both Jew and Christian are workers on the same 
task. He [God] cannot dispense with either.” Moreover, “[t]he truth, the whole truth, 
belongs therefore to neither of them,” because “the essence of the truth is to be 
shared.”177  
 A final dispute among Rosenzweig scholars is the question of whether 
Rosenzweig believed it is possible to grasp the All in this life. Although scholars 
generally agree that we should read the opening and closing words of The Star together 
as “From death . . . into life,” they disagree on the correct understanding of this overall 
admonition. Is Rosenzweig saying that the reconstituted All is a transformation from 
dead philosophy into a living engagement with the All? In many ways this appears to be 
the case. Nahum Glazer, one of The Star’s earliest interpreters, reads the admonition at 
the heart of The Star in this way, as an affirmation of everyday life over dead 
philosophy.178 The fact that Rosenzweig left academia after the publication of The Star in 
order to teach the core Jewish texts to other assimilated Jews and translate the Bible into 
German with Martin Buber appears to confirm this reading. However, other scholars note 
that The Star describes the ‘‘countenance’’ as ultimately inaccessible. Benjamin calls it 
 
176 Batnitzky, Idolatry and Representation, 62, emphasis added. 
 
177 Rosenzweig, The Star, 438-439. 
 




“a mystical vision rather than a return to ordinary life,”179 while Rosenzweig says himself 
that “[i]mmediate sight of the whole truth comes only to him who sees it in God. But this 
is a seeing beyond life.”180 Human knowledge, as described by Rosenzweig is only ever 
partial, only ever a share of the full truth that is God’s own. In support of this reading, 
Benjamin points out that the biblical images Rosenzweig uses refer to Moses, evoking the 
particular way in which God prevented Moses from entering the promised land before 
dying, according to Deuteronomy. Moses merely glimpses the promised land before 
receiving the kiss of God’s mouth that is his death. Benjamin thus argues that 
Rosenzweig could only mean by “true life,” the state in which we can fully grasp the All, 
is life beyond this world (possibly through a mystic vision, but definitely not in the 
everyday). Pollock generally agrees and explores the question of mystic vision as an 
experience Rosenzweig himself had of the All. He argues that Rosenzweig had at least 
one such experience of an “immediate vision of the whole truth . . . in God.” Pollock 
proposes the “possibility” that Rosenzweig believed his ability to have such an immediate 
vision was “rooted in his unique ability to stand “beyond life” and see from a standpoint 
that is both Jewish and Christian at once.” Moreover, Pollock proposes that Rosenzweig 
believed that “the few Jews and Christians like him” might also be capable of such direct 
experience.181  
 
179 Benjamin, Rosenzweig's Bible 31. 
 
180 Rosenzweig, The Star, 439. 
 
181 Pollock, Systematic Task of Philosophy, 297-304. Pollock explains in a footnote to this section that 
his mentor, Emil Fackenheim, also read Rosenzweig in this way and thought it indicated a relapse in 
Rosenzweig’s own thought from the new thinking to the old. (Pollock, 303n59) 
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 There is much to support the contention that Rosenzweig believed it impossible to 
fully grasp the All, except as a kind of rare mystical vision of the All. Even though lived 
experience and communal structures give us crucially important insight far beyond the 
bounds of mere logic, Rosenzweig rejects the Hegelian dialectical model of history, an 
intelligible process moving towards the realization of human freedom.182 Instead, 
Rosenzweig insists that no mode of knowing gives us full access to the reconciled All. 
His own words in The Star provide ample evidence that he believed a full grasping of the 
true All was beyond this life, even if there is some doubt about what he meant by beyond 
life. Nevertheless the question remains whether this impossibility is ultimately an 
impediment to what appears to be Rosenzweig’s charge to his readers to re-enter life, the 
everyday, acknowledging the specific fear of one’s own particular death and the 
limitations of logic to cognize, much less grasp, the All. Again, his own life seems to be 
an example of grounding logic in experience and communal structures. We may, I think, 
draw the conclusion that even if Rosenzweig thought grasping the All in this lifetime 
largely impossible, he might nevertheless advocate trying. Even assuming the 
impossibility of immediately grasping the All, we might live as much as possible in 
creative relationship with the All, through an engagement of logic (theory) with 
experience and communal structures (practice). Such a pragmatic view would eschew 
utopia without thereby opting for either nihilism or quietism, thus also avoiding being 
simply “on the way,” as Christianity, but actually living into the redemptive vocation of 
doing justice, loving the good, and walking humbly with God. Note though, that 
 
182 Redding, Paul, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/hegel/. 
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Rosenzweig offers this admonition from the Hebrew Prophet Micah as the shape of 
vocation in order to describe the task of grasping the All through humility, of relating 
creatively to reality in our human finitude. For Rosenzweig, this is what makes 
relationship with the other possible, even necessary. 
 In Rosenzweig’s description of the new philosophy, he lays the foundation for a 
philosophical anthropology that expands the narrow focus of the Lockean individual. At 
the heart of the alternative he provides is the irreducibly diverse multiplicity out of which 
the reconceived All, or reality is founded. In addition, The Star highlights how 
imperfection and finitude provide the keys to entering into enduring relationship. Failure 
to love in the past and the understanding that “disappointment keeps up love’s 
strength,”183 as well as the successive epistemological frameworks with their inevitable 
limitations are all elements of this imperfection and finitude. The philosophical 
anthropology that emerges from this foundation provides an alternative to the individual 
rights advocacy model of justice in which to be human is to be primarily relational and 
open, rather than primarily autonomous and independent. Thus, to foster flourishing, 
legal advocacy models must also foster relationality and openness. 
 For Rosenzweig, it is from the fear of our own death that we return most fully to 
life. The completion of philosophy with theology further demonstrates that particularity 
and finitude are the keys to relating most creatively to reality. To engage creatively in this 
sense is also to live into our redemptive vocation through communal structures. As 
exemplified in Rosenzweig’s description of the Jewish community, a vocationally 
 
183 Rosenzweig, The Star, 231. 
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oriented community is organized ritually, oriented in time, and lives for the redemptive 
vocational purpose of promoting justice. Drawing on Rosenzweig’s understanding of 
love as constantly renewed externalized acts of love toward the neighbor, grounds a 
dynamic interrelationship between theory and practice for the purpose of doing justice. 
Importantly, this sense of vocation, based on Micah 6:8, also includes a permanent 
aporetic yet dependent relationship between Judaism and Christianity. The Hebrew 
prophet Micah admonished the people that all that God required of them was to “walk 
humbly with their God, to do justice and to love mercy.” When we combine this with the 
idea that the relationship between Man and World, of the self with meaning, is an 
externalization of God’s love as acts of love toward neighbor, and translate, we get 
something like an admonition to acknowledge our limited compassion for others as the 
basis of a commitment to assure that all are able to participate to their fullest extent in 
civil society. Exactly this notion of doing of justice while loving mercy, or justice as acts 
of love toward the neighbor, complicates abstract and atomistic constructions of 
individuals and their nominal rights which perpetuate inequity and unfreedom as the 
result of the application of the abstract rule of law.
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Chapter Three: Open and Relational Subject 
 At the core of Rosenzweig’s revolutionary new thinking is the claim that reality 
depends for existence on the relationships among three irreducibly diverse elements. 
From this it follows that individuality must be relational before it is anything else. The 
nature of the elements and of their relationships also demonstrates that individuality is 
also open, meaning particular, finite, and imperfectible. The individual who is capable of 
grasping Rosenzweig’s reality is therefore radically different than the essentially abstract 
individual Locke imagines exists in nature prior to civil society.  
 Both the First Amendment and the public accommodations laws are designed to 
protect the value of diversity inherent in Rosenzweig’s conception of reality.  However, 
grounded in the lens of rights, the abstract value of diversity requires a justification not 
inherent in the social contract itself; moreover, it does not provide a mechanism for 
evaluating the rights claims of diverse individuals against apparently competing claims to 
protect religious liberty, when these claims compete in the commercial marketplace to 
accommodate sexual diversity and religious traditionalism. Working from Rosenzweig’s 
new philosophy and its companion, theology-as-temporal, we can construct a 
philosophical anthropology that is capable of countering Locke’s narrow vision of 
atomistic individuality. The understanding of individuality grounded in Rosenzweig’s 
reality, not only posits diversity as the original characteristic of existence, but centers
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relationality and openness in the temporal process through which the diverse elements of 
reality emerge, transform, and enter into relations that further transform them and solidify
their relationships. Like reality itself, this open and relational individual is irreducibly 
diverse and particular, finite and imperfectible, possessing bounded rationality and 
ethicality, as well as limited agency.  
 As with Rosenzweig’s insight about the new philosophy, insight into the nature of 
an expanded individuality is grounded in a seeming negative. The fear of one’s own 
particular death provides insight into the new philosophy. What Rosenzweig calls the 
“confession of sin”–the admission of past failure–provides the insight into the alternative 
philosophical anthropology. This admission of past failure becomes enduring-and-
transforming present, grounding openness, as well as relationality, in the individual. 
Grounded in the present, rather than a mythic past or utopian future, and continuingly 
transformational, openness as a characteristic of individuality is not progressing toward 
some ultimate perfection. It is not teleological or Hegelian. Openness is not a stand in for 
a historical arc toward justice, for example. In this sense it is consistent with 
Rosenzweig’s general rejection of Hegel’s dialectical form of gradual perfectibility, 
marking imperfectability as an enduring limit. 
 The Lockean individual is characterized by autonomy and independence, the 
perfectible subject of secular liberalism and of the individual rights advocacy model of 
law, tending always toward abstraction in its perception of its own universality. In 
contrast, the open and relational nature of the philosophical anthropology drawn from 
Rosenzweig is able to contextualize both diversity and particularity in ways that do not 
tend to devolve into atomistic identity politics. The human capable of orientation toward 
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reality as Rosenzweig describes it in The Star is a particular human, finite, oriented in 
time, and formed in relationship, able to participate fully in civil society and the public 
square with diverse and particular others. The finitude which is part of openness, 
combined with relationality, helps this individual live into Rosenzweig’s vision of justice 
as “vocation,” as calling or life’s work. Openness and relationality draw on similar 
sources in The Star that contribute to both the particularity and diversity of the individual, 
and are grounded in acknowledgement of a failure of compassion for others. They are 
interrelated and co-constitutive, as are the elements of the All. However, it is helpful to 
examine these sources in their specificity before translating them into non-theological 
terms familiar to the discourse of secular liberalism and jurisprudence. As we explore and 
translate the details of this broad picture, we begin with relationality.  
Relationality 
 Relationality is the most striking feature of Rosenzweig’s alternative system, 
therefore it is also the most prominent characteristic of individuality grounded in his 
system, rather than in Locke. Rosenzweig’s whole system and each of the elements in it 
are driven by relationality. Reality is inherently relational because it is the product of the 
relationships among the elements. Each element is also individually relational in that 
each comes into being from its primordial nothingness through the emergence and 
reversals of its unique somethings. The process of emergence and transformation of each 
element both secures the existence of each element and brings it into relationship with the 
others, thus grounding the whole of reality. As Rosenzweig repeatedly notes, but for their 
relationships with each other, the elements remain possible only, with the potential to slip 
back into their original nothingness; indeed, anxiety over this possibility partially drives 
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the relational transformations.184 As conceived by Rosenzweig, the three core nothings or 
elements that comprise reality exist independently and cannot be further reduced or 
conflated, making reality irreducibly diverse.  Even in their primordial state, however, 
each of the elements contains the capacity for relationship which is also the capacity for 
existence. Each is also internally relational, as it contains within itself its own particular 
something, what Rosenzweig calls the differential. Thus, the nature of individuality that 
flows from his system is also irreducibly diverse and constituted through relationship. 
 Because one of the elements of reality that Rosenzweig identifies and describes is 
called “Man,” it may be tempting to think that the section on Man is Rosenzweig’s 
philosophical anthropology, but this is not the case. The element Man is not the 
individual, nor the basis of a philosophical anthropology, but rather a constitutive element 
of reality. Indeed, there is as much discussion of the concept of individuality, its 
relationship to particularity and to community, in the description of World, also a 
constitutive element of reality, as there is in Rosenzweig’s description of Man.185 It is as 
this element in the structure of reality that the temporal relationships between the 
elements also express the relational as it is developed in the alternative philosophical 
anthropology that naturally flows from Rosenzweig’s alternative philosophical system. 
This temporal relationship uses explicitly theological terms and is described as the 
 
184 This idea comprises a significant portion of the “Transition” between Part One and part Two of The 
Star, see for example pp. 96-97. Notice, however, that in Rosenzweig, this insecurity is not competitive or 
antagonistic as it is in Asad’s description of the Lockean individual. Instead, it actually facilitates 
relationship. As will be further demonstrated in the discussion of openness, in Rosenzweig, this insecurity 
is also not capable of resolution. It is an aporia, distinct from Hegel’s effort to systemically resolve all 
contradictions. 
 
185 See for example, Rosenzweig’s discussion of the relationship between particularity and 
universality, beginning at the bottom of p. 55 and continuing through the middle of p. 57.  
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theological turn in Rosenzweig; however, it can also be translated into the language and 
structures of liberalism. The translation of these relationships begins by recognizing the 
function of each element as an aspect of reality, and comparing its distinct usage in 
Hegel: God as being, Man as self, World as meaning; and its unique process of entering 
into relationship with the others. Thus, constructing the alternative philosophical 
anthropology flows particularly from the relationships between being and self, as well as 
between self and meaning. Every step of the transformations involved in the becoming of 
a relational self is also a function of and promotes relationality. What Rosenzweig 
describes as the turn toward God in response to God’s call by the proper name, the soul’s 
confession of sin as failure to love in the past, and finally, the Beloved Soul’s turn toward 
the World to externalize God’s love as acts of love toward neighbor is for him the 
description of  justice as vocation. Translated, the diverse and relational individual 
becomes open and particular by acknowledging their failure of compassion as enduring, 
as imperfectability. Therefore, the open and relational individual  becomes free to 
participate fully in civil society and the public square and support others in doing the 
same as a life’s work for justice as equity. 
 Individuality drawn from sources in Rosenzweig is internally constituted by 
relationship and is also the product of relationships. Individuality and relationality are co-
constitutive; relationality is not a later addition or the result of individual agency as 
conceived through the lens of either Locke or Kant.186 The relationships Rosenzweig 
 
186 The concept of agency here is that reflected in Kant’s short treatise “What is Enlightenment?” It 
also touches on the second significant characteristic of the individual as drawn from sources within 
Rosenzweig, and will be addressed more fully later in this chapter. 
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describes as reality may also be understood as the process of the development of the 
individual, as particular and diverse, into and as the result of relationship. This 
development of particularity and diversity is both the enduring source of openness and of 
compassion for (solidarity with) others. It, thus, sustains the shared work of justice as 
equity, or social justice and advocacy with and for others, internally rather than 
externally. Relationality is an original characteristic of the individual as grounded in 
Rosenzweig. Thus, regard for others is also both natural and enduring, even though 
imperfect, as the open and relational individual is imperfect and imperfectible. The 
individual thus conceived is also capable of continuing transformation, refining their 
particularity, in the same way that the elements of reality both transform and remain 
distinct. As with the elements, the continuing refinement of the particularity of the 
individual secures relationship, rather than polarizing. The individual as conceived 
through Rosenzweig’s system continues, through relationship, to be transformed and to 
transform the various communities of which they are inevitably a part. This expanded 
understanding of individuality also transforms the understanding of liberty in the context 
of liberal jurisprudence. Rather than Locke’s freedom, which is primarily freedom from, 
the freedom that flows this alternative understanding of individuality is more like the 
freedom of the Greek demos, the freedom to participate with others in community. 
Openness 
 The individual drawn from sources in Rosenzweig is also open, grounded in the 
present and in acknowledgment of imperfection. Each individual exists in time with their 
own particular narrative arc, unlike the Lockean individual whose abstraction as rights-
bearing citizen is not located temporally. This openness, while temporally grounded in 
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the present, is also connected constructively to the past, and, ultimately, to the future. As 
located in the relationship between Man as Beloved Soul and World, to be open is to be 
constantly renewed in the awareness of finitude and imperfectability, which grounds the 
continuing relationship between the particular self (Beloved Soul) and meaning (World). 
This openness-as-finitude begins by acknowledging the failure of compassion in the past. 
That openness should be a product of finitude may seem paradoxical, but is consistent 
with Rosenzweig’s insight into the creativity inherent in the acknowledgment of the fear 
of death as the fear of one’s own particular death. Moreover, the coincidence suggests 
that maintaining relationship depends on acknowledging finitude and imperfection. Just 
as the command to love is always in the present, the confession of failure is also always a 
present confession, although it is a confession about the past. In this sense, the present 
rests on “the existence of the past [but] doesn’t dwell  in it.”187 The connection between 
past and present that this creates gives rise to a present that is enduring-and-transforming. 
The acknowledgement of failure of compassion in the past motivates a difference concept 
of justice. In contrast to justice as fairness, based on equal rights for those similarly 
situated, justice as equity, precisely because it provides options for resolving conflict 
where justice as fairness fails, recognizes the incommensurability of diversity and 
particularity. The enduring-and-transforming nature of openness also provides the basis 
of the capacity for self-reflection as the capacity for self-correction. Thus, openness also 
sustains the creative process, driving exploration and experimentation in the face of 
 
187 Rosenzweig, The Star, 169. 
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continuing internal and external imperfections, rather than leading to either resignation or 
resentment.  
 In Rosenzweig’s counter-Hegelian temporal dialectic, transformations in the 
relationship between self and meaning (Man and World) takes place in the present 
(Revelation). The relationship between being and self (God’s love) is always in the 
present, constantly new and renewed, it has no duration. This presentness sustains the 
individual’s openness.188 The transformation also takes place in and as part of the future 
(Redemption). As part of this re-orientation toward the future, the self’s awareness of 
itself as lacking in compassion-in-the-past becomes an awareness of itself as always-
lacking compassion. Rosenzweig refers to this as a “perpetually new self-negation”189 of 
the self. This perpetually new self-negation expresses not just current imperfection, but 
the impossibility of perfection, the imperfectability of the individual. Imperfectability, 
thus, flows from and is a characteristic of openness. Rosenzweig also acknowledges that 
there is an element of betrayal in the nature of the relationship between being and self 
(God’s love), because it is constantly renewed rather than continuing. In this way, the 
Rosenzweigian individual also contains an element of insecurity, and this insecurity is as 
permanent as the relationship itself. However, unlike the insecurity of the modern secular 
subject, as explained by Asad, this insecurity is not competitive or antagonistic. Precisely 
 
188 For Rosenzweig, presentness is also the characteristic that distinguishes God’s love (as present 
relationship) from law, and which makes God’s command to love the only commandment that can’t 
become law. Law for Rosenzweig is generally negative because it has duration, rather than presentness. 
However, Rosenzweig describes fate as both enduring and as the original law. However, fate loses its 
endurance when it “breaks into the light,” which it does precisely when God breaks out of God’s 
hiddenness into Revelation (as part of the configuration of reality). Rosenzweig, The Star, 172. 
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because it is not resolved, this aporia instead grounds imperfectability as the source of the 
capacity for continuing change and adaptation. 
 Importantly and distinctly, the individual as grounded in Rosenzweig’s system is 
not abstract, but particular and diverse. Both particularity and diversity flow from and are 
grounded in both the openness and the relationality of this individual. Because of this, the 
individual as grounded in Rosenzweig is capable of embodiment in exactly the ways that 
often prove the most problematic for the Lockean abstract and universal individual. This 
capacity for embodiment provides the concreteness necessary to locate race, 
gender/gender identity, ability – all the complexities and intersectionalities of real human 
difference, including social location, class and power differentials. Distinctly in 
Rosenzweig, particularity and diversity are grounded in relationality and openness, rather 
than abstract, nominal rights. This different grounding provides coherence for difference 
which does not require artificial limits, while also tending to resist the atomization typical 
of endlessly conflictual identity politics. Using this different understanding of what it 
means to be human provides the foundation for a variety of different aspects of human 
life, but especially in law because abstractions tend to elide the very characteristics 
necessary to fully cognize and resolve legal conflicts, which are always particular to the 
diverse parties, but whose resolution must also be consistent with generic principles 
capable of guiding resolution of similar conflicts justly. The problems posed by the 
individual as abstraction manifest themselves in all areas of law, but are especially acute 
in contexts such as employment, housing, education, government services, and public 
commercial space, in which diverse individuals have been and may still be discriminated 
against precisely because of their particularity. In such cases, maintaining the legal fiction 
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of the abstractly equal individual allows courts to preserve the idea of individual rights, 
while also failing to find, protect or redress violations of individual rights in specific 
cases.190 The gap between individuals in the abstract and particular individuals is 
currently at issue in the intersection of sexual diversity and religious freedom.  
 Individuals are simply not equal. We do indeed have different faculties–abilities, 
skills, interests, which combined with variations in social location translate into vastly 
different life chances191–and the legal fiction that we are equal is the very construct that 
most often prevents the law from taking into account the differences that bring us into 
conflict and from which we seek relief. The open and relational individual is far more 
than an abstract possessor of rights belonging to man in the state of nature (or conferred 
through the consent of majorities). Unlike the Lockean individual, the open and relational 
individual is not oriented toward others in a stance of antagonism. As Asad points out, 
independent and autonomous individuals are naturally antagonistic. The theoretical 
freedom, equality, and independence individuals possess in the state of nature are 
 
190 Perhaps the most extensive example of this problem is the right to an abortion. Although the case 
granting the right has not been overturned, courts repeatedly find that legal restrictions on the exercise of 
this right are not substantial enough to justify the invalidation of the laws. Thus, although a woman has a 
technical right to an abortion, she will be hard-pressed to actually exercise that right in most areas of the 
U.S. Other examples can be found in criminal law. For example, in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 
(1987), the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with data showing that the death penalty was imposed in a racially 
discriminatory manner. However, despite a variety of legal protections against racial discrimination, these 
facts in themselves did not benefit the defendant, because he had not shown that a specific act of individual 
discrimination against him resulted in his being sentenced to death rather than life in prison. In other words, 
the Court accepted racial discrimination as normative in the system. Courts frequently find laws acceptable 
despite their “disparate impact” – the undeniably racist or sexist impact of an ostensibly neutral law – 
because of an absence of evidence of specific or individual animus against the disparately impacted group. 
Indeed, courts sometimes describe their rulings as “color-blind” precisely when they are sanctioning 
racially disparate results. Examples of this problem exist in every area of law for every nominally protected 
group. 
 
191 Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical, Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law 
(Brooklyn, NY: South End Press, 2011), 20. 
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insecure both because resources are finite and the mere rights-bearing individual has no 
natural obligations to consider the rights (or needs) of others. Rights are thus, 
competitive, and finite or zero-sum, i.e., one can gain rights only if others lose them.192 
Identity constructed in terms of rights is necessarily also competitive. The fiction of 
equality also frustrates the development of consistent methods for assigning relative 
value to rights for the purpose of resolving conflicts of rights. Locke, like most political 
theorists and philosophers, orients his thesis in logic. As Rosenzweig also demonstrates, 
the epistemology of logic poses only a theoretical framework for relationship. In order to 
secure relationship, Rosenzweig shifts his epistemology to experience. Similarly, a 
philosophical anthropology of openness and relationality operates from an 
epistemological framework of experience, which both makes logic possible, but also 
demonstrates the limits of logic. The same abstractions that ground Locke’s vision of the 
individual and the individual’s relationship to civil society ground law with its abstract 
vision of individual rights. Experience is secondary, if it has a place at all. The 
problematic fit of experience within law is most evident in those areas that touch on the 
legality of relationships, especially in domestic relations law. Not coincidentally, this is 
also the area of law in which equity remains most structurally embedded. Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines equity as: 
A system of jurisprudence collateral to, and in some respects independent of, 
“law”; the object of which is to render the administration of justice more 
complete, by affording relief where the courts of law are incompetent to give it, or 
 
192 The term “zero-sum” comes from game theory and is often used in political theory. Although rights 
may not need to work this way, political discourse often pits the desired rights of minorities against the 
existing rights of those with privilege. Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of internal and external goods differ in 
a similar way: internal goods are not finite, thus the expansion of internal goods for some is not dependent 
on the loss of internal goods for others. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theology, 3rd. 
ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 187-188. 
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to give it with effect, or by exercising certain branches of jurisdiction 
independently of them. 
 
Equity has ancient legal origins as a correction and completion of the law’s harshest, 
most formulaic elements. Reorienting the law’s philosophical anthropology shifts equity 
from the periphery to the center of constructing and resolving legal conflicts. Experience, 
rather than logic is central to the construction of equitable alternatives that fill the gaps 
left by the abstract procedural structures of law. Even a classic jurist such as Oliver 
Wendell Holmes acknowledged famously in the opening of his 1881 classic, The 
Common Law that “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”193 
Martha Nussbaum traces a history of equity from the Greek epieikeia as “flexible and 
particularized judgment linked to leniency.”194 
 In contrast to the Lockean individual, the open and relational individual is 
naturally connected to other individuals, capable of grounding experience, co-constitutive 
of civil society and the public square. Particularity and diversity are valuable not because 
of some later construct, but because they express the nature of reality itself. Expanding 
individuality in the way proposed by this alternative philosophical anthropology is not a 
means of eliminating conflict; conflicts will inevitably arise even among open and 
relational individuals, because particularity and diversity are challenging. The shift 
produced is that rights are not the only or the primary means of resolving conflicts among 
such individuals. Centering openness and relationality, rather than autonomy and 
 
193 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, with a new Introduction by Sheldon M. Novick (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1991), 1.  
 
194 Martha Nussbaum, “Equity and Mercy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring, 
1993), pp. 83-125, 85. Wiley-Blackwell. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265442. 
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independence, as the core of individuality creates the opportunity to frame legal conflicts 
and their resolution in terms of the inevitable failure and restoration of relationship, rather 
than as rights competitions in which one must lose in order for another to win. Because 
the open and relational individual is embodied, operating in terms of broken and restored 
relationships, rather than nominal rights, may also better support the possibility of 
redressing the economic harm inevitably caused by inequity, and of restoring 
relationships fractured by prejudice.195 
 Having articulated the alternative philosophical anthropology grounded in 
Rosenzweig, let us consider the difference it could make to an analysis of the conflict that 
masterpiece Cakeshop illustrates. 
Rethinking Masterpiece Cakeshop  
 Theoretically, individual rights advocacy should be sufficient to resolve the rights 
conflicts of Lockean individuals, assuring the rights of all free, equal, and independent 
citizens to participate equally in the public square. The Court acted swiftly and decisively 
to reject claims for a religious exemption to discriminate on the basis of race in Newman 
v. Piggie Park. As the Court itself acknowledged, there is no rational way to limit an 
exemption in one case, such that it does not “subject[] gay persons to indignities in the 
marketplace” in all cases. As Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor noted in their dissent, the 
 
195 For some readers, this language may seem to invoke special sentencing projects, described as 
Restorative Justice, in contrast to retributive justice. Such models typically involve first-time, non-violent, 
and often juvenile offenders, purporting to draw on pre-Colonial indigenous, and models of justice and 
feminine care models. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), which recounts a case in which the Lakota 
tribe sentenced a murderer to provide long-term support for the victim’s family (and which is usually cited 
as the reason tribal courts may no longer try capital cases), is often cited in this context. These origin claims 
are contested, as are the long-term results. Regardless of their origins, and although they may be consistent 
with the alternative philosophical anthropology model proposed here, these projects represent limited 
experimental exceptions to individual rights based advocacy rather than whole-sale alternatives. 
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logic of the majority opinion itself should have led to this result. Instead, the Court’s ad 
hoc concern about the anti-religious attitude of some members of the Colorado Human 
Rights Commission (and possibly concern for their colleagues fears of religious 
persecution) prevented the Court from reaching a substantive decision. 
 NeJaime & Siegel argue that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Masterpiece is 
substantive in that by expressly rejecting certain religious claims and repeatedly citing 
Piggie Park as relevant, it clearly “repudiate[s] longstanding arguments advanced by 
exemption advocates and instead affirm[s] an approach to public accommodations law 
that limits religious accommodation to prevent harm to other citizens who do not share 
the objector’s beliefs.”196 However, Justice Kennedy has been replaced by Justice 
Kavanaugh, who has demonstrated his sympathy for the arguments advanced by 
exemption advocates in his pre-Supreme Court rulings,197 while the Arizona appellate 
court case NeJaime and Siegel cite in support of their argument was subsequently 
overturned by the Arizona Supreme Court.198 Thus, there is good reason to doubt their 
 
196 Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel, “Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop,” Yale L. J. Forum, September 14, 2018, at 202. 
 
197 Priests for Life v. Dept Health & Human Svs. This case has a complex history, ultimately including 
consolidation with several similar cases all challenging specific provisions of the opt-out procedure for 
employers who refused to provide contraceptive coverage for their employees on religious grounds. The 
consolidated cases were referred to the Supreme Court, which remanded them back to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. Kavanaugh participated as a judge on the D.C. Circuit Court. A majority of the court 
dismissed the priests’ claims that even notifying the government of their refusal to provide coverage 
violated their religious freedom because it made them complicit in the government action of providing 
contraceptive coverage, i.e. that their religious convictions should permit them to prevent their employees 
from receiving contraceptive coverage at all. Kavanaugh wrote a dissenting opinion in which he explained 
why he would have granted the priests’ request. This dissent was reported in a variety of on-line sources at 
the time of Kavanaugh’s Senate confirmation hearings to the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g. National 
Women’s Law Center 8.30.18; Americans United for Life, 7.11.18; National Review 9.07.18; Huffington 
Post 9.06.18; and SCOTUS Blog 7.30.18. 
 
198 Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d. 426, 432 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018), reversed in 
part on 9.16.19 by the Arizona Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision, and quoting Obergefell, in finding that 
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claims, but even if their insights into Kennedy’s goals in the Masterpiece opinion are 
sound and survive his retirement, the limitations of the individual rights advocacy model 
remain; these cases will continue to work their way through the courts seeking a 
resolution this model cannot provide. 
 The fact that the Court failed to reach a majority substantive decision was not the 
result of a lack of well-grounded argument based on legal precedent, and it was not 
because this case did not have the right legal facts. Rather, the non-decision is an 
example of the limitations of the individual rights model of advocacy. The logic of 
abstract rights cannot dislodge or alter deep-seated normative or systemic religious 
prejudice. A variety of causes may be advanced to explain this, but what is crucial is that 
such prejudices are resistant to logic, including the logic of abstract legal rights and 
logical explanations that the feared binary of secular-religious is simply a construct of 
religion itself. Experience is the only means of engaging such prejudices. Moreover, 
disputes over attitudes about sexuality in the U.S. are increasingly “about modernity 
itself” and viewed as markers of religious and political identity for some American 
Christians.199 Such attitudes are reflected in the Obergefell dissents, explicitly invoked by 
Justice Thomas in his separate Masterpiece opinion. Thus, although Justice Kennedy 
 
“Plaintiffs are entitled to ‘continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, 
same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and 
persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central 
to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long 
revered. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).’ AZ Supreme Court at 3-4. On-line sites for 
Lambda Legal and Alliance Defending Freedom who either represented parties or filed briefs in the case 
both reported on the decision on 9.16.19 before the Arizona Supreme Court opinion was available on-line. 
 
199 Elizabeth Shively, “Christian ‘Purity’ Guru’s Loss of Faith May Signal a Coming Reckoning For 
Conservative Christianity,” Re.Wire News. Aug 5, 2019. https://rewire.news/religiondispatches/2019/ 
08/05/christian-purity-gurus-loss-of-faith-may-signal-a-coming-reckoning-for-conservative-christianity/ 
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accepted that the requested exemption would fundamentally eviscerate the capacity of 
same-sex couples to exercise their right to marry,200 the Court was unable either to reject 
or to affirm Phillips’s claim outright, leaving both religious vendors and gay and lesbian 
couples unsure what their legal rights actually entail. When individuals and their rights 
are abstract and nominal, it is possible to have the right to civil same-sex marriage, but 
still be unable to obtain the wedding goods and services typically associated with the 
exercise of that right on the same terms as different-sex couples.  
 Having more than rights in our legal toolbox can greatly assist in the increasingly 
challenging task of maintaining specifically religious freedom as well as a maximum of 
liberty and equality for all. Grounding law in the philosophical anthropology of the open 
and relational individual may generate resources for re-considering the legal conflicts in 
Masterpiece and other similar cases, and perhaps even reduce some of the cultural 
tension and distrust that resists logical explanation. Traditional legal arguments have 
failed to reduce this tension and distrust, and without a shift such as that provided by the 
replacement of Locke’s individual with the open and relational subject grounded in 
Rosenzweig, legal distinctions such as that between identity and conduct and an ever-
expanding structure of anti-discrimination exemptions for those whose animus is 
religiously motivated on the basis of religious freedom is likely to increase.  
 The first of many differences generated by an alternative philosophical 
anthropology is the shift in the meaning and function of liberty. For the Lockean 
 
200 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Human Rights Commission, 584 U.S.   (2018), slip op., 
Opinion of the Court, at 10. 
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individual rights are primary and relationship secondary, and, thus, liberty is negative; the 
open and relational individual operates from a positive concept of liberty. Instead of the 
Lockean understanding of liberty as “freedom from,” from government intrusion into the 
private sphere (the sphere of religion and the body), and consequent prominence of rights 
to preserve negative freedom, we shift to liberty as a positive freedom, a “freedom to,” to 
participate fully in civil society and the public square. This shift in the meaning of liberty 
flows from rejecting the fiction of the individual imagined in the state of nature, as prior 
to civil society. Although pre-dating Locke’s use, this fiction merely advanced the 
theoretical political framework that justified political rebellion for the purpose of 
highlighting independence and autonomy. Rather than the fiction of individuals 
preceding civil society, whose only obligation is to obey the law as established by 
consent, open and relational individuals mutually constitute themselves and civil society 
by taking on concern for the other. The open and relational individual is also 
characterized by imperfectability, which sustains relationship as a process which always 
falls short of perfection. The role of liberal government on this model of individuality is 
to promote the fullest participation of each in civil society and the public square, not 
through abstract rights, but through the fostering of concern for the other. 
 From the perspective of the open and relational individual, with its emphasis on 
liberty as freedom to rather than freedom from, legally sanctioned discrimination is 
always a last resort, available only in specialized, limited cases. Discrimination always 
denies equality, and usually also reduces liberty, especially liberty understood as freedom 
to; thus, it also frustrates relational and open individuality. As the Supreme Court itself 
has stated, discrimination is an “assertion of . . . inferiority” that “denigrates the dignity 
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of the excluded” and “reinvokes a history of exclusion.”201 The Constitution’s two-fold 
guarantee of religious liberty–of free exercise and against government establishment–can 
be fully accommodated with this shift in the understanding of liberty: the government is 
free to protect society from the harms of discrimination in the marketplace, while still 
preserving individual freedom to practice faith as one chooses. Religious practice is one 
of the few areas in which diversity is fostered through the freedom to discriminate. 
Allowing religious communities the freedom to discriminate, for example, in the hiring of 
religious officials and teachers, allows the community to maintain its own distinctiveness 
without reducing relationality or openness generally. However, the opposite is true in the 
public square. Allowing public accommodations to discriminate on the basis of the 
owner’s religious belief reduces diversity in the public square, and constitutes an exercise 
of freedom as freedom from relationality and openness. That the simple proximity of 
diverse groups does not necessarily reduce prejudice, and may even increase it is 
demonstrated by a broad range of evidence. Instead, what reduces prejudice among 
diverse groups is the experience of regularly interacting as relative social and economic 
equals. Thus, permitting discrimination of any kind in the commercial marketplace–
allowing some to exercise freedom from relationality and openness–is uniquely harmful. 
An increase in vendors who discriminate does not in itself diversify the marketplace, and, 
there is no logical principal to limit exemptions which permit discrimination, although 
discrimination always reduces relationality and openness more generally. Diversity as 
 
201 Louise Melling, “Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons to Say No,” 
38 Harvard J.L. & Gender (2015), 177-192, 189, citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 
(1994). 
 112 
fostered in anti-discrimination laws is a value that flows naturally from Rosenzweig’s 
alternative account of the nature of reality as itself irreducibly diverse, and so is inherent 
in the open and relational individual. This is in stark contrast to account of both reality 
and the human on which the social contract depends, which both assumes and requires 
homogeneity to function as theorized.  
 Nevertheless, according to the Public Accommodations Law Scholars who filed 
an amicus brief in Masterpiece, even at common law, public accommodations were 
required to serve customers equally. Contrary to their portrayal by advocates of 
religiously motivated discrimination, this assumption was part of the common law 
imported into the early U.S. legal system. Once slavery ended, the anti-discrimination 
presumptions of the common law of public accommodations had to be dismantled in 
order to create the legal structure of racial segregation. Only because of this prior 
dismantling was affirmative legislation required to restore the anti-discrimination 
presumptions embedded in public accommodations law. Thus, when advocates of 
religiously motivated discrimination argue that these laws have been over-extended to 
include more than race-based discrimination, they mis-represent history in order to 
distinguish the system of marriage segregation they are proposing from racial 
segregation. Although looking through the lens of logic and rights can reveal this 
mistaken historical representation, only experience demonstrates the limitations of logic 
and rights for assuring equality and liberty against religious prejudice. Reading the First 
Amendment in terms of the expanded philosophical anthropology of openness and 
relationality confirms and strengthens prior findings in other contexts that public 
accommodations laws generally do not implicate religious freedom in that they do not 
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infringe on religious practice, because they contain exemptions for religious spaces and 
because commerce is properly distinguished from religious practice. A long history of 
minority religious practitioners being able to adapt themselves to public accommodations 
laws while maintaining their religious distinctiveness also confirms these findings.202 For 
example, the kosher butcher is able to operate in the public square, maintaining his own 
religious commitments by choosing not to sell pork in any form to any customer. He may 
refuse to sell kosher beef to a Christian customer because he suspects the customer will 
use it in a meatloaf preparation that contains pork. This is the parallel to what advocates 
of religious exemptions to the public accommodations laws for those who oppose same-
sex marriage term an identity-conduct distinction. They insist that they are not refusing 
service on the basis of the would-be customer’s protected identity–their sexual 
orientation–but rather on the conduct–same-sex marriage–which they believe God 
opposes, even though such refusals will “primarily impact same-sex couples.”203 Abstract 
logic may justify such a claim, but the experience of the open and relational legal subject 
 
202 Mary Anne Case makes this point in her explanation of “how dependent American Protestants are 
on state laws concerning marriage,” relative to Roman Catholics and Jews. Mary Anne Case, “The Peculiar 
Stake U.S. Protestants Have in the Question of State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages,” After Secular 
Law, eds. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Robert A. Yelle, and Mateo Taussig-Rubio (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
U. Press, 2011), 302-321. Although note what I have described several times as an unlikely alliance of 
Roman Catholics and evangelical Christians. Mary Anne Case also argues that the motivation for Roman 
Catholics in that alliance is concern with maintaining the gender binary against the secular “gender 
ideology.” See for example, Mary Anne Case, “Trans Formations in the Vatican’s War on “Gender 
Ideology” (2019). Journal Articles. 9669. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles/9669, in 
which she locates the origin of this concern in writings from the mid-1980’s by then Cardinal Ratzinger; 
see also, John Millbank and Adrian Pabst, The Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism and the Human Future 
(London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), at 271, arguing that “modern sexism, systematic subordination and 
increasing endangerment of women . . . does not derive from the perpetuation of patriarchy . . . . Rather, it 
results from the abolition of gender difference (emphasis in original).” 
 
203 Brush & NibbLLC v. City of Phoenix, CV-18-0176-PR (Ariz. Sept. 16, 2019), ¶82, although the 
Arizona Surpeme Court denied that the distinction at issue here was based on conduct. Instead, the court 
simply insisted that the refusal was based on the content of the speech at issue in the invitations, speech that 
“celebrating a same-sex marriage ceremony.” 
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demonstrates the limitation and error in this logic. Allowing Masterpiece Cakeshop and 
other wedding vendors to discriminate against same-sex couples creates diversity only in 
the sense that it allows for the creation of a legally sanctioned second class form of 
marriage for same-sex couples, just as racial segregation created a second class of 
citizenship on the basis of race. Allowing some religious vendors operating as public 
accommodations to discriminate on the basis of their belief about same-sex marriage 
reduces diversity by permitting the refusal of a commercial relationship, and thus also 
creates barriers to full participation by all members of civil society.  
 A shift in the foundation of law, from the Lockean narrow vision of humanity to 
the more expanded open and relational philosophical anthropology grounded in 
Rosenzweig, might have prevented Masterpiece altogether, because it might have 
prevented or at least dramatically changed the tone of Obergefell. Through the lens of an 
open and relational legal subject, courts considering claims for marriage equality might 
have focused on the same-sex couples already present in most communities, 
demonstrating their long-term, and even sacrificial commitment to each other, raising 
children together, and burdened by the dignitary and economic harm of being legally 
prevented from accessing the benefits different-sex couples enjoy in marriage. Such 
reflections might have provided counter-weight to the debates that led to Congressional 
passage of the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 (the federal DOMA). The absence of 
federal legislation might have reduced the fuel that drove the proliferation of state 
DOMAs. Without these, and without the limit on federal recognition of various state-
sanctioned same-sex marriages, the path of expansion for state recognition of same-sex 
marriage might have been dramatically different. Without the structure of limitations 
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created by the combination of federal and state DOMAs, a majority of the Supreme Court 
might not have determined that the rights at issue required recognition at the federal 
level. Even if the Court had determined in this different climate that the requirement of 
open and relational individuality required federal recognition that the fundamental right 
to marry includes the right to marry a person of the same gender, perhaps their decision 
would have reduced rather than expanded subsequent litigation over the limits on that 
right posed by religious freedom, if any. In Loving the Court did not go out of its way to 
validate the beliefs and good will of those who opposed interracial marriages on the basis 
of religious belief. They also did not go out of their way to valorize marriage generally or 
the importance of extending the benefits of marriage to interracial couples. They simply 
ruled that Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law was invalid, and therefore that all remaining 
anti-miscegenation laws were also invalid. According to Stone, in 1967, 16 states 
including Virginia had laws against interracial marriage, although polling indicated that 
75% of Americans were opposed to interracial marriage. By contrast, in 2015 when the 
Court decided Obergefell, only 16 states recognized same-sex marriage, but polling 
indicated that 60% of Americans favored approved of same-sex marriage.204 Thus, the 
different tones in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Loving and Obergefell cannot be 
attributed to different social attitudes. Perhaps if the Court in Obergefell had taken a 
 
204 Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex and the Constitution: Sex, Religion, and Law from America’s Origins to the 
Twenty-first Century (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2017), 493, FN 6, and 511. Stone 
doesn’t site his source for either the 60% claim or the claim that “same-sex couples could marry legally in 
38 states and the District of Columbia” by the spring of 2015. The number of states differs from Chief 
Justice Roberts’ calculation in his dissent in Obergefell. Melling cites a 1968 poll (the year after the Loving 
decision) indicating that on 20% of Americans approved of interracial marriage. She also cites a 2011 poll 
(one year prior to Obergefell) indicating that 55% of Americans approved of same-sex marriage. Melling, 
“Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws,” at 183, fn39. 
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similar tone as the Court in Loving, challenges such as that in Masterpiece would not 
have proliferated at the state level.  
 Discrimination always presumptively undermines openness and relationality even 
when it does not violate legal rights. The relational harm it does undermines both liberty 
and equality, not just for Craig and Mullins, the particular customers who were refused 
service and brought a legal claim for redress in Masterpiece. A broad range of actual and 
potential third parties have already been affected and continue to be impacted by the 
Masterpiece Court’s refusal to on whether the refusal of service on religious grounds is 
legally permissible in some or all cases. Craig’s mother was also refused service by 
Phillips; if the couple had had children, their children would have experienced 
discrimination, as relational harm, because of their parents’ sexual orientation.205  Other 
persons who are protected by public accommodations laws might begin to fear that they, 
too, could be refused service on the basis of the vendor’s objection to the conduct their 
status represents. In rural areas with fewer service providers of all kinds, this problem is 
exacerbated. Already in the area of healthcare, some rural communities are dependent on 
a single provider who refuses to provide some medical services on the basis of the 
provider’s religious beliefs and practices. Friends and family members could also come 
to fear refusal, restricting their liberty–both as freedom to participate and freedom from 
 
205 In addition to the harm children experience when their parent is refused service, children been 
denied service themselves because of their parents’ sexual orientation. Children have been denied 
admission to religious schools and even refused medical care, because of their parents’ sexual orientation. 
These examples further demonstrate how the complicity argument dramatically expands both the 
circumstances in which exemptions are claimed and the potential third parties who are harmed when 
exemptions from anti-discrimination laws are permitted legally. The majority in Obergefell identified such 
harms to children as a factor in its finding that the denial of the fundamental right to marriage for same-sex 
couples posed a legally impermissible dignitary harm. Obergefell at 2600, “children suffer the stigma of 
knowing their families are somehow lesser.” 
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discrimination. In addition, granting Phillips an exemption, when other religious vendors 
comply with the public accommodations laws,206 and other religious practitioners 
advocate for marriage equality, as a result of their religious commitments, treats Phillips 
preferentially, thus giving government sanction to his religion and not to others. As 
Sullivan and others have noted, such privileging of one set of religious beliefs by 
exempting those believers from the application of a generally applicable law, allowing 
them to discriminate, may constitute an “establishment” of his religion, in violation of the 
prohibition in the First Amendment. The potential harm would not be limited to same-sex 
couples seeking wedding goods and services. Expanding exemptions from discrimination 
on the basis of the provider’s religious commitments expands in equality and restricts 
liberty. Openness and relationality are reduced as relationship is severed and the 
possibilities of transformation, self-reflection and correction are lessened. Although 
rights are at issue, the problems identified as flowing from the recognition of an 
exemption for religiously motivated discrimination are not primarily problems of rights 
violations, but compromises of the open and relational nature of individuality itself and 
the state’s consequent responsibility, even within and otherwise Lockean construct of 
liberal jurisprudence, to preserve the lives, liberties, and estates of the members of civil 
society. 
 Many of those who would grant the exemption requested by Phillips, including 
the Supreme Court justices who dissented in Obergefell, are particularly sensitive to 
 
206 E.g. the kosher butcher mentioned in FN15; a Seventh-Day Adventist vendor who closes on 
Saturdays; or even a mainstream Christian vendor who closes on Sundays to provide employees time to 
attend church, even though such closure reduces profits. 
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conflations of opposition to same-sex marriage and racism. Although the history of 
racism as well as the breadth of consequences from racism and that of opposition to 
same-sex marriage are quite different, discrimination in both cases reduces liberty and 
equality, and was/is motivated by religious belief. This is as true for same-sex couples 
refused service on the basis of the vendor’s belief that God opposes same-sex marriage as 
it was for African Americans refused service on the basis of the vendor’s belief that God 
opposes racial mixing.207 This is true, even if discrimination on the basis of race is 
fundamentally different than discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and 
although race and sexual orientation trigger different levels of scrutiny in other areas of 
law. In public accommodations laws all protected categories are treated as equal.208 This 
is another reason why Masterpiece is an ideal case through which to consider the 
differences that result from a philosophical anthropology oriented toward relationality 
and openness; what is at issue in this case and others like is not simply the right to have a 
particular identity recognized, instead, the issue is the responsibility of the liberal state to 
assure the fullest possible access of all protected groups equally to public space.   
 The rights-oriented view provides for the obligation of the Colorado Human 
Rights Commission to assure that rights are respected as part of the government’s 
 
207 Although the Supreme Court did not discuss this aspect of the case, nor did anyone claim an 
exemption from anti-discrimination laws, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the explicitly religious 
motivation for the anti-miscegenation law – or at least its enforcement – is clear in the case of Loving, as 
revealed in the trial judge’s explanation of miscegenation laws, which the Supreme Court quotes in its 
decision:  
“Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on 
separate continents. And, but for the interference with his arrangement, there would be no cause 
for such marriage. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to 
mix." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) at 3. 
 
208 Brief for Public Accommodations Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae, p. 5, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. 
Colorado Human Rights Commission, 584 U.S.   (2018). 
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compelling interest in preventing discrimination, but provides no protection against the 
fear that religious views are being denigrated. Preventing discrimination is at the heart of 
the secular liberal project and the goal of even the individual rights advocacy model of 
law; however, the value of diversity, as grounded in openness and relationality is inherent 
in the expanded philosophical anthropology grounded in Rosenzweig.  Both the First 
Amendment and the public accommodations laws are designed to protect this value.209 
However, grounded in the lens of rights, the abstract value of diversity requires a 
justification not inherent in the social contract itself; moreover, it does not provide a 
mechanism for evaluating the rights claims of diverse individuals against apparently 
competing claims to protect religious liberty, when these claims compete in the 
commercial marketplace to accommodate sexual diversity and religious traditionalism. In 
fact, the hidden religious structure of the public square is likely to privilege the exclusion 
claims advanced by religious traditionalism. Grounded in the lens of open and relational 
individuality, however, the liberal state meets its responsibility to secure life, liberty, and 
property when the government secures the fullest participation of all in civil society and 
the public square by incenting all to take on concern for the other. Where the 
understanding of discrimination as a rejection of concern for the other and the claims of 
the other is grounded in a different understanding of the nature of humanity itself, 
discrimination may only be permitted where the liberal state finds a compelling reason 
that overrides and/or offsets the ways discrimination necessarily undermines relationality. 
 
209 Brief for Public Accommodations Law Scholars, p. 27-28, noting that “[i]t has long been settled 
that public accommodations laws further a compelling state interest in eradicating discrimination that 
outweighs any incidental infringement on the interests of public-facing, commercial entities like 
Masterpiece,” and citing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), at 250 and Roberts 
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) at 628. 
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The liberal state’s interest in fostering the fullest level of participation is itself sufficient 
to justify anti-discrimination laws and reject claims for exemptions, without the need for 
recourse to rights in nature or through legislative grant in order to justify concern. This 
interest also helps to reframe critiques of religion from anti-religious, or legally 
impermissible hostility to religion, as religion-positive claims for an expansive rather 
than a narrow view of religious freedom. Such an expanded view encompasses far more 
than the right to discriminate in ways otherwise prohibited by the requirements of liberty 
and equality, while also expanding the categories of religious belief and practice the law 
is able to recognize. In light of such a shift, a product of the openness of the individual as 
understood through Rosenzweig, decision-makers may consider claims that religious 
freedom is being used as a “pretext,” a legally specious attempt to justify otherwise 
illegal behavior, and discuss the damage that can or has been done in the name of religion 
as part of the legally permissible inquiry by a religion-neutral court or other government 
decision-maker in determining whether to grant requested exemptions. Thus, a 
government decision-maker could find a request for religious exemption “patently 
frivolous” as the Supreme Court did in the case of Piggie Park, without triggering the 
objection advanced by the majority in Masterpiece.210 Fostering diversity, as public 
accommodations laws do by forcing (equal) association in the public sphere, is also 
potentially transformative, in that it brings together those who might not otherwise have 
or take opportunities to associate. Not granting a religious exemption in this situation 
 
210 “Indeed, this is not even a borderline case, for the respondents interposed defenses so patently 
frivolous that a denial of counsel fees to the petitioners would be manifestly inequitable. Thus, for example, 
. . . “defendants’ contention that the Act was invalid because it ‘contravenes the will of God’ and 
constitutes an interference with the ‘free exercise of the Defendant's religion.’” Piggie Park, FN5 at 402 
[emphasis added]. 
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better fosters in the public square the diversity inherent in reality than granting the 
exemption, without unduly burdening or restricting religious belief or practice; it also 
fulfills a goal of government to promote concern for the other. 
 Because the open and relational self finds connection to others in recognizing its 
own past failure of relationship, which is the source of self-reflection, using this lens to 
resolve the conflict represented in Masterpiece might include reconciliation procedures 
that invoke equity. Expanding the understanding of individuality expands the analysis of 
the legal conflict, allowing for fruitful complexification rather than the preemptive 
narrowing typical of traditional rights-based analysis. This assures that we can also 
evaluate the likely consequences of various options, which also allows us to engage in a 
different reflection about the harms involved in the conflict. We can evaluate the harm 
claims of all the parties involved or potentially impacted: 1) the baker’s claim of religious 
harm in making a cake for a couple whose relationship he thinks is wrong; 2) Craig and 
Mullins’s claim of dignitary harm resulting from discriminated 3); the claim of the 
community generally against the harm resulting from discrimination; and 4) the claim of 
harm to specific community members who observe Craig and Mullins’ rejection. 
 The turn to equity is facilitated by the shift from the exclusive use of rights, while 
allowing the system to continue to operate within the broad structure of liberal 
jurisprudence founded on the constructive insights of Locke about the need for consent 
from the governed and the benefits of religious tolerance.211 Equity provides access to 
 
211 Note that although Locke’s theory of religious tolerance is probably the most contested aspect of his 
legacy for the U.S. system of preserving religious liberty while advancing secular liberal governance, he 
excluded Roman Catholics from his vision because of his perception of their incurable intolerance. On the 
one hand, this perception reflects exactly the secular-religion binary Asad encourages us to abandon. At the 
same time, the claims of religious practitioners advancing the religious exemption argument is precisely 
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resources not available through rights jurisprudence. Specifically, it offers the 
opportunity to bring the conflicted parties into a different kind of relationship – one 
which has elements of restorative justice, or what is referred to in Jewish-inflected social 
justice movements as tikkun ha-olam, of restoring the fabric of reality that was torn by 
discrimination. 
 The process would allow something like an “Allen plea” in which the vendor 
agrees to accept certain consequences without admitting any wrongdoing. The case 
would proceed like other diversion cases (diverted from traditional punitive process), in 
equity, and involve participation in reconciliation conferences that allowed all parties to 
express to and discuss with each other their different views of the conflict. Same-sex 
couples (or others denied service) would share how that experience negatively impacted 
them/their families/friends and vendors would explain their own conception of how their 
opposition to same-sex marriage is not prejudice on the basis of sexual orientation. Such 
conferences could conclude with an apology from the vendor and a parallel 
acknowledgment of the vendor’s sincere faith from those initially refused. The vendor 
would agree to provide the good or service. Vendors would remain free to reject the 
“diversion & reconciliation path” and instead be fined and potentially sentenced to 
remedial conduct, such as training employees on legal compliance, and subject to a 
period of monitoring. These last two could be left to the outcome of the reconciliation 
process in the diversion cases. 
 
that the authority structure guiding their religious practice does not permit compliance with an alternative 
“secular” authority. 
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 The possible structure of enforced relationship would be like the conferences 
typical of restorative justice, with the same goal of providing a context in which the 
vendor could come to better understand the dignitary harm his behavior causes, to 
himself as well as to rejected customers. As a result of such a process, the baker might 
develop an understanding of the distinction between civil and religious marriage, i.e. that 
those who enter into a civil marriage regardless of whether they are same or different sex 
are not implicating his religious value for Christian marriage. Another possibility is that 
the baker would develop a greater appreciation and respect for gay and lesbian couples 
regardless of whether they are religious or not, including that they are faithful members 
of a tradition that is not Christian. Such a process also evokes the equitable “best 
interests” standards at work in parental dispute cases–rather than pitting the rights of 
various  members of the public or the business community against each other, this model 
provides for a consideration of what is in the “best interest” of all concerned. Similarly to 
the criteria at work in parenting cases, without importing values that violate Rawls’ 
notion of overlapping consensus, the criteria the courts would use would be the 
maintenance of relationship.212  
 The individual drawn from Rosenzweig experiences compassion as a product of 
forgiving oneself. This structure also operates within the register of Christianity, as well 
as the register of equity which, for example, may require an apology, which the law 
cannot. Given the nature of the conflicts Masterpiece represents, this may provide a 
means for experience to compensate for the limits of logic without feeding traditionalist 
 
212 It might even include similar caveats, that forced relationship would pose a risk of physical or 
developmental harm to one or more of the parties. 
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religious practitioner’s fears that they are being “vilified” for their beliefs. In the context 
of religious wedding vendors who are opposed to same-sex marriage because they 
believe God is opposed to such relationships, this gives the law a way to supersede the 
limitations of the law’s epistemology of logic and operate in a register that specifically 
invokes symbols familiar to Christians who seem to be the main ones who oppose 
supplying goods and services for same-sex couples getting married. 
 Phillips and others like him claim that the public accommodations law as applied 
to him burdens his exercise of religious freedom, under the theory of complicity: that by 
creating a cake for use in a same-sex wedding celebration, Phillips is complicit in 
conduct that he believes God opposes. Courts are appropriately leery of inquiring into the 
substantive details of faith traditions,213 asking only whether a litigant’s beliefs are 
sincerely held. Broadly speaking, the First Amendment protects the right to practice one’s 
faith without government interference, thus the government is limited to inquiring into 
the details of claimed harm. The inquiry in the case in which Sullivan acted as an expert 
witness on American religion followed this process. The court inquired into the impact of 
the city’s cemetery regulations on the Plaintiff’s faith. Courts can and must consider 
claims of how the law at issue burdens religious belief or practice. The proposed shift in 
understanding of individuality as relational and open better supports exactly this inquiry, 
 
213 According to the so-called “Lemon Test”–which may or may not be good law in light of subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions on religious freedom–a law which requires excessive entanglement of the 
government in religion is unconstitutional. Typically, courts refrain from inquiry into the details of 
religious belief in part on this basis and in part on the basis of the idea that the First Amendment prohibits 
the government from taking a stand on the truth of religion as expressed in claims for protection. See, e.g. 
the discussion of “the secularity principle” as the theoretic heart of the Establishment Clause in Dennis J. 
Goldford, The Constitution of Religious Freedom: God, Politics, and the First Amendment (Waco, TX: 
Baylor U. Press, 2012), pp. 213-233. 
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and does so in ways likely to expand recognition of minoritized religious practices, such 
as the wearing of religious head coverings, while still maintaining predictable public 
order and general access consistent with state and local public accommodations laws.214 
Because religion is generally not practiced in public commercial space, only the theory of 
complicity provides the basis for finding that the commercial sale of wedding goods and 
services implicates the religious practices of vendors. The theory of complicity underlies 
many of the healthcare refusal statutes that NeJaime and Siegel mention. Neither the 
theory nor the statutes seem to have any natural limit. Phillips was not being asked to 
perform or even attend the same-sex wedding ceremony reception. The public 
accommodations law does not–and could not–prohibit him from discriminating in his 
church or religious community. Although it prevents him from posting a sign indicating 
that he does not make cakes for same-sex weddings, it does not prevent him from 
otherwise expressing his faith, by posting an Ichthus symbol215 in the window and/or on 
all his advertising media, for example. He was not asked to create a cake containing a 
message in favor of same-sex weddings.216 Even the penalty imposed by the 
 
214 Not all states prohibit discrimination in public accommodation on the basis of sexual orientation. 
However, all those that prohibit such discrimination do so on the basis of democratic process. 
 
215 The fish symbol historically associated with Christian identity, and used by a variety of businesses 
and business professional to indicate to co-religionists the religious values of the business. NB that the 
Phoenix Human Rights Ordinance at issue in Brush & Nibb does permit vendors to use signs to indicate 
limitations in service, and doing so was one of the issues in the case.  
 
216 As Justice Kagan noted in her concurrence, the Jack cases are distinguishable on this point because 
in those cases, Jack asked the bakers to include anti-same-sex marriage messages on the cakes. In each 
case, the baker agreed to bake the cakes, but not to include the messages. In at least one case, the baker had 
baked other cakes with explicitly religious messages. Therefore, this limitation was also available to 
Phillips had he been asked to make a cake that contained an explicit statement in favor of same-sex 
marriage. Moreover, as Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, the Masterpiece bakery web-site displayed no 
images of cakes with words. Masterpiece, slip op., Ginsburg, J., dissenting, at 6, FN 5.  
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Commission, requiring that Phillips train his employees to assure future compliance with 
the public accommodations law, did not limit his belief or practice. Contrary to concern 
expressed by Justice Gorsuch in his concurrence, this does not require Phillips to teach 
something he doesn’t believe: it does not require him to teach that God approves of same-
sex marriage, only that the law requires the bakery to serve same-sex and different-sex 
couples equally. Without the exemption, Phillips remains free to believe and to exercise 
his belief (that God opposes same-sex relationships) in all the ways the First Amendment 
is designed to protect. In contrast, those the law seeks to protect are completely denied 
the protection of the law if Phillips is granted the exemption; they suffer a relational 
harm, as well as economic harm, which extends broadly to third parties, reducing both 
relationality and openness for all. Thus, a neutral decision-maker could find that the only 
restriction the law places on Phillips’ practice is that it prevents him from discriminating 
in the public sphere on the basis of sexual orientation, which it is the express purpose of 
the law to prohibit. Through the lens of open and relational individuality, Phillips’ claims 
for exemption are understood as a rejection of the claims of others upon him. 
Reconsidering the claim in this way further highlights the relational harm that granting 
his request poses to Phillips himself, as well as to other individuals in civil society and 
the public square. 
 In some cases, Courts have exempted religious practitioners some neutral laws, 
finding that although they were not designed to impact religion, they did indeed unduly 
burden minority religious practices. Examples of exemptions from such laws include the 
right of the Amish to withdraw their children from public schooling required for others 
and for members of minority religious groups who oppose war to be relieved of otherwise 
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compulsory military service. Phillips and other vendors with religious objections to same-
sex weddings argue that their now minority religious view about same-sex marriage 
should be exempt from public accommodations laws like the Amish and pacifists. They 
also offer Hobby Lobby as an example of a similarly mandated religious exemption from 
neutral, generally applicable law. Hobby Lobby and certain recent Supreme Court cases 
do appear to essentially define religious freedom as the right to prevent others from 
engaging in otherwise legal activity, and not simply as the right to engage, oneself, in 
activity consistent with one’s religious commitments. Granting Phillips’s claim extends 
this definition to include a right to discriminate against customers on the basis of his 
religious belief about their conduct. Some claim that the best way to resolve the conflict, 
consistent with Justice Kennedy’s admonition, is through this kind of legal recognition of 
the identity-conduct distinction. This distinction is grounded in the logic of rights 
inherent in the Lockean independent and autonomous individual; it further turns on the 
view of religious liberty as freedom from the claims of others to participation. The 
argument from this perspective is that Phillips did not refuse to serve customers on the 
basis of their “status,” their sexual orientation, which is prohibited, but rather on the basis 
of his religious objection to their “conduct,” same-sex marriage, which is not (or should 
not be). The only cases that can even be treated as making a similar distinction are cases 
in which courts have found that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not a 
distinction based on gender. To the extent these cases can be compared, they demonstrate 
the problem of the rationale behind the proffered status-conduct distinction, which is that 
one can discriminate against same-sex marriage without discriminating on the basis of the 
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sexual orientation of the partners to the marriage.217 The oddly sympathetic language in 
Obergefell clearly suggested to some that this the Court might have been willing to 
sanction this legal distinction. 
 Some traditionalist Christian advocates have argued that exemptions foster 
diversity by accommodating a variety of religious and non-religious believers in public 
commercial space,  and that such exemptions can be tailored narrowly. Laycock and Berg 
propose that exemptions could be limited to “small businesses that conscientiously object 
to providing personalized goods and services directly to same-sex marriages (primarily 
through weddings) when other providers are readily available.”218 They argue that this is 
a means of encouraging religious vendors to participate fully in public commercial space, 
and “without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in 
an open market” as required by Kennedy’s language in Masterpiece. Even some liberal 
advocates have offered such compromises as a means of demonstrating that their value 
for diversity includes traditionalist religious as well as progressive religious and non-
religious vendors and service providers in the public marketplace. This might appear to 
satisfy the interests of the open and relational individual and a taking on of concern for 
others. However, what it actually does is preserve the very historic and/or normative 
 
217 Anton Sorkin makes the case for this distinction in Anton Sorkin, “Make Law, Not War: Solving 
the Faith/Equality Crisis,” 12 Liberty University Law Review 3, Article 5 (2018). https://digitalcommons. 
liberty.edu/lu_ law_review/vol12/iss3/5. Scalia also suggests this distinction can be made in his dissents in 
Romer and Lawrence. The argument rests on the two-fold presumption that no legitimate exemptions to 
discrimination on the basis of race exist, but that discrimination on the basis of homosexual conduct is or 
should be legal. 
 
218 Douglas Laycock, Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, and 
Thomas C. Berg, James L. Oberstar Professor of Law and Public Policy at the University of St. Thomas 
(Minnesota) have made this argument in a variety of formats, including an amicus brief filed in 
Masterpiece and on SCOTUSblog. 
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prejudices anti-discrimination laws are explicitly designed to end; it protects traditional 
religious prejudices and majority religious practitioners from the consequences of social 
change. This effect undermines the capacity of the democratic process to produce change 
in response to shifting demographics and social attitudes.219 The “diversity” that 
proponents of a right to discriminate against same-sex couples claim will result from 
allowing religious wedding vendors to enter the market on their own terms is an inversion 
of real diversity. They offer no meaningful difference to the commercial marketplace, 
except their discrimination. The consequence of this discrimination is not diversity but 
segregation. The Supreme Court cases tracing the trajectory of expanding rights for gay 
and lesbian persons are replete with the dissenters’ claims that the rights at issue are 
neither enumerated nor or so deeply embedded in the nation’s history or conscience220 
that they deserve recognition as fundamental rights. From the perspective of individual 
rights advocacy, a history of discrimination becomes its own legal justification against  
recognizing the right necessary to redress that discrimination. The openness of the open 
and relational individual provides a counter-weight to such arguments from tradition 
against legal and social change, which often involves shifts in social and political power.   
 Allowing discrimination to persist in the public commercial sphere undermines 
openness and relationality, while also rejecting positive freedom as the freedom to 
 
219 Counter-examples, such as the convictions of religiously-motive social justice advocates who leave 
food and water on public land for border crossers and of anti-war protestors who use religiously symbolic 
means of vandalism, demonstrate that the protective effect goes in the direction of maintaining historic 
prejudices only. See Patrick Hornbeck, “Catholic Anti-Nuke Activists Looking at 20 Years in Prison a True 




220 This is the general standard for treating a right as a fundamental right, and thus assuring its 
mandatory application. 
 130 
participate fully in the public square. It denies the experience of relational harm to which 
same-sex couples are subjected, and sanctions the inequitable way they are excluded 
from full participation. It condones their segregation from the marketplace. Such claims 
are also premised on a false equivalency. Religious vendors may choose to exclude 
themselves from the marketplace rather than comply with public accommodations laws, 
but this is their choice–and not their only choice. However, those whose discrimination is 
sanctioned do not make a choice to leave the marketplace, they are excluded from it. 
Moreover, as the variety of recent cases contesting the application of neutral laws to 
religious believers makes clear, such exemptions cannot be even this narrowly tailored. 
Laycock and Berg argue that their proposal for exemptions is narrowly tailored to 
balance the interests of religious vendors and same-sex couples, but none of their 
categories is capable of rational or obvious limitation. How, for example, would a 
“small” business be defined, and why or how could it be legally distinguished from larger 
businesses? The Supreme Court has already found this precise limitation meaningless in 
the case of Hobby Lobby. At what point would a good or service become sufficiently 
“personalized” to trigger the exemption? Although the Court in Masterpiece discussed 
the question of off-the-shelf cakes versus customized cakes; they came to no conclusions. 
In the context of other vendors of similar goods and services, how interchangeable must 
“similar” goods be? Is a “similar” good like a generic versus name-brand alternative? 
Finally, does “readily available” indicate the relative physical location of the alternative 
goods/services or how long it would take to procure them or some combination of both? 
As if these questions do not already demonstrate the problem, the legal theory behind 
such an exemption in public accommodations also lends itself to exemptions from all 
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other areas of anti-discrimination law, such that the exceptions would  be likely to 
swallow the rule. Such questions cannot be meaningfully addressed or limited through 
the application of individual rights advocacy based on the Lockean individual. However, 
once again, experience demonstrates the limits of logic to resolve or reduce the 
uncertainty that such standards would produce. 
 In contrast to the philosophical anthropology of independent and autonomous 
individualism, and rights-oriented expansion of discrimination and the interruption of 
relationship, the broader philosophical anthropology of openness and relationality fosters 
both diversity and redress of harm in precisely these fraught contexts. Through the lens of 
this expanded understanding of individuality, courts and other government entities will 
retain the ability to assure that all religious practitioners’ religious freedom claims are 
treated with respect rather than hostility or suspicion. Fear that one must adhere to “new 
orthodoxies” of tolerance, and abandon traditional religious practices, can be addressed 
without creating impossible standards of neutrality and without avoiding thoughtful 
inquiry about the potential harm that religious exemptions may cause. Finally, the more 
complex analysis of conflict generated by openness and relationality fosters useful 
consideration of the ways in which sexual orientation is like and not like race for 
purposes of understanding the nature of and need to assure both liberty and equality for 
persons whose religious belief or sexual identity is minoritized. 
 Application of the philosophical anthropology of open and relational individuality 
to law might have prevented Masterpiece, but even if it did not, it might have impacted 
the justices’ reasoning to produce a different constellation of majority, separate, and 
dissenting opinions. Presumptively, a majority of justices would have voted to affirm the 
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decisions of the Colorado Human Rights Commission and the Colorado Court of 
Appeals, finding that Jack Phillips a) violated CADA when he refused service to Craig 
and Mullins and that b) granting him a religious exemption from compliance with the law 
would create significant harm. Justice Kennedy might still have written the opinion, 
offering all the reasons Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor argued led logically to that 
result. He would have a) emphasized that no rational way to limit an exemption existed, 
given the particular facts of this case and b) cautioned the Colorado Human Rights 
Commission about the need to treat religious claims with greater respect throughout the 
process. Justices Roberts, Kagan, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor would have joined in 
the majority opinion. Kagan would still have written a separate concurring opinion in 
order to clarify how she would have preferred the Colorado Court of Appeals addressed 
the distinction between Masterpiece and the Jack cases in order to affirm that the 
difference was not the result of hostility to religion. She would also have written to 
emphasize the illogic of the claim that the wedding good at issue was not a “wedding 
cake” but rather a “cake celebrating same-sex marriage.”221 Justice Sotomayor would 
have joined in this concurrence. Justice Gorsuch would have dissented from the 
majority’s ruling, continuing to argue both that the Jack cases cannot be distinguished 
except on the basis of hostility to religion and that the good at issue was “a cake 
celebrating same-sex marriage,” which could somehow be distinguished from a wedding 
cake other than on the basis of the protected identity of those whose relationship it 
celebrated. Finally, informed by a philosophical anthropology of open and relational 
 
221 At oral argument, Justice Kagan commented that the purpose of food is to eat it and that no one 
thinks it expresses speech. 
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individuality, Justice Thomas would have joined the majority in affirming the Colorado 
Human Rights Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals findings. He would have 
written a separate opinion to clarify that he would not have joined the majority, but for 
Justice Kagan’s argument that the Jack cases can be distinguished, and to affirm that 
hostility on the part of the government toward religious claimants is impermissible. He 
would also have addressed Phillips’s free speech claim in order to agree with Justice 
Kagan that there is no free speech right inherent in baked goods. He would have 
cautioned the parties that in a case involving actual speech, he might have ruled 
differently; and he would have argued that public accommodations laws should not be 
used to penalize traditionalists for not holding politically correct views about inclusion. 
 Asad and Sullivan invite us to see religion as an organizing category, rather than 
an epistemological or authority framework. They also invite us to challenge religion as a 
useful, let alone neutral, category for promoting liberalism or equality and liberty for all 
before the law, given that it reproduces the same exclusions that religion itself produces. 
Asad also argues that apparently secular law requires a particular kind of legal subject, 
while Sullivan argues that the law recognizes only certain forms of religion for 
protection. The subject of apparently secular law that Asad proposes is the Lockean 
individual, naturally antagonistic toward others, and bearer of often incoherent rights, 
including the right to religion as backed by authoritative behavior regulating texts (or at 
least long-standing normative tradition). The alternative philosophical anthropology I am 
proposing has the capacity to change the way the law discharges its liberal obligations 
and to expand our organizing categories. Rather than religious versus secular, the 
alternative suggests that opposing categories are open and relational versus abstract and 
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individual. This change expands the potential for law to foster flourishing, as it 
transforms the relationship between the secular and the religious, expanding and 
complexifying the category of religion in ways that acknowledge power differentials and 
make room for pluralism. Instead of an antagonistic relationship, resting on an unreal 
claim of difference, the secular and the religious could be understood and practiced as 
themselves co-constitutive of civil society and the public square whose object is to 
maximize diversity and participation without thereby simply reinscribing the religiously 
restrictive secular or the overtly theologically political.   
   Although individuals bear rights, individuals are more than mere rights-bearers. 
Rights are a vital component of the means by which individuals secure their uniqueness, 
especially as chosen and legally recognized identity; but more is required to counter the 
atomism into which identity can devolve, and more is required for flourishing. 
Relationality and openness are also required to put rights in context, at the service of 
flourishing understood as taking on  concern for others and promoting the fullest possible 





Chapter Four: Revisiting Law and Religion in the Public Square 
 To be human is not simply to be an autonomous individual, prior to all social 
relationships; rather, humans as individuals are open (finite, imperfectible, particular, 
present, transformed and transforming) and relational (constituted by and constituting 
community). Human flourishing requires law, but law based on an understanding of 
individuality as the open and relational subject grounded in Rosenzweig’s alternative 
account of reality as an irreducibly diverse multiplicity, oriented in time and dependent 
on internal and external relationships for manifestation. Law could and should foster 
human flourishing, but often fails to do so because of the natural limitations in the 
individual rights advocacy model grounded in Locke, despite the gains achieved through 
the individual rights advocacy model. In some cases, law actually exacerbates the 
inequities and unfreedoms the social contract purports to be able to redress more 
securely. As demonstrated, the flaw lies not in the law or even in the core paradox of 
liberalism, but in the philosophical anthropology that grounds liberalism and, thus, the 
rule of law in liberal contexts. This default anthropology is the abstract individual Locke 
posits in the state of nature, prior to civil society, as free, equal, and independent, with 
like faculties and no natural subordination, atemporal, and tending toward abstraction. 
This individual enters civil society with natural rights–to freedom, equality, 
independence, to use and to have like faculties recognized; and rights against unnatural 
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subordination – having made a rational choice to give up his right of self-enforcement 
and consented to future majoritarian decisions. Rights jurisprudence should be able to 
resolve disputes among such individuals, and the resolution of rights disputes is indeed 
one of, if not the primary, responsibilities of civil government and the reason the 
individual cedes his executive function and voluntarily enters into civil society, according 
to the fiction of the social contract. Although Locke posits what appears to be an ideal 
state in nature, he acknowledges that insecurity and antagonism toward others is what 
motivates the transition to civil society. The rights each possesses are finite and always 
relative to the same rights others possess, with no natural limits. This is particularly 
evident in Locke’s theory of private property, which assumes a finite, one-time 
distribution rather than on-going expansion.222 Like private property, rights are also finite 
and zero-sum. Both secular humanism and Christian theology provide constructs for 
understanding the concept of dignity as belonging equally to everyone, and thus, some set 
of basic rights could be conceived as having the character of the internal goods MacIntyre 
describes as flowing from practices, and therefore either unlimited or not limited by 
others’ possession of the same rights. In practice, however, this is not the case; partly 
because of the nature of rights themselves and partly because humans are actually 
particular and irreducibly diverse in ways Locke’s framework cannot account for without 
devolving into atomism and incoherence. This is uniquely evident in the clash between 
diversity of sexual identity and religious rights jurisprudence, and reveals the limits of 
rights-based advocacy which leads to the impasse at the heart of Masterpiece. Echoes of 
 
222 Helga Varden, “John Locke – Libertarian Anarchism,” in Philosophy of Justice, ed. Guttorm 
Fløistad (Oslo, Norway: Springer, 2015). 
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this impasse in other contexts appear to threaten to overwhelm the structures that sustain 
liberal democracy, especially in its efforts to reconcile religious beliefs, which for some 
have not evolved with continuously “evolving conceptions of individual liberty, personal 
privacy, and human equality.”223  
 An alternative philosophical anthropology which can account for particularity and 
diversity without devolving into identity politics or populist anti-liberalism is needed in 
order to move beyond this impasse. We find the sources for this alternative in 
Rosenzweig’s reconception of reality itself as irreducibly diverse and particular, 
consisting in the relationships among Kant’s three nothings: God/theology/being, 
Man/psychology/self, and World/cosmology/meaning. The philosophical anthropology 
that flows from this reconception of reality highlights openness and relationality as the 
driving forces of individuality, rather than independence and autonomy. The open and 
relational individual is mutually constituted in and through relationships, not prior to 
relationship or civil society. The open and relational individual is also finite and 
imperfectible, and, through acknowledgment of this, capable of self-reflection, self-
correction, and compassion. This individual does not “enter” civil society, but is always 
part of its factuality. Individuals constitute civil society and are constituted by it, and thus 
the freedom most natural to civil society is the freedom to participate, freedom as 
humility, not autonomy or freedom from relationship with others. Individuals are not 
solely a collection of rights, and the redress of harm is not solely a matter of the 
resolution of inevitable rights competitions. Law from this perspective is a tool for 
 
223 Stone, Sex and the Constitution, Prologue, XXXII. 
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negotiating the inevitable conflicts that arise among diverse and particular individuals, 
preventing them from succumbing to the temptation to withdraw from relationship or to 
seek closure at the risk of their own and others’ flourishing. 
 The problems created in law because of its narrow Lockean philosophical 
anthropology are nowhere more evident than in the current impasse over identity, 
especially sexual identity, and religious liberty. For some, the U.S. has always 
represented an anomaly of modernity in its religious character. Nevertheless, the rise of 
evangelical Christian-inflected populism and anti-liberalism in the form of public 
opposition to the legal recognition of same-sex marriage seems to transgress even 
traditional boundaries. Asad argues that traditional critiques and discussions of the 
secularization thesis, whether from the side of religion or the secular, equally miss the 
point that the secular and the religious are not actually mutually exclusive opposites. 
Instead, because the religious creates and constitutes the secular, the secular is always 
already shot through with the religious, including its construction of power-as-exclusion. 
This extends in the U.S. to early Christian beliefs about “sex, sin, and shame.”224 Thus, 
the public square has always to some extent included and excluded what religion itself 
includes and excludes. As Sullivan notes, this structure is also paralleled in law, which 
although formally committed to the recognition and protection of religious freedom, 
recognizes as religion only that religion that has the same shape as law. While the claim 
that the U.S. is a Christian nation is not true in the sense its conservative proponents 
intend, the religion that law has historically recognized has tended to be much like 
 
224 Stone, Sex and the Constitution, Prologue, XXVII. 
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mainstream Protestant Christianity, including its anchoring in a specific reading of the 
Bible, the state’s concern for public morality, and a tendency to view the secular as not 
simply anti-religious, but anti-American. As traditional social bonds have weakened and 
the culture has become more truly diverse, including new kinds of people via 
immigration and “newly visible people” via social movements,225 the relationship 
between the secular and the religious has increasingly hardened into one of opposition 
between mutually exclusive sources of authority. This attitudinal reification of the binary 
has transformed the secular from the neutral (whose presumptions were always entirely 
consistent with Protestant Christianity in any case) into the counter-religious or even anti-
religious. Although protections for sexual minorities are increasingly stigmatized by 
religious and political conservatives as expressions of this counter-religious, these same 
religious and political conservatives do not advocate that such views are entitled to the 
protection of the First Amendment. Rather, they seek protection for their traditionalist 
prejudices, especially as these appear to be on the decline demographically and in terms 
of social influence. Their goals can be adequately summed up in the words of Justice 
Scalia in his dissent in Romer v. Evans, “to preserve traditional sexual mores against the 
efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the 
laws.”226 Freedom and equality for these religious and political conservatives are 
products of rights and of relationship oriented by rights. John Millbank sums up their 
 
225 Kenji Yoshimo, “The New Equal Protection,” 124 Harvard L. Rev. 747 (2011).  
 
226 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority in Romer struck 
down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution, Amendment 2, which prohibited the state or any 
subdivision of the state from adopting protections to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
“orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.” 
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position usefully when he argues that the “complimentarity” of the different sexes 
“automatically produces symbolic meaning, legal norms, political order, social peace, 
charitable but non-institutionalized care and economic subsistence and stability.” When 
he then warns that “modern sexism, systematic subordination and increasing 
endangerment of women . . . does not derive from the perpetuation of patriarchy . . . . 
Rather, it results from the abolition of gender difference,”227 he is describing this same 
organizing model of the gender binary as necessary to social order and a form of the 
common good. In contrast, this same group of religious and political conservatives often 
stigmatize the secular as positing a false equality that denies difference and encourages 
people to reject their proper role or place, especially in terms of gender determinism. 
Even though this religious model presents itself as communal, and even produces 
arguably communal forms, it’s driven by a model of individual salvation fully consistent 
with Locke’s abstract individual. This model of salvation tends toward obsessive focus 
on individual behavior and legalistic purity-contamination dichotomies. Much recent 
scholarship has identified an inherent racism in these strains of Christianity, but the 
gender binary is even more deeply grounded, located at the heart of reality as constructed 
from the abstract universal of this version of the Christian God who creates male and 
female, from the beginning. As early as 1985, then Cardinal Ratzinger, writing for the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith warned of the dangers feminist calls for 
gender equality posed to the theological anthropology of gender complementarity.228 The 
 
227 Millbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 271(second emphasis in original). 
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primary right advocated to combat this version of the secular, and its attack on the 
theology of gender complementarity, is the right of the individual to religious freedom in 
order to resist the “new orthodoxy;” hence the insistence on religious freedom as the right 
to reject relationship. Efforts to preserve this version of religious freedom, against non-
traditional identity and relationships in an increasingly diverse society, are likely to 
continue to produce social crisis and legal impasse, so long as the individual rights model 
of advocacy is the primary legal option. No amount of deference by moderate liberals is 
likely to assuage the fears or certainties motivating this group of traditionalist Christians 
and their growing alliance of religious practitioners who view the secular as a competing 
quasi-religious authority and who stridently link their right to maintain their traditionalist 
views of sexuality as religious exemptions from anti-discrimination legislation with 
nationalist identity and the binary opposition of the religious from the secular.  
 The alternative philosophical anthropology of openness and relationality broadens 
the legal and social meaning of individuality inherent in the social contract, which is too 
narrowly focused on independence and autonomy to ground a resolution of this impasse. 
Rosenzweig’s new thinking locates particularity and diversity within openness and 
relationality, thus providing a limit for the problematic tendencies of the Lockean 
individual’s abstraction and atomism, and potentially reducing our “pluralism anxiety.”229 
Law based on such and alternative philosophical anthropology is capable of conceiving 
of and resolving legal conflicts through means that do not rely exclusively on the 
individual rights advocacy model. This shift of focus also increases the capacity for law 
 
229 Kenji Yoshimo, “The New Equal Protection,” 747. 
 142 
to instantiate systemic rather than merely nominal equality, concerned with economic 
justice rather than with decency (sexuality). 
 Rosenzweig’s critique of philosophy identifies as problematic in philosophy many 
of the same aspects that are also problematic in law: presumptive universalism, the 
pointless point of view or view from nowhere, the conflation of diversity and particularity 
into abstractions, the conceit of timelessness. In addition, because Rosenzweig’s critique 
specifically rejects the Hegelian ontotheological schema on which much of the 
secularization thesis rests,230 dramatically new options become available for entering the 
debate about how to conceptualize and negotiate the relationship between religion and 
liberalism. Asad’s critique of the binary construction of religion and the secular already 
points us toward the possibility of responses that do not fit within either the sociopolitical 
philosophy of liberal secularism, which cannot account for passionate religious 
commitment to exclusion, or the revival of discourses of political theology, with their 
opposing extremes of illiberal religious philosophy and weariness of the 
Enlightenment.231 
 Even though Rosenzweig shares Hegel’s goal of constructing a system that 
determines all things through their position within a whole, he objects to Hegel's system's 
failure “to take into account the particularity of each being,” and the way it “divorces 
 
230 Mandair & Dressler, Secularization and Religion-Making, 10. Mandair and Dressler describe the 
ontotheological schema as flowing from Hegel’s rejection of the traditional Enlightenment model that 
posits a radical break between modernity and its religious past. The “ontotheological” is a combination of 
the “onto” of cosmological antiquity, the “theo” from the theological Middle Ages, and “logico” from 
anthropomorphic modernity. 
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knowledge from our human vocation.”232 Implicitly, he agrees with prior critiques that all 
holistic and monistic systems are necessarily nihilistic, and that Hegel’s system fails its 
own criteria for success. Through Hegel’s construction of what Rosenzweig calls “system 
as architecture,” in which each part has meaning only in relation to the whole, Hegel 
“reduces the diversity and multiplicity of all beings to one form, overlooking the 
uniqueness of each individual.”233 Where Hegel focuses solely on the transformation in 
the understanding of knowledge, Rosenzweig adds reciprocal relation.234 By grounding 
all of reality in relationality, as the source and nature of existence, Rosenzweig not only 
takes into account the particularity of beings, he also provides a foundation for 
particularity and diversity that avoids atomism and competition. His account of reality 
counters the universalism and abstraction inherent in the Hegelian system, and toward 
which rights tend, while also contextualizing diversity and particularity within 
relationality and openness. Where Hegel’s ontotheological schema maintained the 
continuity of philosophy and theology through the identification of reason with 
Christianity, allowing the particular to be elided, Rosenzweig’s “turn to the theological” 
as temporal grounds the individual’s openness as finitude and imperfectability, as well as 
a relationship of equality between the “new” philosophy and a “new” theology. This 
provides the capacity for self-reflection and self-critique, allowing for growth without 
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resort to the Hegelian dialectic or utopian notions of progress toward some ultimate 
perfection. Hope and humility sustain always-incomplete work to expand both liberty and 
equality. 
 Although Rosenzweig rejects Hegel’s schema of the continuity of philosophy and 
theology, he also does not subscribe to the dominant Enlightenment narrative of a radical 
break between the past as religious/traditional and the present as modern/humanistic. 
That he does not subscribe to the radical break is evident in both his description of the 
history of philosophy, from cosmological antiquity, through the theological Middle Ages, 
and into anthropomorphic modernity. Although he posits both a new theology and a new 
relationship between the new philosophy and the new theology, his system remains to 
some degree within the binary of secular-religious which Asad invites us to reject. 
Nevertheless, his system also rejects the identification of reason with Christianity, 
reconnects knowledge and human vocation, and illustrates the limits of logic in the 
systemic task of cognizing reality. Because of these differences, his work has the capacity 
to ground not only an alternative philosophical anthropology, but to dramatically alter our 
perception of the apparent binary. It might even be said of Rosenzweig that his system is 
a continuation of Hermann Cohen’s project of demonstrating that, contra Kant, Judaism 
is indeed a religion within the bounds of reason. Perhaps we can read The Star as closing 
the circular relationship between historical consciousness, the assumed secularity of 
critique, and Western civilizational identity through the identification of reason with 
Judaism, rather than with Christianity. From this perspective Judaism becomes the 
paradigmatic religion of reason, perhaps a religion of reason-plus, because it also 
understands the limits of reason and refuses to remain bound within those limits. Thus, 
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this new thinking does a better job of resolving the conflict between subjectivity and 
worldliness than Hegel’s use of Christianity for the same purpose. In resolving this 
tension through the alignment of Judaism with reason, whether Rosenzweig intends to or 
not, he also grounds a different kind of distinction between religion and the secular, if 
only because the religion he uses to generate the secular is different, especially in its 
knowledge of how to live authentically on the margin of, as well as within, the dominant 
culture. This will not ultimately resolve the tension between liberal pluralism and 
religious particularity, especially given the aporia Rosenzweig insists structures the 
relationship between Judaism and Christianity. Nevertheless, like Kant, we can at least 
avoid falling back into a one and universal despair, if we are committed to the continuing 
expansion of our perception of possibilities and the realization that ultimate resolution of 
the tension is neither possible nor beneficial for human flourishing.  
 We need not make this final leap to replace Hegel’s ontotheological schema with 
Rosenzweig’s new thinking in order to ground an alternative philosophical anthropology 
that expands the narrow rights focus of the Lockean individual while still operating 
within the parameters of liberal and democratic jurisprudence and acknowledging the 
“aporia at the heart of the ‘religio-secular paradigm.’”235 What we know is that the 
Hegelian frame for the secular liberal provides structures for organizing knowledge and 
experience that are not as useful as were thought initially, because they were not as 
neutral as initially believed. We can also draw from Rosenzweig the conclusion that there 
is no truly neutral, and the better path to common ground in developing structures for 
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organizing our knowledge and experience is actually through acknowledging difference 
as incommensurable.236     
 Justice as fairness is a phrase made prominent as the title of John Rawls classic 
work. While fairness is a benign idea, the basis of his theory is also the individual as 
imagined in the social contract theory. Because it is based on the same philosophical 
anthropology, it also leads to rights-based justice, and similarly assumes a community of 
homogenous individuals. Thus, in addition to other limits, it also fails to account for the 
effects of the presence of distinct ethnic or social groups within communities, which are 
in fact, rarely homogenous. Through its focus on individuals, it also “neglects the group 
and both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the 
practices are at issue.”237 Thus, it fails at precisely the juncture where law and religion 
intersect with changing sexual mores and growing awareness of sexual diversity. Rawls 
nuances the Aristotelian model of justice by theorizing natural limits to systemic 
injustice, based on individual self-interest. However, the Rawlsian model also permits 
those who are not similarly situated to be treated differently and envisions justice as 
encompassing an obligation that punishment be meted out to those who do bad things, 
consistent with the Aristotelian model of justice. Justice as fairness in its rights focus not 
only permits, but requires that those who are not equally situated be treated differently, 
because it is not fair that some who do bad things get away with it or that they not pay the 
 
236 Batnitzky argues against reading Rosenzweig as post-modern, but notes that his new thinking is 
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appropriate consequences for the harm they have done. Thus, justice “as fairness,” even 
on Rawls’ more nuanced model, requires equality and/or commensurability. In contrast, 
equity has a long history of filling the gaps in law, especially where equality and/or 
commensurability are lacking, or when the law seeks to regulate relationship, rather than 
property, business, or criminal behavior. Aristotle calls equity “justice that goes beyond 
the written law.”238 Justice as equity, thus, already draws on a recognition of the limits of 
justice as fairness, creating the conditions for an expanded philosophical anthropology of 
relationality and openness, and dispelling the mentality of scarcity, of a finite capacity for 
justice based on the resolution of competing rights claims. Equitable as a technical term 
in law is not the same as equal. For example, an equitable division of marital property is 
not necessarily an equal distribution. An equitable distribution takes into account factors 
such as a wife’s greater career sacrifice to raise marital children, and consequent loss of 
future earning capacity. The analysis involved in determining the equity in a situation 
necessarily requires consideration of the particular characteristics of the actual parties to a 
specific case, rather than of generic roles or rules. Equity as a system of courts separate 
from but parallel to law courts is long gone, but remains structurally embedded in family 
law. Equity informs the practice of resolving parenting disputes through determination of 
what is in the best interests of the children, rather than through competing parental rights; 
in standardized and detailed laws guiding the calculation of child support, it provides 
guidelines for departing from those detailed, standard rules; and when Native American 
children are removed from their parents, it centers the importance of cultural heritage in 
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guiding placement decisions. The alternative philosophical anthropology of openness and 
relationality expands options for applying equitable principles to traditional legal 
problems to generate new solutions.  
 Jack Phillips of Masterpiece Cakeshop continues to refuse to serve customers in 
violation of CADA. This continuing refusal may or may not result in an eventual return 
to the U.S. Supreme Court as “Masterpiece II.” However, a sufficient number of religious 
wedding vendors are also refusing to provide the same service to same-sex couples as 
they do to different-sex couples that it is only a matter of time before the Supreme Court 
is once again asked to rule definitively on the question of whether public 
accommodations law should exempt them from compliance. NeJaime and Siegel explain 
the decision in Masterpiece as outlining a program for rejecting religious freedom and 
free speech claims for exemption from public accommodations law consistent with the 
rejection of similar claims for racial discrimination in Piggie Park. This structure was 
indeed adopted whole-heartedly by the Arizona Court of Appeals in the case of Brush & 
Nib LLC v. City of Phoenix, a religious wedding invitation vendor who claimed the right 
to an exemption from the city’s public accommodations ordinance, which like CADA 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Christian owners of Brush 
& Nib LLC create custom-designed, hand-lettered wedding invitations with “celebratory 
messages” consistent with their belief that God approves of only different-sex marriages. 
They argued that application of the city’s ordinance to them would constitute “compelled 
speech” in violation of the First Amendment’s free speech provisions, as well as violate 
their religious convictions about the God-given nature of marriage as between one man 
and one woman. In its elegant opinion rejecting these claims, the Arizona Court of 
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Appeals quoted a portion of Justice Kagan’s opinion in Masterpiece for the proposition 
that 
a vendor cannot escape a public accommodations law because his religion 
disapproves selling a product to a group of customers, whether defined by sexual 
orientation, race, sex, or other protected trait. A vendor can choose the product he 
sells, but not the customers he serves—no matter the reason.”239  
 
Unfortunately, the Arizona Supreme Court did not read Masterpiece in the same way as 
NeJaime and Siegel. Instead they reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on 
exactly the legal grounds equal marriage advocates most fear, and which I have argued 
demonstrate the limits of the individual rights model of advocacy and the need to ground 
law in an expanded philosophical anthropology. Using precisely the analysis NeJaime 
and Siegel argued that Justice Kennedy ruled out, the Arizona Supreme Court found that 
Brush & Nib’s free speech and free exercise rights superseded the city’s interest in 
eradicating discrimination, or what they pejoratively described as “efforts to compel 
uniformity of beliefs and ideas” through the use of public accommodations laws.240 
Although the Arizona Supreme Court described its ruling as a narrow, applying only to 
the creation of custom wedding invitations with celebratory messages, the logic of the 
decision reflects both the siege mentality of the Obergefell dissenters and the way 
Laycock and Berg’s suggestion of permitting limited exemptions is likely to be used to 
deny equal marriage in practice. The Phoenix city ordinance permits businesses to post 
notice to customers about their service limitations, and the Arizona Supreme Court 
decision gave explicit permission for Brush & Nib to post a notice indicating that they do 
 
239 Brush & Nib LLC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426 (Ariz. Ct App. 2018), ¶27. 
 
240 Brush & Nib LLC v. City of Phoenix, CV-18-0176-PR (Ariz. Sept. 16, 2019), reversed in part and 
vacated in part. 
 150 
not create wedding invitations for same-sex couples. Thus, the case demonstrates how 
exemptions are unlikely to be narrowly tailored in practice, and, if granted, are likely to 
swallow the purpose of anti-discrimination laws, created the same different-but-equal 
regime the U.S. Supreme Court rejected for race. The Arizona Supreme Court based its 
expansive ruling in part on the claim that Masterpiece “clearly contemplated that some 
exemptions, if narrowly confined, were permissible.”241  
 Consistently with the tendency of the individual rights advocacy method, the 
Arizona Supreme Court shifted the focus of the case from an inquiry into discrimination 
in public accommodations laws to a question of how to protect religious freedom. 
“Although this case is about freedom of speech and religion, it suits the preferred analysis 
of our dissenting colleagues to reframe it as one involving discriminatory conduct based 
on a customer’s sexual orientation.”242 Having made this shift, the Court balanced the 
religious freedom of the vendor against the city’s interest in eradicating discrimination, 
entirely neglecting any consideration of the impact of discrimination on same-sex 
couples. Not surprisingly, they found that the combined free speech and religious 
freedom rights of the vendor outweighed the city’s interest in eradicating discrimination 
(contrary to the opposite opinion in Masterpiece, which the Court of Appeals opinion 
cited). Having narrowed their focus on religious freedom, the Court found that the public 
accommodations ordinance would create a broad harm to Brush & Nib’s proprietors, 
including a violation of their free speech rights as well as their religious freedom, if they 
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were compelled to produce custom wedding invitations “with celebratory messages” for 
same-sex couples.243 While rejecting the claim of a distinction between status and 
conduct, the Arizona Supreme Court nevertheless found that refusal to make wedding 
invitations for same-sex couples did not constitute discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation because they would not sell invitations with messages celebrating same-sex 
marriage to any customer. The normative religious prejudices protected by this ruling 
confirm Sullivan’s thesis about the kind of religion law recognizes as entitled to 
protection. These religious views about the nature of marriage turn out to be waning in 
influence, according to polling data showing increased acceptance of same-sex 
relationships even among Evangelical Christians. Those who continue to hold them find 
sympathy among traditionalists on the U.S. Supreme Court and elsewhere for their 
perception that the application of public accommodations laws to them represents 
“vilification” for their “unwilling[ness] to assent to the new orthodoxy [on marriage].”244 
Despite, or perhaps because sexual mores are changing, the attempt by those whose 
views are no longer dominant socially to retain the power to exclude also demonstrates 
the truth of Locke’s other insight which also shapes U.S. law: that religions become 
intolerant when they have the power of the government to back them.245 Because the law 
is not really secular, and the secular is not really religion-free or even religion-neutral, 
 
243 The conditional language here is occasioned by the specifics of this case. Brush & Nib were not 
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city from enforcing the ordinance against them. 
 
244 Obergefell, 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
 
245 John Locke, A Letter concerning Toleration and Other Writings, edited and with an Introduction by 
Mark Goldie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010). https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2375; accessed 9/6/2019. 
 152 
some religious rights will always win, despite shifting social attitudes, and some will 
always lose. The difference is the decree to which the religious right at issue reinforces 
existing power structures or reinforces them.   
 Other courts may rule differently than the Arizona Supreme Court;246 they may 
take the same tack as the Arizona Court of Appeals (and the three dissenting justices of 
the Arizona Supreme Court). However, there is every reason to believe that when a 
similar case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court again, they will not rule consistently with 
NeJaime and Seigel’s explanation of Kennedy’s decision in Masterpiece. Because 
Kavanaugh has replaced Kennedy, if the same logical rights-based arguments are made 
as were made in Masterpiece, the likely result will be more like the Arizona Supreme 
Court’s opinion than the Arizona Court of Appeals opinion. Thus, a different lens is 
needed if the right to civil same-sex marriage is not to be eroded in practice by ever-
expanding religious exemptions. 
 The open and relational legal subject is capable of navigating the legal terrain 
differently. Its embodied philosophical anthropology may better support a counter-
argument against the abstract argument that a religious vendor who refuses to provide 
wedding goods and services to same-sex couples that they would to a different-sex 
couple is not discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, even though this 
“primarily impact[s] same-sex couples.”247 In addition, when considering claims for 
 
246 And note that religious freedom rights under the Arizona Constitution are broader than the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (because federal rights set the “floor” while states can guarantee 
greater rights, but not less); in addition, the Phoenix public accommodation ordinance permits broader 
exemptions for religious entities than CADA does. The weight of both these factors to their decision is 
discussed by the Arizona Supreme Court in its opinion. 
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exemption through the lens of an open and relational legal subject, courts might expand 
their balancing tests to consider the relative harms to vendors, potential customers, and to 
the community itself. Rather than the sterile and abstract weighing of government interest 
against the always specific claims of religious vendors, and the rejection of an obligation 
to consider the impact of their decision on others, including those most directly harmed 
by exclusion, the balancing of relative harms fosters relationship. In addition, openness 
may operate as a compelling invitation for courts to adopt a higher standard for 
determining what kind of burden neutral laws such as the public accommodations laws 
actually place on religious vendor’s religious freedom, given that commerce is generally 
not the only or primary venue for religious persons to express their faith. In the beginning 
of its Brush & Nib opinion, the Arizona Supreme Court declaimed that the right to free 
exercise of religion includes, “the right to create and sell words, paintings, and art that 
express a person’s sincere religious beliefs.”248 This is both true and unrelated to the 
question of whether Brush & Nib should be exempt from application of Phoenix’s public 
accommodations ordinance or be permitted to post a notice of non-service for certain 
customers whose only common characteristics are the possession of a protected identity 
and the exercise of a fundamental right. Finally, through the lens of the open and 
relational legal subject, a court faced with a preemptive claim such as Brush & Nib’s 
might combine principles of restorative justice and equity to require the proprietors of 
Bruch & Nib to meet with same-sex married couples who share their Christian faith. Note 
that the goal in such a situation would not be primarily to change the vendor’s opinion 
 
248 Brush & Nib, ¶ 1. 
 154 
about whether God approves of same-sex marriage, but rather to impact their belief that if 
they provide wedding goods or services they are either endorsing a contrary religious 
value or complicit in conduct by others of which God does not approve. This goal is 
consistent with both Locke’s religious toleration views and the structure of the First 
Amendment’s guarantee or religious liberty consistent with equality and liberty for all.  
 These potential differences are important for future cases involving religious 
wedding vendors and service providers. They are also important in the context of the 
broad reevaluation of the place of religious freedom, identity, and what constitutes the 
common good. In addition to the religious wedding vendor cases already working their 
way through state and federal courts, the U.S. Supreme Court will be asked to determine 
this term whether federal employment protections against sex discrimination include 
protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Other contested 
aspects of sexuality and the particular character of the religious that shapes both law and 
the public square include the health care refusal laws described by NeJaime and Seigel 
(giving a variety of state officials various rights to refuse to provide otherwise available 
and/or prescribed medical care/prescription drugs to a customer on the basis of the 
provider’s religious beliefs); continuing efforts at the state and federal level to restrict 
access to (including by denying coverage for) reproductive healthcare generally, and birth 
control specifically; and finally, renewed efforts at the state level to severely restrict 
access to exercise the right to abortion or even to ban abortion outright. 
Conclusion 
Rosenzweig rejects Hegel’s solution to the problem of reconciling subjectivity and 
worldiness. In its place he constructs his own system that preserving or even 
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systematizing the aporia of subjectivity and worldliness, provides justification for 
diversity as inherent in the structure of reality, and proposes a new relationship of 
equality between a new philosophy and a new theology. Importantly for law in particular, 
Rosenzweig proposes an epistemological structure that demonstrates both the limits of 
logic and that experience is the condition for the possibility of logic. While this system 
does not explicitly reject the binary of religion versus the secular, it does offer a different 
way of engaging the interrelationship between the secular and the religious, taking 
Asad’s alternative genealogy of the secular seriously, and responding differently to 
attempts by passionate religious practitioners to reify the binary as forms of legal 
exclusion. It does so by proposing to draw the apparently irreconcilable opposites into 
generative relationship for the purposes of providing opportunities to engage reality 
directly. It thus also provides a means of taking seriously Sullivan’s critique of the limits 
of privileging religious liberty in order to secure religious liberty, while creating an 
alternative to her radical solution of doing away with that privilege. Even these small 
moves beyond the binary construction of religion and the secular potentially defuse anti-
liberal religious fundamentalisms, and may create space to forge alliances and recognize 
common values that promote the coordinated seeking of justice as equity, without 
sacrificing the particularity of identity that makes justice and equity meaningful in 
particular lives. The Arizona Supreme Court displayed no compassion for same-sex 
couples in its Brush & Nib decision; the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Colorado 
Human Rights Commission displayed no compassion for Jack Phillips’ religious 
convictions. The alternative philosophical anthropology of openness and relationality as 
grounded in Rosenzweig and applied to law provides space to develop much-needed 
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compassion. It does so without sacrificing commitment to equal liberty for each in their 
diversity and particularity. Acknowledgment of imperfectability generates compassion 
and grounds a human vocation for justice as acts of love toward neighbor. The proposal 
for this expansion of the default philosophical anthropology of law may seem radical, but 
is in many ways modest, as it remains within traditional structures of American liberal 
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, it could have a powerful impact in many areas. In particular, 
it invites further exploration of how to assure equal liberty for distinct social or ethnic 
groups as well as for diverse individuals; the question of how robust an account of human 
flourishing can be constructed without beginning to elide differences; and continuing 
exploration of relationships among economics, justice, and community. 
 In addition to other sources of imperfectability as an aspect of the open and 
relational individual, imperfectability is also a function of Rosenzweig’s notion of aporia. 
His concept of the systematic task of philosophy depends on a notion of aporia as 
existential for humans, as part of the human vocation for knowledge. His work suggests 
the political, social, and religious benefits of learning to live with unresolvable tensions. 
Scholars dispute whether Rosenzweig believed it was possible to fully grasp reality in 
“this” life, but he nevertheless bade his readers to return to life to fulfill their vocation. 
 
DO JUSTICE, LOVE MERCY & WALK HUMBLY249 
and 
DO JUSTICE AS ACTS OF LOVE TOWARD NEIGHBOR 
 
249 For Rosenzweig, freedom equals faithfulness and humility, in contrast to autonomy, because it is 
humility rather than autonomy that drives love of neighbor. Nisenbaum, “From the Revolution in Thinking 
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